TOP SECRET

THE CASE OF THE "ROTE KAPELLE"

PART I

17.10.49.

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PREFACE

The size and complexity of the organisations considered under the general heading of the "Rote Kapelle" are such that it is difficult to produce a simple and concise account of the whole system.

In this production, therefore, we present the following:-

Part I - an account of the system, group by group, embodying the essential details of the available information.

Part II - an account of the system, treated year by year and incorporating some speculative comment. This repeats the information in Part I, but arranges it differently.

Part III - Personalities Index. This gives personal details and brief histories of almost every individual who is believed to have been associated with the organisations. Those of lesser importance have not necessarily been mentioned in the narrative of Parts I and II.

It has been necessary to exclude much detail from this work since if no limitations were set it would extend to an enormous size. It is felt that an account of the "Rote Kapelle" should be completed and issued now, and that further study or investigation should be assessed in its proper light, that is, as relevant to counter-espionage against the Russians for present-day needs. There has been some danger of the idea growing up that investigation of the "Rote Kapelle" is an end in itself. The truth of the matter is that such investigation is useful because it deals with examples of Russian Intelligence activities, and should be co-related and merged with the general counter-intelligence effort against Soviet Russia.

In particular instances, information which we possess but which we have excluded from this production may become important; this will, of course, be made available to those requiring it as the occasion arises.

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PART I

An account of the networks

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THE CASE OF THE "ROTE KAPELLE"

Foreword

1. It will be seen that most of the Russian Intelligence networks described in this paper were in existence before the war, at which time they were employed against several Western European countries, including Germany. These groups were isolated from each other, were controlled by trained experienced Russian agents and were successful in maintaining a high degree of security. Although there is little direct evidence on the point, it must be assumed that they were also successful in obtaining at least some of the secret information which they were seeking.

2. With the onslaught of war, the main target became Germany and most, or all, of the resources available to the Russians were switched to operate against that country at the expense of their work against the others. As the difficulties of operation, administration and communication in war-time increased, the isolation of the networks from each other and many other security measures had, at least to some extent, to be sacrificed.

3. From the foregoing it may be inferred that the methods used by the Russian Intelligence Service to-day are more likely to be evolved from those in force before the war than from those employed during it. Thus, when investigating the present activities of the R.I.S. it is not always helpful to seek parallels in their war-time operations.

4. On the other hand, war-time experiences and the lessons learned from them have undoubtedly modified the behaviour of the R.I.S. and a knowledge of these is therefore of some value to those currently concerned with combatting Russian espionage.

5. Possibly the most valuable product of the study leading up to this paper has been the collection of information about those individuals who previously worked for the R.I.S. and who survived to work to-day (or who associated with those who work for the Russians to-day). Our experience suggests that the professional Russian spy, who is qualified for, and experienced in working abroad may continue to operate in spite of having been detected or even imprisoned in the past. Some of the personal details, therefore, which have been amassed in the preparation of this work may be of practical use in future investigations and will, no doubt, be incorporated in the records of the Counter-Intelligence Services of some of the Western powers.

6. "Rote Kapelle" was the cover-name for a secret operation started by Ast. Belgien (Abwehr III.F) in August 1941 and conducted against a station of the Russian Intelligence Service which had been detected in Brussels by the "Funkabwehr". Subsequently the operation extended into France, Holland, Germany and Switzerland, where at least seven major Russian networks were penetrated. "Kapelle" was an accepted Abwehr term for Counter-Espionage undertakings against secret wireless transmitters, and in the case of the Brussels station, "Rote" was used to differentiate it from other enterprises conducted by Ast. Belgien.

7. In July 1942, the case of the "Rote Kapelle" was taken over from Ast. Belgien by section IV. A.2. of the Sicherheitsdienst. After the arrest of two leading Russian agents, Leopold TREPPER and Victor SUKOLOV, a small independent Gestapo unit, Sonderkommando "Rote Kapelle" was formed in Paris in November 1942. At a later date the unit was

/commanded

Foreword (continued).

commanded by Kriminalrat Pannwitz by whose name it was generally known thereafter. It was especially entrusted with the task of following up the leads resulting from the arrests which had taken place in Brussels, Paris and Marseilles.

8. At least seven important Russian networks - some directed by the Red Army Intelligence Service and others believed to be directed by the M.G.B. were discovered and either eliminated or brought under control. It is clear that by the end of the war the German Intelligence Service had penetrated the main Russian Organisation in Western Europe, or at least were dealing with one of its principal branches. It appears that in spite of the success of the German operations, however, the Russian organisation was not entirely eliminated.

9. The present work has its origin in our discovery of the German counter intelligence effort against the R.I.S. during the war and to this it owes its name. Its scope, however, is wider than its title may suggest for it is in reality a review of our information on a large range of Russian intelligence activities in Western Europe between 1936 and 1945.

TREPPER's Group.

Chapter I. Introduction.

1. Leopold TREPPER was an extremely resourceful and capable man, who eventually became a director of the Red Army Intelligence in Western Europe, and responsible for several espionage groups. The particular network described here is named after him since he founded it early in his career and it was composed of people immediately connected with him. TREPPER's Group operated, under the control of the 4th Department of the General Staff of the Red Army, in Belgium, and later in France, from 1936 to 1942. It owed its success very largely to TREPPER's dynamic personality.

2. It is believed that TREPPER first made contact with Soviet espionage agents in Paris in 1932. Thereafter he was sent to Moscow to be trained for three years. He returned to Western Europe in about 1936 and began recruiting a network of agents. Little is known about the activity of his group between 1936 and 1940, apart from what TREPPER chose to reveal to the Germans after his arrest in 1942. It is thought that it concentrated mainly on France and the United Kingdom, and that it was only turned against Germany at a later date. These enterprises appear to have been successful.

3. TREPPER operated his group under the cover of various firms. At first it was centered on Brussels, but shortly after the German invasion of the Low Countries, TREPPER moved his headquarters to Paris and left Victor SUKOLOV behind in charge of the remaining network. The Germans made several arrests in Brussels towards the end of 1941 which eventually led to the capture of TREPPER in 1942. TREPPER offered his services to the Germans and revealed the names of most of his group, besides the identities of certain other persons with whom he was in contact. It is believed that he did so only because he knew that their capture was inevitable. The Germans appear to have been taken in by his apparent good faith and TREPPER was able to carry out a successful triple-cross. He managed to escape after about nine months.

4. It is highly probable that TREPPER did not disclose the whole of his network. Some of his agents may still be active, while others, including TREPPER himself, are believed to be still alive and may re-appear.

5. We have little evidence by which to assess the value of TREPPER's group to the Russians. However, consideration of the movements and general activities of those concerned, and of the lines of communication known to have existed, suggest that the network did obtain intelligence of considerable value.

Chapter II. Pre-war Activities (1936 - 1939).

1. In December 1936, having completed his training in Moscow, Leopold TREPPER was despatched on a mission to France. He was instructed to report on the general situation and draw up plans for the establishment of an espionage network which it is believed was to be directed mainly against the United Kingdom. He returned to Moscow to report in 1937 and 1938 using on each occasion false papers in a different name. In 1937 he travelled to Brussels and met Leon GROSSVOGEL, a Communist whom it is believed he had previously known in Palestine. Leon GROSSVOGEL had been

/General

Chapter II (continued).

General Manager to the "Excellent Raincoat Company" since 1935, and was transferred to the post of travelling inspector at about the time of TREPPER's first visit to Brussels in 1937.

2. Towards the end of 1938 TREPPER again visited Brussels from Moscow, probably using the cover of a business man. It is believed that he financed GROSSVOGEL to the extent of 8,000 dollars in the formation of a small export company known as the "Foreign Excellent Raincoat Company", which was created in December 1938 as a subsidiary of the "Excellent Raincoat Company". GROSSVOGEL became manager of the new concern which was designed to deal in the export of raincoats to Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. It is not known whether GROSSVOGEL realised at the time that TREPPER was acting as a Russian agent and that he intended to use the firm as a cover for espionage.

3. In March 1939, TREPPER established himself in Brussels, posing as Adam MIKLER, a wealthy Canadian business man. At about the same time GROSSVOGEL made a tour of the Scandinavian countries with the object of establishing branch offices of the "Foreign Excellent Raincoat Company". His tour was not a success since though business prospects seemed good, local regulations made it difficult to create the type of branch office required. Only one office was in fact established in Stockholm and this was put in the charge of a Belgian named BOELLENS, who was recommended by the Belgian Embassy. By this time GROSSVOGEL had been fully drawn into the scheme and had been formally recruited by Moscow as an agent.

4. In April 1939 TREPPER was joined by Michel MAKAROV who arrived from Moscow via Paris with a Uruguayan passport in the name of Carlos ALAMO. MAKAROV was sent to Ostend by TREPPER as manager of a branch of the "Foreign Excellent Raincoat Company". He was a wireless operator who had also been trained in the art of producing forged papers. Shortly after MAKAROV's arrival TREPPER was introduced by GROSSVOGEL to Abraham RAJCHMANN, whom he was able to recruit as a forger thereby releasing MAKAROV for general duties.

5. In July 1939 Victor SUKOLOV arrived in Brussels with a Uruguayan passport in the name of Vincente SIERRA. He was on his way to Copenhagen where it was intended that he should organise a subsidiary network of his own. He was not strictly under TREPPER's orders, but was to acquire some experience, especially in commercial matters before taking up his own duties.

6. The imminence of war caused these plans to be considerably revised. It became necessary to close down the Stockholm branch of the "Foreign Excellent Raincoat Company" and the creation of any further branches became impossible. SUKOLOV's transfer to Copenhagen was cancelled and on Moscow's instructions he was attached to the Belgian network. Up till that time communication had been maintained through the Soviet Trade Delegation in Brussels, but now the need for an independent wireless link with Russia became acute.

Chapter III. Wartime activity (1940 - 1942).

1. In May 1940 the German invasion of the Low Countries created fresh problems. MAKAROV was bombed out of Ostend and was transferred to Brussels, where he was given the task of organising a W/T link with Moscow. TREPPER's position became insecure as he was still living in Brussels as a Canadian business man. He arranged through the Russian

/Embassy

Chapter III (continued).

Embassy for his family to be evacuated to Moscow and withdrew himself to unoccupied France in July 1940. He was accompanied by GROSSVOGEL (a Jew) who was obliged to leave as he had no means of support, the Germans having expropriated the "Excellent Raincoat Company". TREPPER and GROSSVOGEL were later joined by Frau GROSSVOGEL, JASPAR, a late manager of the "Foreign Excellent Raincoat Company", and his wife, and another business acquaintance of GROSSVOGEL's named Nazarin DRAILLY. At this stage neither JASPAR nor DRAILLY were aware of TREPPER's real identity or activities.

2. In TREPPER's absence, SUKOLOV took over the leadership of the Belgian network with MAKAROV, now established in Brussels, as his W/T operator, and a woman named Rita BLOCH employed as a courier. In addition, there were several sub-agents who included Hermann ISBUTSKI, Josefa POTSNENSKA, and Isidor SPRINGER, a courier between SUKOLOV and TREPPER.

3. In France TREPPER renewed his direct contact with Moscow by getting in touch with General SUSLOPAROFF, the Russian Military Attache in Vichy, and set about the creation of a new organisation. He assumed a new identity as a Frenchman under the name of Jean GILBERT. The next step was to provide the Belgian organisation with a new commercial cover. For this purpose GROSSVOGEL was instructed to recruit Nazarin DRAILLY who was sent back to Belgium to consult with SUKOLOV about the formation of a new company. At the same time GROSSVOGEL organised another concern in Paris under the name of SIMEX which was to be linked with the Belgian Company.

4. On 19th March 1941, the Belgian Company was created under the name of SIMEXCO, with SUKOLOV as managing director and Nazarin DRAILLY as the second largest shareholder. The remainder of the board was made up of Belgian business men who were unaware of the firm's connexion with espionage. SUKOLOV's wireless link with Moscow was in operation and liaison was maintained by courier and personal visits with the group in France. In the late Autumn 1941, SUKOLOV made a journey to Germany on Moscow's instructions, travelling presumably under the alias of Vincente SIERRA. During this visit, he made contact with SCHULZE-BOYSEN (see Chapters XIII - XIV) who was in charge of an important group in Berlin, and attempted to restore that group's W/T communication with Moscow. The SCHULZE-BOYSEN W/T set never functioned satisfactorily and the group was obliged to send its traffic to Brussels for transmission to Moscow over SUKOLOV's link.

5. TREPPER's communications with Moscow were also carried at this time over SUKOLOV's transmitter in Brussels. As this was an inconvenient and dangerous arrangement TREPPER endeavoured to organise his own W/T link in France. For this purpose he recruited Herz and Miriam SOKOL, who were, however, not ready to operate until April 1942. In September 1941, TREPPER was brought into touch for the first time with Henri ROBINSON (see Chapters X - XII) who controlled a large group of agents in France. The introduction was arranged through General SUSLAPAROFF shortly before the Russian Mission withdrew from Vichy in July. It was contrary to the normal practice that ROBINSON and TREPPER, should be in touch with each other. It is said that an exception was made in this case because it was thought that ROBINSON's particularly extensive contacts in France would be of great assistance to TREPPER in building up his new network.

6. In the Summer 1941, MAKAROV, SUKOLOV's W/T operator was given as assistant Anton DANILOV, who came from France where he had been working in the Soviet Embassy at Vichy. On 12th December 1941, DANILOV was arrested by the Germans while he was actually transmitting from a safe-house which was being run by Rita BLOCH and Josefa POTSNENSKA in Brussels, and the

/latter

Chapter III (continued).

latter were arrested at the same time. DANILOV's W/T set was located with the assistance of a mobile D/F unit of the "Funkabwehr". MAKAROV was arrested when he visited the house on the following morning. TREPPER himself was taken into custody for a short while when he called at the house a few hours after DANILOV's arrest. However, his acting was so good that he was able to secure his release and warn SUKOLOV before any further damage was done. SUKOLOV withdrew from SIMEXCO and escaped to France with his mistress Marguerite BARCZA and Isidor SPRINGER. After a short period with TREPPER in Paris, SUKOLOV proceeded to Marseilles, accompanied by Marguerite BARCZA. Isidor SPRINGER went into hiding at Lyons where he organised his own group. The connection between SIMEX and SIMEXCO was not fully discovered until the Autumn of 1942. Thus the German penetration of the Low Countries network was partly sealed off.

7. After these arrests, the Germans succeeded in decyphering MAKAROV's W/T traffic at least as far back as October 1941, and perhaps even farther. Meanwhile they attempted to penetrate the organisation by the use of agents. By this means RAJCHMANN was identified and it was discovered that he had in his keeping a spare transmitter given him by Leon GROSSVOGEL. RAJCHMANN was not arrested until July 1942, but by this time observation had led to the arrest of several members of the organisation.

8. Meanwhile, TREPPER in France, with the assistance of Henri ROBINSON, was put into touch with a transmitter operated in Paris by the Communist Party. Communication with Moscow was re-established through this link by February 1942, and TREPPER was able to make a full report on the situation. Moscow instructed him to make contact with Konstantin JEFFREMOV (see Chapters VI - IX) who had been sent to Belgium in September 1939, without TREPPER's knowledge to establish an independent network. A meeting was arranged between the two at the SCHNEIDER's house, in Brussels, and JEFFREMOV was instructed to take over the remainder of SUKOLOV's network. W/T communications were to be assured through JEFFREMOV's transmitter in Brussels which was operated by Johann WENZEL with whom ROBINSON was already in touch. It was also agreed that WENZEL should train ISBUTSKI as a W/T operator so that TREPPER's group in Belgium should be able to develop its own communications. Liaison between TREPPER and the Belgian group was arranged through GROSSVOGEL and Germaine SCHNEIDER. The former was introduced to JEFFREMOV and the latter was already in touch with ROBINSON and WENZEL. It is believed, however, that TREPPER did not use WENZEL's W/T link before June, 1942.

9. In April 1942, the SOKOLs' W/T station in Paris was put into operation and communication was established with Moscow. This station did not have long to run as Herz and Mirian SOKOL were arrested in June the same year. This arrest does not appear to have seriously affected TREPPER's own position.

10. On 30th June, WENZEL was arrested and a few weeks later JEFFREMOV was also apprehended. In July, Germaine SCHNEIDER escaped from Brussels, and warned TREPPER of their arrests. She was sent to join Isidor SPRINGER's group in Lyons. TREPPER switched his communications back to the French Communist Party and sent his traffic over their transmitter. It is clear that TREPPER was fully informed of the situation in Belgium and he must have known that it was only a question of months before he himself and his organisations in France were traced through the trade connections between SIMEX and SIMEXCO. Meanwhile SUKOLOV, in Marseilles had organised a new group which worked under cover of a branch of SIMEX. This branch was managed by Alfred CORBIN, a director of SIMEX, Paris, who became a courier between SUKOLOV and TREPPER. SUKOLOV was arrested on 12th November 1942, in Marseilles, probably on account of his former connections in the Low Countries. His evidence was required later by the Germans in connection with the arrests of the SCHULZE-BOYSEN group in Germany. It seems that meanwhile he was slow to talk as he was not used as a W/T play-back until March 1943.

/Chapter IV.

Chapter IV. The arrest and captivity of TREPPER (1942 - 1943).

1. The Germans soon gained a considerable amount of information from the interrogation of captured agents and decyphered W/T traffic in Belgium, and it did not take long before they discovered the connection between SIMEXCO and SIMEX. In the Autumn of 1942, they arrested the whole staff of SIMEX in Paris, and after lengthy interrogations learned enough to be able to capture TREPPER on 5th December 1942. After his arrest TREPPER talked freely, offering to collaborate with the Germans and act as a double-agent. The Germans at the time believed him to have given his whole-hearted collaboration, but some doubt is thrown on this by his subsequent actions. It seems that in fact he confined his statements to those matters which he believed the Germans were bound to discover for themselves. TREPPER was thus immediately responsible for the arrest of Hillel KATZ, his right hand man in Paris, Henri ROBINSON his partner, and members of the SPRINGER group in Lyons besides an impressive collection of other agents.

2. The Germans promptly started a series of W/T play-backs. They had four in the Low Countries, WENZEL in Brussels, WINTERINK in Amsterdam, both of which belonged to JEFFREMOV's group, JEFFREMOV himself in October 1943, and ISBUTSKI who refused to co-operate and was operated by a substitute. On 25th December 1942, they began a play-back for TREPPER himself from a W/T station which he was supposed to have set up in Paris. These play-backs were not a success as Moscow was probably aware of the deception from the start. TREPPER most likely had time to warn Moscow about the four in the Low Countries, and he was probably able to tell Moscow about the one he was supposed to operate as it is now known that he succeeded in sending a report to Moscow two or three weeks after his arrest. In any case the Germans were clumsy over the play-backs and even if the Russians had not received warning of the deception, they must have been suspicious of the sudden ease with which communications were established after the difficulties which had been encountered in the past by both groups.

3. In March 1943, the S.D. achieved what appeared at first sight to be a success from the play back with SUKOLOV. A message was received from Moscow instructing SUKOLOV to get into touch with Waldemar OZOLS who was said to be in charge of a network, but had been out of contact for a long time. In July, SUKOLOV made contact with OZOLS and developed what seemed to the Germans a promising new line of deception. When OZOLS was recruited by SUKOLOV, he was unable to produce the network which Moscow had credited him with. The only contacts he admitted were in the French Resistance. The Germans followed these leads with enthusiasm and made use of him to penetrate several resistance organisations. They learnt little or nothing about any Russian network.

4. It is extremely likely that TREPPER intended from the moment he was captured to practise a triple-cross. An instance of this kind of activity was when he succeeded in obtaining from the German Intelligence in 1943 an up-to-date statement of their knowledge of British resources in the Mediterranean, which he sent to Moscow ostensibly to create confidence. In fact the information was needed by the Russians in their concern for a second front. It is also almost certain that he had outside lines of communication with the Russian Intelligence Service during his period of captivity.

Chapter V. TREPPER's escape (1943 - 1945).

1. On 16th September, 1943, TREPPER, who had been living in comparative liberty in Paris as an "honour-prisoner", escaped from his German captors. At first he went for help to his mistress Georgina de

/WINTER

Chapter V (continued).

WINTER, and then to Claude SPAAK with whom he had already been indirectly in contact. He entrusted SPAAK with a message which was to be sent to the Soviet Military Attache in London, through the French Communist Party but it is not known whether it ever arrived. The Germans posted TREPPER as a wanted man in October 1943, advertising that he would probably try to escape to Switzerland or Spain. In fact we do not know what became of him after his escape, but it is thought that he remained in hiding in France.

2. At the beginning of 1944 an important development took place in the SUKOLOV-OZOLS deception plan. OZOLS put SUKOLOV in touch with Paul Victor LEGENDRE, who was the leader of a large network in the French Resistance. The LEGENDRE organisation was persuaded to work for the "Russian Intelligence" in addition to its normal activities. It seems that SUKOLOV worked wholly in Russian Intelligence interests and obtained the confidence of the Germans by revealing the names of numerous members of the Resistance. There can be little doubt that SUKOLOV was also operating a triple-cross plan which on the whole appears to have been a success. In August 1944, SUKOLOV was evacuated with the Sonderkommando Rote Kapelle from Paris to Germany.

3. In January 1945, TREPPER left Paris for Moscow by air under the alias of Vladislav Ivanovitch IVANOWSKI. During the journey he gave Alexander FOOTE (see Chapters XIX - XX) the impression that he had spent most of the war in hiding in France.

4. In February 1945, SUKOLOV was transferred with the Sonderkommando to the Black Forest. He was last seen in Berlin in March of the same year.

JEFFREMOV's Group.

Chapter VI. Introduction.

1. This group operated under JEFFREMOV's leadership in the Low Countries from 1939 until 1942. Some of its members were active before this date but it is not clear whether they were working for the G.U.G.B. or the 4th Department. After the arrival of JEFFREMOV in 1939, the control appears to have been taken over by the 4th Department. The network was closely connected with Henri ROBINSON's group (see Chapters X - XII) and may have been under his orders in the early stages. Both groups have a common characteristic, a close association with the secret apparatus of the local Communist Party from which most of their members were recruited.

2. Little is known about the early activities of Konstantin JEFFREMOV, except that he was a Soviet Army Captain and an expert in chemical warfare. He arrived in Brussels from Zurich in March 1939, under the name of Erland JERNSTROEM, with a Finnish passport, ostensibly to study chemistry at a local Polytechnic School. He ran his organisation successfully from 1939 until 1942 when he was arrested and turned by the Germans. The W/T play-backs of this group were not a success. JEFFREMOV proved unsatisfactory and was eventually put in solitary confinement.

Chapter VII. Early activities.

1. In January 1936, Johann WENZEL arrived in Belgium from Germany. He had previously been working for a secret section of the German Communist Party, and he was now taken over by a Soviet Intelligence Service. WENZEL was an expert W/T technician. At about the same time Franz and Germaine SCHNEIDER are believed to have been recruited by Henri ROBINSON. They had a previous record of secret Communist work, particularly as managers of a "safe house" in Brussels.

2. In 1936, Daniel GOUWLOOZE, a former member of the intelligence organisation of the Dutch Communist Party, was also taken on by the Soviet Intelligence Service. It is not known whether this was the G.U.G.B. or the 4th Department, Red Army. During 1937 and 1938, WENZEL is known to have been in contact with GOUWLOOZE. From 1937 to 1939 the SCHNEIDERs were used as couriers by ROBINSON for his agents in the United Kingdom.

3. At the beginning of 1939, WENZEL went to Amsterdam and recruited Anton WINTERINK, a member of the Dutch Communist Party, who was introduced to him by GOUWLOOZE. WINTERINK returned to Brussels with WENZEL where he was trained as a W/T operator. In June 1939, WENZEL received another recruit from GOUWLOOZE. This was Adam NAGEL, also a Dutch Communist, a photographer, who was sent to join him in Belgium.

Chapter VIII. JEFFREMOV takes control.

1. In September 1939, Konstantin JEFFREMOV arrived in Brussels from Zurich with a Finnish passport under the name of Erland JERNSTROEM as a student of chemistry. He was instructed by the 4th Department, Red Army to build up a network of agents. For this purpose he made contact with WENZEL and the SCHNEIDERs. It is not known whether his group was

/intended

Chapter VIII (continued).

intended to undertake immediate operations or whether it was to be held in reserve. At about this time GOUWLOOZE was in touch with the secret organisation of the Dutch Communist Party, and was able to use its W/T communications with Moscow. He arranged for traffic to be passed over this link, which originated from a Russian Intelligence agent in the Low Countries who was known to him as "Clement". It is thought that "Clement" may have been either JEFFREMOV or SUKOLOV (see Chapters I - V).

2. JEFFREMOV's group appears to have maintained its independence though its activity during 1940 and 1941 is not clear. It is believed that WENZEL and WINTERINK established W/T communication with Moscow by the Autumn of 1941, and possibly earlier.

3. In January 1942, JEFFREMOV was introduced to Leopold TREPPER in the SCHNEIDERs' house at Brussels as a result of instructions which TREPPER had received from Moscow (see Chapters I - V). It appears that TREPPER did not know of JEFFREMOV before this date. TREPPER handed over to JEFFREMOV the remnants of SUKOLOV's group which had been disrupted by the arrest of certain of its members. It is believed that he was instructed to continue the transmission of SCHULZE-BOYSEN's material which was being received by courier from Germany (see Chapters XIII - XIV). Germaine SCHNEIDER became a courier between JEFFREMOV's group in Belgium and TREPPER in Paris.

Chapter IX. The arrests.

1. On 30th June 1942, WENZEL was arrested in Brussels while in the act of transmitting. Germaine SCHNEIDER was also arrested but she managed to pretend that she was WENZEL's mistress and was released as of no interest. In July, JEFFREMOV was caught by the Germans, and a little later both he and WENZEL appear to have been broken under severe interrogation. JEFFREMOV's evidence led to the arrest of WINTERINK in Holland.

2. Around August 1942, the Germans began a series of W/T play-backs. WENZEL was made to operate his transmitter and a substitute was found for WINTERINK who refused to co-operate. A little later another transmitter was operated by JEFFREMOV himself. None of these play-backs are thought to have been successful as Germaine SCHNEIDER was able to warn TREPPER of the arrests, and he in turn passed the information on to Moscow. The Germans were quick to round up what was left of the network, and through their knowledge they discovered the existence of SIMEXCO, which eventually led to the arrest of TREPPER in December 1942. WENZEL escaped from captivity on 17th November 1942, and has not been heard of since.

3. Meanwhile GOUWLOOZE continued to be active in Holland where he was in touch with the Dutch Communist Party which had a W/T connection with Moscow. At the beginning of 1942, Alfred KNOCHEL, a member of this group, was sent into Germany with instructions from Moscow to make contact with the German Communist Party. KNOCHEL began by sending his reports back by courier to GOUWLOOZE but later he reported the preparation of a W/T transmitter. In November 1942, Van PROOSDY was sent by GOUWLOOZE to join KNOCHEL who was in Berlin and act as a W/T operator. It seems that KNOCHEL and his contacts were arrested shortly after SCHULZE-BOYSEN and it is believed that they were turned by the beginning of 1943 and possibly earlier. In June, 1942, two Russian agents were parachuted into the Low Countries and instructed to get in touch with GOUWLOOZE They were, KRUYT, father and son. KRUYT father was arrested by the

/Germans

Chapter IX (continued).

Germans shortly after he landed. Jan KRUYT, his son, was dropped in Holland with a W/T transmitter. Later GOUWLOOZE sent him a certain De LAAR as a W/T operator. In November another agent named Peter KOUSNETZOV alias CUHN was parachuted into Holland, but did not make contact with GOUWLOOZE until March 1943. He was sent by GOUWLOOZE to Jan KRUYT as a substitute for De LAAR. KOUSNETZOV and KRUYT were arrested in July 1943. KRUYT was subsequently released and it is believed that he was turned. In November 1943, GOUWLOOZE himself was arrested.

4. The various play-backs appear to have been closed down between February and July 1944, with the exception of JEFFREMOV's which was transferred to France and later to Berlin.

ROBINSON's Group.

Chapter X. Introduction.

1. Henri ROBINSON had a network of agents which operated in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, the Low Countries and Switzerland. His group, which was directed from Paris, was active from about 1930 until 1942 when he was arrested by the Germans. Certain of his agents carried on after he was captured and may still be engaged in espionage. ROBINSON's first targets appear to have been Italy and France. Later he became responsible for a network of agents in the United Kingdom, and was only relieved from this commitment after the German invasion of France. He then turned against Germany and continued to work in this direction until his arrest.

2. ROBINSON had a long experience as a Communist. During his early youth he adopted Communism when he was studying law at Zurich University. In 1924 he was said to be Technical Head of the under-cover organisation of the Comintern for Central and Western Europe, and believed to be stationed in Berlin. Around 1930 he appears to have moved to Paris, which he used as a base after that date. At about this time it is believed that ROBINSON first engaged in espionage, recruiting his agents from among his former Communist Party acquaintances. By 1936, he is reported to be active for the 4th Department and in touch with the Soviet Military Attache in Paris. ROBINSON also appears to have been connected with the G.U.G.B., presumably on account of his previous work for the Comintern. During the whole of the time that he was active, ROBINSON kept in close contact with the Communist Party and was thus able to make good use of Party facilities during the German occupation of France.

3. ROBINSON, who was extremely clever and versatile, revealed very little to his German interrogators after his arrest in 1942. He succeeded in saving a good number of his agents. He was so successful in this that many of them remain unidentified to this day. ROBINSON was betrayed by TREPPER (see Chapters I - V) and was captured shortly after him. He is believed to have been the senior Russian agent in France, and must have been of great assistance to TREPPER during the time when the two collaborated. Most of his agents were well placed. He is known to have had contacts in the French 2ieme Bureau, official Vichy and secret Gaulist circles, and even among the German occupation authorities. His final fate is unknown.

Chapter XI. Pre-war activities, 1936 - 1939.

1. In 1936 ROBINSON was living in Paris, where he was in touch with the Soviet Military Attache. At that time he is believed to have collaborated with Maria POLIAKOVA in Switzerland and to have been working against France and Italy. He is also known to have associated with Rachel DUEBENDORFER and Anna MUELLER. His mistress, Klara SCHABBEL, and his illegitimate son, Victor SCHABBEL, were living in Berlin. Victor is known to have stayed with his father in Paris during this period. (Both appear to have been involved in the German groups in 1942). During this period an unidentified Soviet agent known as HARRY II, was based on Paris from where he was working against the United Kingdom. HARRY II was responsible for an agent in England called Ernest WEISS who had been recruited by the Russians in Paris in 1932. In May 1936 he

/introduced

Chapter XI (continued).

introduced WEISS to MEREDITH and VERNON who were to be developed as sources of information in the Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough, where they were both employed. During the same year WEISS was introduced to Germaine SCHNEIDER of Brussels who acted as a courier for HARRY II.

2. In 1937, HARRY II handed over his commitments in the United Kingdom to ROBINSON. WEISS received instructions to meet ROBINSON in Jersey. ROBINSON is believed to have had other contacts in the British Isles which were unknown to WEISS as he visited this country on various occasions without getting in touch with the latter. In the same year compromising documents were stolen from VERNON's flat, which made it advisable for him to cease his activities for a while. ROBINSON continued to visit the United Kingdom during 1938, but he appears to have obtained little that was of intelligence value from WEISS, MEREDITH and VERNON. He is thought to have had some other more valuable sources in the U.K. ROBINSON is also known to have made frequent trips to Belgium and Switzerland during this period. In Belgium he was in contact with Franz and Germaine SCHNEIDER whom he employed as couriers to England, Switzerland and France.

3. In 1939 ROBINSON is known to have been in touch with an unidentified agent, JEAN, who was active in the United Kingdom. JEAN, who appears to be an agent of some standing, collected intelligence from a number of sources of whom the most important were PROFESSOR and his wife SHEILLA, BOB and ELLEN. ROBINSON communicated with JEAN by post and by courier. A code book was used for the most secret parts of their correspondence. WEISS, who does not appear to have been very active in 1939, saw ROBINSON for the last time in Paris in July and claims that he left the service shortly afterwards. WEISS has no knowledge of JEAN or his agents.

Chapter XII. War-time activities.

1. ROBINSON's communications were disrupted by the German invasion of France in June 1940. He was completely out of touch with his agents in the United Kingdom and could see no possibility of re-establishing contact. On instructions from Moscow he turned his activities against Germany and German enterprises in France. ROBINSON proceeded to build up a new network in France and recruited agents among French workers who were being sent to Germany. He recommended that Moscow should make its own arrangements for establishing contact with JEAN and his sources. In January 1941 ROBINSON was informed by Moscow that his former connections in the United Kingdom had been taken over and that he was discharged of all responsibility in that quarter. In France ROBINSON is known to have employed Louis MOURIER, Medardo GRIOTTO and Maurice AENIS-HAENSLIN as agents. GRIOTTO was a talented engraver who was able to produce forged documents of all kinds. ROBINSON used his secretary, Marcelle CAPRE as a cut-out and a talent-spotter. ROBINSON lost contact with DUEBENDORFER and it was not until the beginning of 1941 that he succeeded in sending a courier to her in Switzerland. It is believed that the courier was AENIS-HAENSLIN. At that time DUEBENDORFER appeared to be completely without instructions or funds, and ROBINSON was obliged to send her $2,000. During the same period he was also out of touch with an unidentified agent, JENNY, who eventually got to Switzerland where she communicated with DUEBENDORFER. In May 1941, DUEBENDORFER linked up with RADO (see Chapters XIX - XX) and discontinued sending her reports by courier to ROBINSON.

2. By this time ROBINSON's new service in Germany and France was well developed. He managed to acquire valuable sources among French officials collaborating with the Germans, and within the German occupying authority.

/Up

Chapter XII (continued)

Up to June 1941 it is believed that he handed his reports to an intermediary known as LUX who passed them to the Soviet Embassy in Vichy for transmission to Moscow. ROBINSON also chose a safe-house for a W/T set which he had been sent by Moscow and recruited Renee PETITPAS as caretaker. He selected a technician capable of being trained as a W/T operator from among his former Communist Party acquaintances. For some unknown reason, ROBINSON failed to establish satisfactory W/T communications with Moscow, and was later obliged to resort to a W/T station which was being operated by the Communist Party in France.

3. A meeting was arranged between ROBINSON and TREPPER after the withdrawal of the Soviet Embassy in June 1941. In September the same year, their two services were united. In the summer of 1941 it is believed that an unidentified agent was sent from Russia to France, who was destined for England. According to a later statement by TREPPER, ROBINSON is reported to have arranged his voyage across the channel through his contacts in the French Resistance.

4. When, in December 1942, TREPPER was arrested, he supplied the Germans with information which enabled them to capture ROBINSON shortly afterwards. ROBINSON was slow to talk after his arrest and maintained that he was a courier and that he knew very little about the people with whom he was in contact. His arrest took place in the house of Medardo GRIOTTO, which he had used as a meeting place with TREPPER. Incriminating evidence against him was found in AENIS-HAENSLIN's flat and in the house of Louis MURIER.

5. In the Spring of 1943, it is believed that ROBINSON was taken to Berlin for interrogation. In June 1943, Anna MUELLER was enticed into Germany from Switzerland by the Gestapo, following the arrest of her brother, Hans MUELLER. She was confronted with ROBINSON whom she recognised and she admitted having helped him to cross the frontier between Switzerland and France clandestinely on several occasions. It has since been learned that Anna MUELLER was an intermediary between ROBINSON and Max HABIJANIC, a corrupt official in the Swiss passport office in Basle, who provided her with passports in assumed names on various occasions. She had apparently known ROBINSON for a long time, and had met him in the first instance through the Swiss Communist lawyer, Dr. Franz WELTI, at Basle who died in 1934. Dr. WELTI also introduced her to Max HABIJANIC and arranged that she should act as a go-between for ROBINSON. She knew Franz SCHNEIDER who had visited her in February 1940 and given her $300 on instructions from ROBINSON.

6. In June 1943, the Germans, following leads from ROBINSON's arrest, broke into the French Communist W/T station at Le Raincy. They are said to have found evidence of contacts with the United Kingdom and Switzerland. It is believed that later the same year ROBINSON agreed to collaborate with the R.S.H.A. He is thought to have returned to France to assist in the penetration of Resistance and Communist underground movements. According to one source he was in the South of France in the Spring of 1944. On the other hand, another source has reported that he was executed in Germany some time during 1943. The truth is not known at present.

SCHULZE-BOYSEN's Group

Chapter XIII. Introduction.

1. Harro SCHULZE-BOYSEN first came into contact with the Soviet Intelligence Service when he was leader of a Communist group in Berlin. He was employed in the German Air Ministry and at first only acted as an occasional informant. It was only after the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 that he devoted himself wholeheartedly to espionage and became the chief of the most important Russian network in Germany. By 1941, he had built up a group with connections in Augsburg, Saxony, Thuringia, Magdeburg, Hamburg and Prague. He was arrested in 1942 and subsequently executed, together with most of the members of his network. His group is known to have worked for the 4th Department, Red Army.

2. SCHULZE-BOYSEN was described by the Germans as an idealist and a "drawing-room Communist". Most of his agents were recruited among fellow-thinkers, who worked for a cause which they believed would one day determine the future of Germany. They were generally well placed, and the information provided by the group seems to have been valuable while it lasted. SCHULZE-BOYSEN was a journalist and a professional Air Force officer. During the war he was appointed to the liaison staff of the Luftwaffe Chiefs of Staff, a most interesting position for a Russian secret agent.

Chapter XIV. History.

1. Harro SCHULZE-BOYSEN was an informant of the Russian Intelligence Service in 1936. He worked in the Air Ministry at Berlin, and at that time supplied intelligence on German activities in Spain. His information was passed to the undercover organisation of the German Communist Party and from there handed by Gisela von POLLNITZ to the Soviet Embassy at Berlin.

2. SCHULZE-BOYSEN appears to have been inactive from 1937 until April 1939. At that time he was approached by Victor SUKOLOV (see Chapters I - V) who revived him as a source and persuaded him to recruit other agents from among German Government employees. It is believed that shortly afterwards a courier link was arranged between SCHULZE-BOYSEN and SUKOLOV who was posted to Brussels in July 1939.

3. By 1941, SCHULZE-BOYSEN had succeeded in organising an important network of agents with connections throughout Germany and also in Czechoslovakia. In June 1941, the Soviet Embassy was withdrawn from Berlin. Prior to this, Alexander ERDBERG of the Soviet Trade Delegation arranged for funds and W/T transmitters to be left with SCHULZE-BOYSEN so that he could operate independently. Hans COPPI (SCHULZE-BOYSEN's W/T operator) was instructed to establish direct W/T communications with Moscow, but for some reason he was unable to do so, and the group was obliged to rely on the courier service to Brussels which was working satisfactorily by this time. SCHULZE-BOYSEN's information was then transmitted by W/T from Brussels to Moscow over SUKOLOV's network. SUKOLOV, presumably under the alias of Vincente SIERRA, paid several visits to SCHULZE-BOYSEN in the course of the year to assist him with his organisation and communications.

4. SCHULZE-BOYSEN is known to have employed the following people as agents:- His wife, Libertas SCHULZE-BOYSEN, who acted as his deputy and was deeply implicated in his intelligence activities: Kurt and Elisabeth

/SCHUMACHER

Chapter XIV (continued).

SCHUMACHER, who worked in close personal contact with him, and were concerned with the courier service to Brussels: Eva BUCH, who was an assistant in the German Institute of Foreign Affairs: Oda SCHOTTMUELLER and Erika von BROCKDORF, who provided accommodation for W/T transmitters: Kurt SCHULZE, a W/T technician and former operator in the German Navy who was in contact with SUKOLOV for technical matters: Dr. Herbert ENGELSING, a self professed informant: Guenther WEISENBORN, author and dramatist, a close friend of SCHULZE-BOYSEN, who was employed in the Deutsche Rundfunk: Dr. Elfrede PAUL, the mistress of Kurt SCHUMACHER who acted as a cut-out for ENGELSING and WEISENBORN.

5. In November 1941, COPPI was introduced to Kurt SCHULZE, who gave him technical instruction and supplied him with another transmitter. COPPI, however, was still unable to make contact with Moscow.

6. After the arrest of SUKOLOV's W/T operators in Brussels in December 1941, it seems that SCHULZE-BOYSEN's traffic was switched to JEFFREMOV's network (see Chapters VI - IX). This arrangement appears to have worked satisfactorily until the arrest of JEFFREMOV himself in July 1942. In August 1942, SCHULZE-BOYSEN's group received a parachute agent, Albert HOESSLER, who brought another transmitter. HOESSLER was introduced by Kurt SCHUMACHER to COPPI, with whom he attempted to establish W/T communication with Moscow. It is believed that this attempt was also unsuccessful, although contact may have been made for a few days.

7. On 30th August 1942, SCHULZE-BOYSEN was arrested as a result of leads provided by the deciphers of JEFFREMOV's traffic to Moscow. The Germans were able to read the traffic which their intercept stations had accumulated for some time back. SCHULZE-BOYSEN had an agent in the German intercept service, and received forewarning, but for some reason he was unable to escape, and it seems that nearly the whole of his group was arrested. HOESSLER and COPPI were captured in the autumn of 1942 and most of the network was rounded up before the end of the year.

8. The Germans used HOESSLER as a W/T deception agent from October 1942 until February 1943. HOESSLER was executed a little later, as were most of the members of the group.

9. Dr. ENGELSING escaped detection and is at present living in Germany. Guenther WEISENBORN was sentenced to a long term of imprisonment but is believed to be now in Berlin where he is reported to be on excellent terms with the Soviet authorities. He is alleged to have been instructed by them to maintain contact with the surviving members of the network.

Rudolf von SCHELIHA

Chapter XV. Introduction.

1. Rudolf von SCHELIHA, a former German cavalry officer, who later passed into the Diplomatic Service, is believed to have been recruited by the Soviet Intelligence Service while serving in Warsaw in 1934. It is not known whether he engaged in espionage on behalf of the 4th Department, Red Army or the G.U.G.B. Von SCHELIHA operated as a paid source in Poland and later in Germany. In June 1941, when Germany declared war on Russia, he appears to have been left without means of communicating with Moscow, and seems to have ceased working as an agent. It is thought that he was regarded as a valuable source by Moscow on account of his situation in the German Foreign Office, as several fruitless attempts were made to revive him and furnish him with a channel of communications.

2. It is believed that von SCHELIHA was never inspired by idealistic motives. He appears to have worked for the Russians in order to satisfy his craving for women and money. So much so that the Russians were prepared to blackmail him should he have refused to cooperate. As far as it is known, he never controlled a group of agents in the same manner as SCHULZE-BOYSEN and HARNACK, although it would seem that the Russians intended to provide him with a network at a later stage. He was arrested before they were able to carry out their plans.

Chapter XVI. History.

1. In 1936, Rudolf von SCHELIHA was councillor to the German Embassy in Warsaw and was at that time engaged in espionage against Germany. He was in touch with Ilse STOEBE who was employed as a foreign newspaper correspondent. Ilse STOEBE was the mistress of Rudolf HERRNSTADT, Warsaw correspondent of the "Berlin Tageblatt", and was used as a cut-out for communication between him and von SCHELIHA. HERRNSTADT is believed to have passed von SCHELIHA's information to the Soviet Embassy in Warsaw.

2. Von SCHELIHA continued to act as a source in Poland until September 1939. When war was declared he returned to the Foreign Office in Berlin. He was accompanied by Ilse STOEBE, whom he arranged to be employed in the Press Section of the Foreign Office. In this capacity she was officially in touch with the TASS representatives in Berlin. Until June 1941, von SCHELIHA's information was passed through Ilse STOEBE to TASS, and from there to the Soviet Commercial Attache in Berlin.

3. After war broke out between Germany and Russia, von SCHELIHA was left without any means of communication. Various unsuccessful attempts were made to revive him as a source. In August 1941, SUKOLOV @ Vincente SIERRA (see Chapters I - V) was ordered by Moscow to visit Germany from Brussels and, among other assignments, to deliver a cypher key to Ilse STOEBE. He was unable to find her as she had been dismissed from the Foreign Office and was working in Dresden. In November 1941, SUKOLOV made a second visit and delivered the cypher to Kurt SCHULZE (see Chapters XIII - XIV) who was intended as a W/T operator for STOEBE and von SCHELIHA. SCHULZE does not appear to have succeeded in getting in touch with STOEBE.

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Chapter XVI (continued).

4. In May 1942, Erna EIFLER, a Russian agent, was dropped by parachute into Germany with a W/T set and was instructed to find STOEBE and re-establish communications with von SCHELIHA. EIFLER was accompanied by Wilhelm FELLENDORF, also equipped with a W/T set, who was intended to organise a group of agents in Berlin. Both took shelter with Bernhard BAESTLEIN in Hamburg and were arrested as a result of the capture of Wulhelm GUDDORF by the Gestapo (see Chapters XVII - XVIII). In October 1942, Heinrich KOENEN was parachuted into Germany with similar instructions, and provided with incriminating documents with which to blackmail von SCHELIHA, should this prove necessary. KOENEN was arrested shortly after his arrival and neither he nor EIFLER succeeded in getting into contact with Ilse STOEBE. The Germans operated both as W/T deception agents and were thus able to capture von SCHELIHA and Ilse STOEBE in the autumn of 1942. Von SCHELIHA and STOEBE were believed to have been executed. The Germans continued the play-back until about 1943.

Arwid HARNACK's Group

Chapter XVII. Introduction.

1. Dr. Arwid HARNACK was responsible for a group of agents which was centred on Berlin and was active from 1940 until the autumn of 1942. The group worked for the 4th Department, Red Army. The information gathered by the network is believed to have been fairly high grade, as it ran agents on the intelligence staffs of the O.K.W. and O.K.M. Its agents were generally recruited among left-wing intellectuals and Communist sympathisers who were connected with German Government circles. They worked for an ideal which they firmly believed would one day deliver their country from Nazi oppression.

2. HARNACK was an official in the German Ministry of Economics who was recruited by Alexander ERDBERG of the Soviet Trade Delegation in Berlin. He was at first employed as an informant, and it was only later that he developed into a group leader. Through HARNACK, ERDBERG is reported to have obtained control of the SCHULZE-BOYSEN group (see Chapters XIII - XIV). HARNACK and his wife were executed in 1943.

Chapter XVIII. History.

1. Before leaving Berlin in June 1941, Alexander ERDBERG provided Dr. Arwid HARNACK with instructions and funds to enable him to operate his group independently. ERDBERG also supplied Dr. Adam KUCKHOFF, one of HARNACK's principal assistants, with a W/T set to communicate directly with Moscow. It was simultaneously arranged that HARNACK should be in touch with Hans COPPI, the W/T operator of the SCHULZE-BOYSEN group to provide him with an alternative channel. Neither groups, however, succeeded in making contact with Moscow, and in August 1941, SUKOLOV (see Chapters I - V) visited Berlin to assist them. The transmitter supplied for HARNACK's group proved unusable and communication was later established by courier link from Bernhard BAESTLEIN of the German Communist Party in Hamburg, through Flensberg and Denmark to the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm.

2. HARNACK is known to have employed the following agents in his network:- Herbert GOLLNOW, an Abwehr officer at O.K.W. Headquarters; Wolfgang HAVEMANN, a lieutenant in German Naval Intelligence; Dr. Adam KUCKHOFF and his wife; Leo SKRZYPCZYNSKI, proprietor of a firm manufacturing W/T components for the Luftwaffe; Dr. Adolf GRIMME; Johannes SIEG; Karl BEHRENS and Rose SCHLOESINGER who were used as couriers to Hans COPPI; Dr. Friedrich LENZ, who acted as a cut-out between HARNACK and the Soviet Embassy in 1941.

3. In August 1942, the Germans obtained possession of a cypher from WENZEL, JEFFREMOV's head W/T operator (see Chapters VI - IX). After his traffic had been read, it was found that references were made to the Berlin agents and in the autumn HARNACK and most of his group were arrested. HARNACK and his wife were both executed and so were several other members of the network.

4. The following are believed to be alive to-day:

Dr. Friedrich LENZ
Margareta KUCKHOFF
Dr. Adolf GRIMME
Leo SKRZYPCZYNSKI.

RADO's Group

Chapter XIX. Introduction.

1. RADO's group was based on Switzerland and was active on behalf of 4th Department, Red Army, from 1936 to 1944. It produced Strategic, Political and Economic intelligence, and had sources in Germany, Italy, France and Switzerland. The most valuable of these is thought to have been an informant who had constant access to the German order of battle on the Eastern Front. The network communicated with headquarters by courier service to Paris until the oubreak of war. Subsequently it used W/T and operated at least three transmitters which worked directly to Moscow. One was situated in Lausanne and two were in Geneva.

2. There was little contact between this network and the other Soviet controlled groups in Western Europe. The German Counter Intelligence Services consequently found it more difficult to penetrate and, as it operated from a neutral country, they were never able to take direct action as in the occupied territories. The group appears to have been the most successful of the Russians enterprises that have come to light so far.

3. This network did not owe its success to Alexander RADO, who appears to have lacked the personality of Leopold TREPPER or Henri ROBINSON, and it is extremely doubtful whether he would have succeeded in more difficult circumstances. RADO was not particularly brave or honest, nor had he the strength of character to control his organisation by his own efforts. However, he was fortunately most ably assisted by Rachel DUEBENDORFER, Otto PUENTER and Pierre NICOLE, who proved far more resourceful. DUEBENDORFER in particular, herself a well established and trusted agent of the Soviet Intelligence Service, distrusted RADO and even refused to name her sources to him. It is thought that RADO was called to account by his Russian masters after the war. He was last heard of in Moscow, but his present fate is unknown.

Chapter XX. History.

1. Maria POLIAKOVA appears to have been the chief 4th Department agent in Switzerland in 1936. The exact nature of her activities is unknown, but she is thought to have been working against France and Italy. She is believed to have been in touch with Rachel DUEBENDORFER, Anna MUELLER and Selma GESSNER-BUHRER in Switzerland, and Henri ROBINSON in France (see Chapters X - XII). In 1936, Alexander RADO arrived in Geneva and set himself up under cover of GEOPRESS.

2. POLIAKOVA was recalled in 1937 to Moscow where she continued to work for the 4th Department. At that date RADO appears to have taken over part of her enterprises in Switzerland. He sent his reports, which were concealed in micro-photographs, to the Soviet Military Attache in Paris. There is no evidence that DUEBENDORFER, MUELLER, GESSNER-BUHRER or ROBINSON were connected with RADO at this time. It seems that DUEBENDORFER continued to send her material to ROBINSON in Paris.

3. During the summer of 1938, another network was set up in Switzerland under the control of Ursula HAMBURGER, and was directed against Germany. In the autumn 1938 Alexander FOOTE, a former member of the International Brigade was offered a secret and dangerous job abroad by Fred COPEMAN of the Communist Party Headquarters in London. He was put in touch with Brigitte LEWIS in London, who sent him to see her sister, Ursula HAMBURGER in Geneva. Ursula HAMBURGER recruited FOOTE, and posted him to Munich.

/She

Chapter XX (continued).

She gave him funds, and advised him to learn German and make useful contacts. He was told to study W/T and photography. Ursula HAMBURGER asked him if he could recommend other men suitable for similar employment, whereupon he suggested Leon BEURTON with whom he had served in the International Brigade. Ursula HAMBURGER is reported to have had a W/T transmitter in her chalet at Caux sur Montreux, with which she made contact with Moscow approximately twice a month and she is said to have collected economic intelligence which she passed to Moscow on this link.

4. In 1939 RADO was visited by an agent using the cover name "MANOLO". (By July 1943 the Russians were aware that "MANOLO" had been captured by the Germans. "MANOLO" may have been Victor SUKOLOV (see Chapters I - V) who was arrested in November 1942. SUKOLOV told his German interrogators that in the Spring of 1940 he had taken a cypher to someone in the "rue de Lausanne" at Geneva. This is the street in which RADO was living at the time.) ROBINSON also visisted Switzerland during this period, but it is thought that he went to see DUEBENDORFER and Anna MUELLER.

5. In the early Summer of 1939, Leon BEURTON was sent over from the United Kingdom to join Ursula HAMBURGER. She dispatched him to Frankfurt a/Main on a similar mission to that of FOOTE. At that time, like FOOTE, he was told to investigate the possibilities of sabotage in Germany. In August 1939, on account of the imminence of war, FOOTE and BEURTON were recalled to Switzerland and, simultaneously, Ursula HAMBURGER was ordered by Moscow to cease all activity against Germany. FOOTE and BEURTON lived in Montreux and visited HAMBURGER frequently for elementary instruction in W/T.

6. In September 1939, Frans OBERMANNS, a German Communist who had served with the International Brigade, arrived to join Ursula HAMBURGER equipped with a W/T set. He arrived under a Finnish passport, but had insufficient training for his cover, and was arrested by the Swiss in December in Fribourg after he had set up his transmitter. OBERMANNS spent the rest of the war in a Swiss labour camp.

7. In February 1940, Anna MUELLER received a visit from Franz SCHNEIDER of Brussels (see Chapters X - XII). SCHNEIDER stayed at Basle and brought her $300 on instructions from Henri ROBINSON.

8. In the spring, 1940, Moscow suggested that Ursula HAMBURGER's group should prepare to move to Rumania. This plan was discarded later when the Germans occupied Rumania.

9. In the Summer, 1940, Ursula HAMBURGER moved her transmitter from Montreux to a chalet near Geneva. Earlier that year, she divorced Rudolf HAMBURGER in a Swiss Court and married Leon BEURTON, thus incidentally acquiring British nationality. In June 1940, her German maid, Olga MUTH, who was very attached to Rudolf HAMBURGER and who had been told that the change of husbands was an impersonal arrangement necessitated by the situation, discovered that the relations between Ursula and Leon were in fact extremely personal. In her indignation, she decided to denounce Ursula BEURTON to the British Authorities. Olga MUTH telephoned the British Consulate but was unable to make herself understood and was cut off by an impatient official. As a result, the Russians appear to have considered that Ursula BEURTON was compromised and ordered her to prepare to return to the United Kingdom. Olga MUTH was sent back to Germany.

/10.

Chapter XX (continued).

10. In July 1940, Ursula BEURTON moved her W/T station to the flat of Edmond HAMEL who owned a wireless shop in Geneva. FOOTE transferred his residence to Geneva in August and began instructing HAMEL in morse and W/T procedure.

11. RADO's communications were interrupted by the invasion of France in June 1940. At about this time Ursula BEURTON was instructed to get in touch with RADO and provide him with a W/T link to Moscow. DUEBENDORFER's communications also broke down and she was out of contact until the beginning of 1941 when ROBINSON succeeded in sending a courier through to her in Switzerland.

12. In December 1940, Ursula BEURTON left for England and handed over her wireless communications to FOOTE and Leon BEURTON. From this date the W/T service was integrated into RADO's group. It is possible that the 4th Department intended to use Ursula BEURTON in the United Kingdom, but so far she is not known to have engaged in any subversive activity.

13. Ursula BEURTON left her W/T transmitter with Leon, who took on the instruction of HAMEL. FOOTE was ordered to Lausanne and operated his transmitter from there. In the Spring 1941, when HAMEL was proficient, he operated by himself, and Leon BEURTON ceased to work with him. Later HAMEL's wife, Olga, learnt to transmit and was able to assist her husband.

14. In January 1941, the courier sent by ROBINSON to DUEBENDORFER returned to Paris, bringing with him intelligence which ROBINSON forwarded to Moscow. He also reported that DUEBENDORFER was without money or instructions. ROBINSON sent her $2,000. DUEBENDORFER appears to have depended on ROBINSON for her contact with headquarters until at least April when she was put in touch with RADO.

15. RADO is known to have had contact with a considerable number of agents. The two most important were DUEBENDORFER and Otto PUENTER. DUEBENDORFER had one outstanding informant, a Czech refugee named Rudolf ROESSLER, who was an authority on military strategy, and was in close contact with the Swiss General Staff through whom he had access to Swiss Military Intelligence. He produced for DUEBENDORFER, intelligence known as "LUCIE material", the origin of which has not been discovered. This was a series of accurate and up to date reports on the German Order of Battle on the Eastern Front. DUEBENDORFER kept in touch with him through Christian SCHNEIDER, a former employee of the I.L.O. Geneva, who acted as a cut-out. ROESSLER worked mainly for money and DUEBENDORFER was constantly in financial difficulties and worried that she should not have enough funds to keep him interested. At first his reports were treated with caution in Moscow, but later, when he had proved himself to be so accurately informed, he was regarded as a source of the utmost importance. DUEBENDORFER also ran several other agents, including the unidentified PAUL in Zurich, and had her own cypher for transmission of reports.

16. Dr. Otto PUENTER, a well known Swiss journalist in Berne, controlled a number of useful sources, notably in diplomatic circles and in the Swiss General Staff. His informants included Charles THIEBAULT, a former French Air Attache in Berne, Felix SALTEN in Zurich, and an unidentified group in Germany known as ROT.

17. Besides DUEBENDORFER and PUENTER, RADO is known to have been in touch with the following:- Leon and Pierre NICOLE and Dr. Maria BLANCHI, all of whom were closely connected with the Swiss Communist Party; Baron Manfred von GRIMM, who had contacts in Austria and at the court of Liechtenstein; Georges BLUN, a French journalist in Zurich; and many others who are only known by their cover names.

/18.

Chapter XX (continued)

18. RADO was also constantly worried over funds. These he sometimes managed to secure by artificial business transactions from America. Aaron PALIVODA, the R.K.O. Pictures representative in Geneva, was one of the intermediaries he used for this purpose.

19. Early in 1942, FOOTE was instructed to train another recruit, Margareta BOLLI, as a W/T operator. Later she was installed with a W/T transmitter in a flat at Geneva. RADO was thus able to dispose of three transmitters for handling his traffic with Moscow, FOOTE in Lausanne, and HAMEL and BOLLI in Geneva.

20. In June 1942, Leon BEURTON left for the United Kingdom to join his wife. In September the Police raided HAMEL's flat in search for Communist literature, but apparently failed to notice his transmitter. After this incident, HAMEL's set was removed to a villa outside Geneva.

21. In the Summer 1942, FOOTE received instructions to contact Anna MUELLER in order to obtain her assistance for the renewal of a passport which was being used by an agent in Italy. Anna MUELLER had frequently been employed in the past to secure passports for members of the Soviet Intelligence Service. These were supplied to her by Max HABIJANIC, an official in the Swiss passport service in Basle. This time the passport was in the name of SCHNEIDER.

22. In the Spring 1943, Anna MUELLER was enticed into Germany after the arrest of her brother Hans in Freiburg. Hans MUELLER was captured as a result of attempting to pass a W/T set to a Russian woman parachute agent, known as "INGE". Hans was executed, but his sister was interned and later confronted with Henri ROBINSON, whom she admitted having helped to cross the Franco-Swiss frontier clandestinely.

23. At about this time, Margareta BOLLI was seduced by a Gestapo agent, named PETERS. She was able to provide the German Counter Intelligence Service with an important clue to FOOTE's cypher. In October 1943, she was arrested by the Swiss while PETERS was in her flat.

24. In April 1943, FOOTE was ordered to pay a sum of money to an unidentified courier from France. The courier turned out to be a Gestapo agent, and FOOTE was subsequently told to break off relations with RADO, but to keep in W/T contact with Moscow. He resumed contact with RADO in September. Meanwhile DUEBENDORFER learned that ARNIS-HARNSLIN was in German hands, and it was thought that he may have been the courier whom Moscow intended to send to Switzerland and for whom the German agent had been substituted.

25. In July 1943, RADO was given a serious warning by Moscow to expect penetration of his network by German Counter Intelligence Services, and he was advised to take precautions for the security of his group. He was told that MANOLO, who had visited him in 1939, had been captured by the Germans and he became very scared. RADO informed Moscow that he was also being watched by the Federal Police and asked for protection but Moscow was unable to be of any assistance.

26. In October 1943, the Swiss authorities arrested HAMEL and BOLLI. Unfortunately RADO had recently left with HAMEL lists which referred to his agents and accounts. As a result, FOOTE was arrested in November. FOOTE was able to damage his transmitter before it fell into the hands of the Police. Later the Swiss attempted a play back, but this had little chance of success as, instead of FOOTE's, they used RADO's code which had been taken from HAMEL. FOOTE was interned.

/27.

Chapter XX (continued).

27. RADO meanwhile took refuge with Dr. BIANCHI. DUEBENDORFER, who was still in contact with ROESSLER was thus cut off from Moscow. In November 1943 and again in March 1944, she wrote to Hermina RABINOWITCH, a former colleague in the I.L.O. who had been posted to Montreal, and appealed to her for assistance.

28. The Swiss ended their W/T play-back in April 1944. At about this time Rachel DUEBENDORFER, Paul BOETTCHER and ROESSLER were arrested. ROESSLER was released shortly afterwards. In July, the Soviet Military Attache in Ottawa, with the help of Hermina RABINOWITCH, succeeded in sending funds from New York to Switzerland. They were acknowledged by Alexander ABRAMSON, another I.L.O. associate and a Soviet agent, with whom DUEBENDORFER deposited ROESSLER's material at the time of her arrest. Later in the year DUEBENDORFER and BOETTCHER were released on bail.

29. FOOTE was released from internment in September 1944, also on bail. He searched for RADO, and received a message through the Swiss Communist Party that he would shortly be leaving for Paris. From there RADO said that he would arrange for someone to make contact with his group. FOOTE was advised to wait in Switzerland. He was not satisfied, however, with RADO's attitude and arranged through Pierre NICOLE to meet DUEBENDORFER and ROESSLER. The latter informed FOOTE that he was prepared to continue working for the Soviet Intelligence Service on a long term basis after the war. FOOTE thereupon decided to leave for Paris and make contact with the Soviet authorities. He escaped to France with the help of the Communist Party, and took with him samples of ROESSLER's intelligence. He arrived in Paris in November 1944 and went to see Lt.-Colonel NOVICOV, head of the Soviet Military Mission to whom he told his story.

30. In July 1945, Rachel DUEBENDORFER and Paul BOETTCHER escaped to France.

ANNEX

DIAGRAMS OF THE NETWORKS

Note. Some of the characters in the diagrams are not mentioned in the text.

(A) TREPPER's group at the time of the arrest of MAKAROV and DANILOFF (Dec. 1941)



(B) TREPPER's network from December 1941 until December 1942.



(1) see chart D.
(2) see chart C.

(C) JEFFREMOV's network



(1) see chart B.
(2) see chart D.

(D) ROBINSON's network



(1) see chart H.
(2) see chart B.

(E) SCHULZE-BOYSEN's network



(1) see Chart G.
(2) see Chart F.
(3) see Chart A.
(4) see Chart C.

(F) Rudolf von SCHELIHA's network



(1) see chart E.
(2) see chart G.
(3) see chart A.

= contact attempted without success.

(G) HARNACK's network



(1) see chart E.
(2) see chart A.
(3) see chart F.

(I. RADO's network



(1) see chart D.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

24

THE CASE OF THE "ROTE KAPELLE"

PART II

TOP SECRET

THE CASE OF THE "ROTE KAPELLE"

PART II

An account, treated year by year

17.10.49.

TOP SECRET

THE CASE OF THE "ROTE KAPELLE"

PART II

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Annex. Historical diagrams.

Chapter I. 1936

A. Switzerland

1. The principal Red Army Intelligence agent in Switzerland in 1936 and for some years before seems to have been a woman officer, Maria Josifovna POLIAKOVA. She was a Jewess, born about 1910, the daughter of a member of the Foreign Trade Commissariat who had served in England, Germany and France. She was recruited by the R.U. about 1931 and served as resident agent of the fourth or technical intelligence section in both Switzerland and France. She also served at an unknown date as resident agent for the first section, in Germany. POLIAKOVA, who was still alive in 1946, spoke good French, German and English. The cover-name under which she was most widely known in Western Europe seems to have been GISELA (also GISEL and GISI). This was reported by GOUZENKO, the defector from the Soviet Embassy at Ottawa in 1945, as a cover-name for Red Army Intelligence in general. No evidence was forthcoming from GOUZENKO or his documents however to illustrate the use of such a cover-name, except in the correspondence and notes about Hermina RABINOWITCH and her dealings with the Swiss network in 1943 - 1944. The references there are to "GISEL's parents", "GISEL's family", "GISEL's man" etc. can easily be understood as "POLIAKOVA's management, i.e. Red Army Intelligence", "POLIAKOVA's agent-network in Switzerland", POLIAKOVA's representative" etc. The evidence of FOOTE and of GOUZENKO himself (elsewhere) suggests that POLIAKOVA maintained her responsibility for some of the Swiss network after her return to Moscow in 1937 and throughout the war. References to her in 1943 and 1944 therefore in this context were by no means out of date. The ROBINSON papers also contain evidence of GISELA's existence as an individual rather than as an organisation, and her identity with his old colleague POLIAKOVA. (It is also possible that this woman used the cover-name of "MEG", which appears in the ROBINSON papers as the name of a pre-war collaborator probably of superior rank to ROBINSON himself.

2. The geographical scope of POLIAKOVA's activities in 1936-7 is not known. To judge from the activities of her assistants and successors in Switzerland, it seems possible that she was mainly engaged against France and Italy. If, as seems probable, she was a superior officer to ROBINSON, then she may have had some authority over him and his predecessor in work against the British Isles. There is certainly evidence that HARRY I, HARRY II and ROBINSON all had recourse to Switzerland as a metropolis of espionage from which they received their principal directions, and ROBINSON, speaking of MEG, implies that he had discussed with her the maintenance of communications with the British Isles. POLIAKOVA returned to Moscow in 1937 but came safely through the purge and in 1940 became first assistant to the chief of the fourth section. According to GOUZENKO, who knew her as a Lieutenant Colonel in 1943, she was transferred in that year from the English to the German section of the Red Army Intelligence (possible sub-sections of the old fourth section) and she was given credit for DUEBENDORFER's success against Germany in Switzerland. Her Moscow postings seem to have reflected her experience in the field, and "GISELA's family" interests play a considerable part in this story. POLIAKOVA was married to a Hungarian who had worked as a Comintern agent and who was posted to Hungary by Red Army Intelligence shortly before June 1941.

3. Other Russian agents of some standing in Switzerland in

/1936

Chapter I (continued)

1936 were Anna MULLER, Selma GESSNER-BUHRER and Rachel DUEBENDORFER. All three seem to have owed allegiance to POLIAKOVA. The exact relations between POLIAKOVA and DUEBENDORFER are unknown and, to judge from DUEBENDORFER's later career, she was an agent of considerable experience and independence. It is likely that she was an old acquaintance of ROBINSON

4. A new arrival in Switzerland in 1936 was Alexander RADO, a Hungarian Jew. It is likely that he was accredited to POLIAKOVA, but for the first six months or so he must have been largely occupied in the establishment of his excellent business cover in Geneva, "The Geographical Press Agency", or GEOPRESS.

B. France.

1. At the beginning of 1936 there were two agents of some standing in France, both apparently members of Red Army Intelligence and in communication with Red Army headquarters through the Military Attache at the Soviet Embassy in Paris.

2. First of these in seniority was Henri ROBINSON who had been working as a Soviet agent in Western Europe since about 1931. In the early stages of his career he seems to have been mainly employed by the Comintern and even as late as 1936 he probably maintained considerable Comintern interests. For example, it is said that during the 1930's he acted as head of the O.M.S. or Comintern Communication Service in Western Europe. It is evident from various sources, however, that ROBINSON by 1936 was well known to Red Army Intelligence, and probably equally useful to the G.U.G.B. of the N.K.V.D. His work for the Comintern had led him among the clandestine activities of European Communist Parties and, apart from his valuable knowledge of covert communications between these parties, it is said that in 1930 he was put in charge of the B.B. or intelligence apparatus of the French Communist Party. This function is said to have been laid upon him by Red Army Intelligence, and if the story is true it is an example of the Russian exploitation of Communist Parties for intelligence purposes. ROBINSON seems to have done other work for Red Army Intelligence before 1936, and in 1936 itself he is said to have been formally related to the Soviet Military Attache in Paris. Despite the strength of these Red Army connections, it must not be forgotten that the G.U.G.B., organisationally at least, had a prior claim on ROBINSON's services. As early as 1932 the Foreign Section of the O.G.P.U. took control of the Organisational Department of the Comintern and the successor of this Foreign Section, the G.U.G.B., consolidated its hold in 1937, when it took over the O.M.S. For these reasons it is not surprising that ROBINSON in his papers shows signs of G.U.G.B. as well as Red Army experience. So far as our main story is concerned, however, it is right to regard ROBINSON as an agent of Red Army Intelligence. The direction and scope of ROBINSON's activities in 1936 are unknown. Presumably he kept up his connections with the clandestine side of the French Communist Party, and a study of his passports shows journeys in 1935 and 1936 to Switzerland and Italy. As has been suggested in Section A of this chapter, he may have been collaborating with POLIAKOVA in Switzerland.

3. The unidentified Red Army Intelligence agent, HARRY II, seems to have been based on Paris, at least since the Spring of 1935. About

/ that

Chapter I (continued)

that date he took over the management of Ernest WEISS as a secondary agent in the British Isles. His first meeting with WEISS took place in Switzerland and there is no information from whence he came, but by March 1936 at the latest he seems to have set up his headquarters in Paris. Like ROBINSON, HARRY II's link with Moscow seems to have been through the Military Attache at the Soviet Embassy in Paris, but he was not of the same calibre as ROBINSON and it is possible that his sphere of interest was limited to the exploitation of WEISS. HARRY II's activities in the British Isles are described later.

4. In December 1936, there arrived in Paris the celebrated Red Army agent, Leopold TREPPER. TREPPER probably used the Soviet Military Attache in Paris to keep in touch with Moscow, but his primary mission seems to have been as a general technical adviser in Western Europe rather than as a collector of intelligence in any particular country.

C. The British Isles

1. The only agent of HARRY II known to us in the British Isles at the beginning of 1936 was Ernest WEISS. This man, a German Jew, was formally recruited in Paris in January 1932 and came to England in May of the same year. During 1932 and 1933 he had worked for an unidentified Red Army agent known as "FRANK" or "HARRY I". HARRY I had wide responsibilities and was compromised at the end of 1933 by the arrests of Robert SWITZ and Lydia STAHL in France. WEISS, under HARRY I's instructions, had been in touch with Robert SWITZ and the whole of HARRY I's apparatus in the British Isles seems to have been closed down when the French arrests took place. WEISS and a subsidiary source, Ilse STEINFELD, for example, were summoned separately to Switzerland at the beginning of 1934 where both seem to have been warned to lie quiet and hold their tongues. WEISS did nothing until the autumn of 1934 when he was asked to report by letter to Vienna on his position and possibilities. There followed a year later in Switzerland his first meeting with HARRY II who spoke of a new assignment, but it was not until the Spring of the following year, if we are to believe WEISS, that HARRY II paid a visit to England. Immediately after his arrival in April 1936, he travelled on to Ireland where it is possible that he had a rendezvous with MEREDITH, one of the new British sources to whom he presented WEISS in the next month. Whether this rendezvous took place or not, HARRY II's visit to Ireland is interesting because HARRY I before him had behaved as though he possessed a base in Dublin. In May 1936 HARRY II introduced WEISS to both MEREDITH and VERNON, who were to be developed as sources of technical intelligence gathered at this time from the Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough, where they were both employed. WEISS was provided with a car and a regular programme was laid down for his rendezvous with the two new sources.

2. During this same year WEISS was introduced by HARRY II to a courier named PAULINE, who was in fact Germaine SCHNEIDER of Brussels. WEISS was directed to photograph the intelligence he got from MEREDITH and VERNON and he would pass it to HARRY II either by direct contact in England or by Germaine SCHNEIDER, or by a visit to HARRY II in Paris.

3. It is not known whether any other of HARRY I's agents or sources in the British Isles were revived at the same time as WEISS,

/nor

Chapter I (continued)

nor is it known whether HARRY II had lines independent of WEISS in this country. It seems clear, however, that the new enterprise through WEISS to MEREDITH and VERNON produced very slender intelligence revenues.

D. The Low Countries.

(i) Belgium.

1. The most important agents in Belgium in 1936 were technicians. In January 1936 Johann WENZEL arrived in Belgium from Germany. He had been serving with the clandestine Military Section of the German Communist Party and he was now taken over by Red Army Intelligence. WENZEL's principal uses to this service were to be as a wireless technician, able both to operate himself and to train new operators.

2. It is possible that WENZEL, even as early as 1936, entered into relations with Franz and Germaine SCHNEIDER of Brussels. These two were also new recruits to Red Army Intelligence in 1936, but they had behind them a record of Communist and Comintern work, particularly as managers of a "safe house" used by couriers and other Communists in secret journeys across Europe. For the last reason it is probable that the SCHNEIDERs and ROBINSON were already well-acquainted. Their first direct employment by Red Army Intelligence was as couriers. Germaine SCHNEIDER had an extensive round, including France, the British Isles, Germany and Bulgaria. Franz SCHNEIDER's scope is not so clear but his employment by Unilevers seems to have taken him occasionally through Belgium to Switzerland, which was his country of origin, and he was used as a courier in that direction. He is also known to have visited the United Kingdom as a courier for ROBINSON. (Note. The Red Army agent who recruited the SCHNEIDERs in 1936 for ROBINSON may have been Konstantin JEFFREMOV, who later - from September 1939 to January 1942 - ran a service of his own from Brussels. It will be seen that both WENZEL and the SCHNEIDERs make an early appearance in this service and it is possible therefore that they came under JEFFREMOV's direction even in 1936, three years before the first certain evidence of JEFFREMOV's residence in Belgium. From 1936 to 1939 JEFFREMOV could conceivably have lived in the Low Countries under some unknown cover or he could have made periodic visits elsewhere. But there is no strong reason why his recruitment of the SCHNEIDERs should not have been a single mission, carried out on behalf of someone else. When he next appears in the story, in 1939, JEFFREMOV seems to be visiting Belgium on a special technical occasion of recent origin. See Chapter IV. D.)

(ii) Holland.

3. An intermittent resident in the Hague in 1936 was KRIVITSKY, then acting apparently as a general inspector of both Red Army and G.U.G.B. intelligence undertakings in Western Europe.

4. Probably as an off-shoot of G.U.G.B. operations, Daniel GOUWLOOZE, a Dutch Communist, was exploiting the intelligence apparatus of the Dutch Communist Party against Holland herself. GOUWLOOZE had formerly worked for Comintern communications between Moscow and Holland. He later admitted that he was taken over by a Russian Intelligence Service from 1936 to 1937, but it is not known whether this was the G.U.G.B. or the Red Army. As in the case of Henri ROBINSON, it is

/likely

Chapter I (continued)

likely that the G.U.G.B. had a prior claim on his services.

E. Germany.

1. In Germany, Harro SCHULZE-BOYSEN, who was employed by the German Air Ministry, had become a source of information for the Russian Intelligence Service on an indirect line through the German Communist Party. It appears, for example, that in 1936 he produced intelligence on German preparations against the Red Government in Spain, which he passed to the A.M. Apparat (or Secret Military Section) of the German Communist Party. This was handed on through Gisela von POLLNITZ to a contact in the Soviet Embassy in Berlin. From there the intelligence would be transmitted to Moscow but it is not clear whether it went to Red Army Intelligence or to the G.U.G.B. It might be expected that the G.U.G.B. would have first claim on a strictly Communist Party source. On the other hand, Red Army Intelligence may have tapped the A.M. Apparat just as they seem to have secured a hold on the B.B. Apparat in France by means of ROBINSON. So far as SCHULZE-BOYSEN himself was concerned, it is worth emphasising that he was only a source of information at this date. It was not until much later, in 1941, that he became an operator as well as a source.

2. Outside Germany, but producing intelligence against her, there was an important Russian intelligence source in Poland. This was Rudolf von SCHELIHA, who had been working as a secretary in the German Legation at Warsaw since 1932 and who was recruited as a source by either the G.U.G.B. or the R.U. in 1934. Von SCHELIHA seems to have been blackmailed into treason by the exploitation of his weakness for women and money. His first manager, if not recruiter, was Rudolf HERRNSTADT, a journalist employed on the Berliner Tageblatt in Warsaw. HERRNSTADT was a Jew and direct contact between him and von SCHELIHA became unsafe under the Nazi regime. A cut-out was therefore installed in 1936 in the person of Ilse STOEBE who was ostensibly employed in Warsaw as a foreign correspondent for German and Swiss newspapers. Ilse STOEBE was also HERRNSTADT's mistress but her use as a cut-out was by no means accidental. It is now known that she was working for HARRY I, and therefore for the R.U., as far back as 1932. HERRNSTADT is believed to have passed von SCHELIHA's information to the Soviet Embassy in Warsaw.

F. Scandinavia.

1. Leopold TREPPER may have paid a visit to Sweden in December 1936 on a special mission to assess intelligence which had been obtained there on a steel alloy process. The agents whom he met on this occasion may have been working either for Red Army Intelligence or the G.U.G.B., since at this date Red Army Intelligence, if we are to believe KRIVITSKY, still held paramount authority in Russia on all technical intelligence questions. Whatever their service may have been, TREPPER is likely to have used his 1936 contacts in Scandinavia as part of the long-term operation which he planned against the British Isles in following years.

/ G. Italy.

Chapter I (continued)

G. Italy.

1. ROBINSON paid two visits to Italy from France via Switzerland in 1936. By comparison with his visits to the British Isles in 1937 - 1939, it might be suggested that he was managing a Red Army Intelligence agent somewhere in Italy, perhaps on behalf of a higher authority, such as POLIAKOVA.

Chapter II. 1937.

A. Switzerland

1. 1937 in Russia was a year of political upheaval and the Red Army was visited with the most savage purge of its history. Red Army Intelligence was greatly affected, since the accusations against Marshal TUKHACHEVSKY and his friends hinged on their supposed collaboration with the German Army. In fact, as KRIVITSKY admitted, the Red Army Intelligence staff owed a great deal of their success in Europe and perhaps further afield to a professional understanding with their opposite numbers in Germany. This understanding had gone underground since Hitler's accession to power in 1933, but it had not disappeared.

2. In the turmoil of 1937 therefore a number of important Russian agents were recalled from Western Europe to Moscow, and perhaps the most notorious evidence of the purge in the intelligence field was the assassination of Ignace REISS in Switzerland and the defection of KRIVITSKY in France. (Note: G.U.B.G. agents also suffered, for example MALY @ HARDT, who had come partly under KRIVITSKY's control.)

3. Among the suspect servants of the R.U. was POLIAKOVA. She was recalled in 1937 from Switzerland to Moscow when she seems to have had a dangerous passage, for her father was shot in the purges and her brother arrested. It is said that she owed her safety to her ability, her memory and the width of her experience. She was not allowed to return to the field and for a time she was kept in subordinate posts, but by 1940 her professional standing at least seems to have been largely restored.

4. The successor to one part of POLIAKOVA's enterprises in Switzerland was Alexander RADO, whose cover of GEOPRESS, with its international connections, was developing well. His targets were probably Germany and Italy. In November 1937 he paid a short visit to England, ostensibly on GEOPRESS business, and it is possible that he may have carried out an intelligence mission at the same time. RADO's intelligence was concealed by microphotography and passed to the Soviet Military Attache in Paris by postal and courier links.

5. DUEBENDORFER, MULLER and GESSNER-BUHRER are not known to have been disturbed by the general recalls and reorganisations. There is no evidence that they were connected with RADO before the war and they should be regarded as branches of "GISELA's family".

B. France

1. It is probable that the return of HARRY II to Moscow and the handing over of his service against the British Isles to ROBINSON was connected with the re-organisation of Red Army Intelligence. This handing over from HARRY II to ROBINSON seems to have taken place in the first half of 1937 since ROBINSON visited England in February and June. It may have meant that either ROBINSON was relieved of some of his Comintern responsibilities or that he dropped his Italian connections. The latter possibility is supported by the evidence of

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Chapter II (continued)

his passports though we cannot be sure that we possess all of them.

2. Changes in Red Army Intelligence in Western Europe may also have brought about the promotion of Leopold TREPPER. Paris seems to have remained his base but he is said in this or the next year to have taken part in widespread planning discussions. In Paris itself he is supposed to have discussed the Scandinavian network and on a visit to Switzerland in the same year he is supposed to have taken part in talks about Czechoslovakia, the Balkans, Greece and Italy. It is reasonable to suppose that the purged Red Army Intelligence was undergoing a wide reorganisation at the behest of the triumphant G.U.G.B.

3. In 1936 (see Chapter I. F.) TREPPER may have been used on a short term technical mission to Scandinavia. Apart from any new authority and responsibility he may have acquired during 1937, he seems to have continued his technical functions and paid a visit to the British Isles for a similar purpose.

4. In October 1937 Waldemar OZOLS returned to France from service with the International Brigade. This man, who was of Latvian origin, may already have been an experienced Russian agent. According to one account he had been working for Red Army Intelligence in France since 1926. Little is known about his targets or his collaborators, but he is said to have paid visits to the British Isles from 1935 to 1939. Until the war began he appears to have been quite independent of ROBINSON or TREPPER, though his directions, like theirs, came through the Soviet Military Attache in Paris.

C. The British Isles.

1. From January to July 1937 WEISS went on working the MEREDITH and VERNON sources for HARRY II. Germaine SCHNEIDER may have visited as a courier in May. In July WEISS paid a short visit to France where HARRY II seems to have told him of the coming change-over to a new master. WEISS has told us that his first meeting with ROBINSON, whom he knew as ANDRE, took place in Jersey and, by comparison with ROBINSON's passport in the name of WEHRLI, it seems very likely that the rendezvous was between September 2nd and 6th, 1937. It is interesting to observe, however, that ROBINSON, using the same passport, made two visits to the British Isles in February and June 1937, before he took over WEISS. This may imply that he had other connections in the British Isles unknown to WEISS. The day after WEISS had returned from his first meeting with ROBINSON he had one of his regular rendezvous with VERNON and found this man in a state of alarm because of a burglary which had been made on his house at Farnham. VERNON was rightly concerned lest the burglary should bring to light his Communist sympathies and also, as it turned out, his somewhat free borrowing of official documents from the Royal Aircraft Establishment. By agreement with WEISS and later with the approval of ROBINSON, VERNON was allowed to retire from active service for the time being. Discoveries made over the burglary, which had been carried out by Fascists, led to VERNON's prosecution under the Official Secrets Act and his dismissal from the Royal Aircraft Establishment. MEREDITH also found it prudent to leave this employment and for the ramainder of the year there seems to have been no espionage income on the WEISS line.

/2. TREPPER

Chapter II (continued)

2. TREPPER seems to have paid a visit to the British Isles in 1937. This was partly a technical mission to give an opinion on the value of some machine part which had been acquired by Russian Intelligence in England. In this year and in 1938, however, he seems to have had other discussions in England, but we know little about them since they did not interest TREPPER's German interrogators. According to KRIVITSKY, there were preparations before 1937 to set up a radio station for Red Army Intelligence in the British Isles. So far as his knowledge went, this station had never functioned for practical purposes, but it may be thought that TREPPER had the knowledge and authority to be concerned in a project of this kind.

3. TREPPER also told his interrogators that either in 1937 or 1938 he carried out some commissions for ROBINSON during a visit to this country. His story does not suggest that he was much in ROBINSON's confidence and implies rather that his visit was used as a matter of convenience for ROBINSON's affairs. TREPPER made a telephone call on ROBINSON's behalf, possibly to some part of the Communist Party organisation, and made a rendezvous with unidentified agents to whom he passed on ROBINSON's instructions.

4. OZOLS may also have visited the British Isles in 1937, but his business is unknown.

5. From November 7th to the 10th, 1937, RADO visited England, ostensibly on GEOPRESS business. From the genuine business point of view GEOPRESS, which dealt largely in topical maps, might well have been benefited by an English connection. Considering GEOPRESS as a cover for espionage however, it seems more than likely that RADO had other business to transact. As the successor to part of POLIAKOVA's interests he may have undertaken a mission on her behalf, for there are indications (see Chapter I. A.) that POLIAKOVA's activities from Switzerland included some service in the British Isles.

D. The Low Countries

1. The SCHNEIDERs continued to work as couriers and Germaine SCHNEIDER was handed over by HARRY II to ROBINSON for his English connection.

2. In 1937 Leon GROSSVOGEL, a Communist, who had been living in Belgium since 1926, was transferred from the post of General Manager to the Excellent Raincoat Company, which he had occupied since 1935, to the position of travelling Inspector for the firm. Such a move would be helpful to the covert activities of a Russian Intelligence agent and it seems significant that TREPPER met GROSSVOGEL in Brussels in the same year. There is no certain information on the date when GROSSVOGEL first became involved with Russian Intelligence.

3. In October, WENZEL moved from Belgium into Holland where he called on GOUWLOOZE, using the alias of "HERMANN", and told him that he wanted to settle there and work for the Dutch Communist Party. GOUWLOOZE agreed to help, but shortly afterwards "HERMANN" seems to have been summoned "abroad". In all probability WENZEL reported back to Moscow and took further instructions for the communications service which he developed (perhaps on behalf of JEFFREMOV) the following year.

/E.

Chapter II (continued)

E. Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia.

1. In Germany itself, 1937 seems to have seen the temporary extinction of SCHULZE-BOYSEN as a source of information exploited through the German Communist Party. The reason for this interruption is unknown, but possibly it was the result of some successful anti-Communist enterprise by the Gestapo. Outside Germany von SCHELIHA continued to supply valuable information through Ilse STOEBE and Rudolf HERRNSTADT to the Soviet Embassy in Warsaw.

2. The organisation or re-organisation of a Russian Intelligence network in Czechoslovakia seems to have been on the agenda of discussions attended by TREPPER either in 1937 or 1938 in Switzerland.

F. Scandinavia

1. TREPPER told his interrogators that he took part in discussions with a Russian, a Swede and a Norwegian in 1937 or 1938 on the establishment or re-organisation of a network in Scandinavia. These discussions were held in Paris. TREPPER seems to have completed in 1937 or 1938 the technical mission which had led to his visit to Sweden in 1936.

G. The Balkans

1. Germaine SCHNEIDER probably continued to serve during 1937 as a courier to an unknown agent in Bulgaria.

2. In 1937 or 1938 the establishment or reorganisation of a network in the Balkans was part of the agenda in disoussions attended by TREPPER in Switzerland.

H. Italy

1. In 1937 or 1938 the establishment or re-organisation of a network in Italy was part of the agenda in discussions attended by TREPPER in Switzerland.

Chapter III. 1938

A. Switzerland

1. RADO continued his service of information to the Soviet Military Attache in Paris.

2. DUEBENDORFER, MULLER and GESSNER-BUHRER probably continued Their independent activities. In May 1938 ROBINSON paid a visit to Switzerland, using his WEHRLI passport, and it is possible that this visit should be related to DUEBENDORFER's concerns since on the 1940 evidence of the ROBINSON papers he had been closely associated with her for some years past. No such association is traceable between ROBINSON and RADO.

3. During the summer of 1938 a new service was set up in Switzerland under the field direction of Ursula HAMBURGER, née KUCZYNSKI. This woman and her husband, Rudolf HAMBURGER, had been employed by Russian Intelligence at least since 1930 and from 1930 to 1935 they were running a service in China. This service came to grief in 1935 and Ursula HAMBURGER escaped on a Soviet ship to Moscow. In October 1935 she arrived in England from Leningrad and stayed with her family, the KUCZYNSKIs, in London. In January 1936 she left for Warsaw where she rejoined her husband who appears to have travelled to Poland from China via the United States. It is possible that HAMBURGER had visited Czechoslovakia in October 1935 and that he also had paid a visit to the KUCZYNSKIs in London. In their Polish mission the HAMBURGERs used W/T communications with Moscow. They seem to have been visited in Poland during 1937 by Brigitte KUCZYNSKI, one of Ursula's sisters from England. Rudolf HAMBURGER seems to have remained in Poland until at least April 1938 but in the same year he moved first to the United States, then to London and from there to Switzerland where he rejoined his wife for a time. In June 1939 he arrived in Hong Kong from Saigon and left the same day for Shanghai. He was then using a German passport, but in March or April of the following year, when he was arrested by the Chinese at Chungking, he was using a Honduras passport whose date of issue was October 1939, and which he claimed to have procured in Switzerland. The Chinese found him in possession of a wireless transmitter. At first the Chinese seem to have been in some doubt whether he was a Japanese or a German agent, but in June 1941 at the outbreak of the Russo-German war the Soviet authorities lodged a vigorous demand for his release. The Chinese complied and HAMBURGER next came to light in Persia, where he was arrested by the United States authorities in April 1943. Once again there were doubts about the direction of his espionage, but he eventually confessed his service under British interrogation and was handed over to the Russians. His admission to the British and the Americans in Persia that he was a Soviet agent seems to have got him into serious trouble in Moscow, and he is now believed to be serving a lengthy sentence in a compulsory labour camp in the U.S.S.R.

4. Ursula HAMBURGER seems to have been left very much to her own devices in her 1938 mission. She told FOOTE that she had made her own selection of Switzerland as a base, and implied that the only direct contributions made by the R.U. to her service were money, wireless apparatus and one agent who made a singularly ill judged arrival in Switzerland in September 1939. She also gave FOOTE the

/impression

Chapter III (continued)

impression that selection and recruitment of agents had been left to her own initiative, but here she may have exaggerated her lack of guidance from Moscow. It is noticeable, for example, that the agent contributed by headquarters was an ex-member of the International Brigade just as were FOOTE and BEURTON, her first recruits. FOOTE thought it strange that neither he nor BEURTON were required to be Party members, but this forbearance may have been R.U. policy for the task in hand.

5. FOOTE had his first rendez-vous with Ursula in Geneva at the end of October, and she posted him to Munich via England for a period of self education in the elements of undefined secret work against Germany. Possibly at this first meeting Ursula asked FOOTE to name a suitable assistant and he told her of Leon Charles BEURTON who had served with him in Spain.

6. In 1938 the sum of $6,500 was paid into von SCHELIHA's account at Zurich from New York (see Chapter II. E.).

B. France

1. During 1938 ROBINSON continued his operations against the British Isles from his base in Paris. He visited England himself and he also visited both Belgium and Switzerland. He seems to have been in Belgium at least twice and his business there may have been with the SCHNEIDERS. (It is possible that he went on from Belgium into Germany, using an unknown passport, to visit his mistress Klara SCHABBEL and their son in Berlin). He was in Switzerland in May, June, July and September. His connections with DUEBENDORFER seem to have been maintained and the frequency of these visits suggests that he may have helped her in her line of communications with Moscow, perhaps through his contact with the Soviet Military Attache in Paris.

2. TREPPER, based on Paris, continued his planning operations and to judge from his own account was mainly concerned with projects for a network directed against the British Isles. He may have visited England for this purpose during 1938. He spent some six months of the year in a personal report to Moscow, but returned, probably in the Autumn, on operational duty to establish his base in Brussels. On his way to Moscow he passed through Denmark, Sweden and Finland.

3. OZOLS may also have visited England during 1938, continuing his unknown operation.

4. During this year Anton DANILOFF is believed to have been posted to the Soviet Consulate in Paris, where he may have begun espionage work with the Soviet Military Attache.

5. In 1938 Victor SUKOLOV makes his first appearance in this story. He was about twenty-seven years old but had already had considerable training and experience under Red Army Intelligence. He had carried out some intelligence mission in Spain during the Civil War and then seems to have been posted to France. In 1938 funds were sent for him to a bank in Marseilles from Mexico. TREPPER's posting of SUKOLOV to Marseilles in 1942 may mean that SUKOLOV had used this town as a base before the war.

/C. The British Isles.

Chapter III (continued)

C. The British Isles

1. During this year ROBINSON continued his operations against the British Isles which he visited at least three times in April, July and September. So far as WEISS was concerned the espionage income seems to have remained poor. VERNON produced little or nothing, while MEREDITH, who had moved to a private firm, produced only occasional material which, according to WEISS, received unfavourable criticisms from Moscow through ROBINSON. It is worth bearing in mind, however, that WEISS may not have been ROBINSON's only operator in this country. For example, ROBINSON's visits in July and September do not seem to have concerned WEISS. The ROBINSON papers, referring to information from England in the following year, may be construed to mean that even MEREDITH was exploited on an alternative line. There is a background to this possibility. In the first place it appears that HARRY II, ROBINSON's predecessor, had an acquaintance and meetings with MEREDITH and his wife in which WEISS took no part. WEISS has also said that he believed MEREDITH's visit to Russia in April and May 1937 may have had a good deal to do with his development as an agent. MEREDITH had spoken as though he were better able to act as an adviser alongside Russian technicians in Russia than as a producer of documents, blue prints and answers to occasional briefs which took no proper account of his technical scope. If there is anything in this supposition, MEREDITH's visit to Russia may have been followed by a better service through some other cut-out than WEISS. We have also to reckon with the unidentified agent "JEAN", who by April 1939 seems to have been well established in the British Isles and who certainly offered more businesslike prospects at that time to ROBINSON than WEISS ever seems to have done.

2. Rudolf HERRNSTADT made further visits to England in 1938 and again saw Ilse STEINFELD.

3. TREPPER is also believed to have visited the British Isles during this year, possibly on a technical mission, but probably also to develop his plans in a new large scale operation against this country directed from the Low Countries and Scandinavia.

4. In September Alexander Allan FOOTE returned from the International Brigade to be considered for a special courier post between Spain and the British Communist Party. Whether or not this proposal was genuine, it soon disappeared in favour of an invitation to carry out "secret work" in Europe. If we are to believe FOOTE, he was not a member of the Communist Party at this time, neither had he any clear idea of what the secret work might be. He gathered that his name had been put forward by SPRINGHALL and his recruitment was carried out through Communist Party Headquarters in London. From there he was passed to a woman in Hampstead whom he later learnt to be Brigitte LEWIS, nee KUCZYNSKI, the sister of Ursula HAMBURGER. Brigitte sent him out to a rendez-vous with Ursula in Geneva at the end of October. The rendez-vous still left him much in the dark. He was ignorant of Ursula's identity - he knew her as "SONIA" - and he knew neither the name of the organisation by which he was paid nor the purpose of the work he was to do. Nevertheless he not only took Ursula HAMBURGER's directions but he produced on her request the name of a further recruit, Leon Charles BEURTON, who had served with him

/in Spain

Chapter III (continued)

in Spain and who was politically inclined towards the I.L.P. FOOTE went on to his first post in Munich through England where he had further meetings with Brigitte LEWIS, and it was to Brigitte that he sent his Munich address by means of secret writing concealed in a book.

D. The Low Countries

(i) Belgium

1. The SCHNEIDERS seem to have continued to work as couriers during 1938. It is possible that they were joined at their house in Brussels by WENZEL, who returned from Moscow this year to settle in Belgium.

2. ROBINSON visited Belgium in June, perhaps for business with the SCHNEIDERS.

3. Although his arrival in Belgium is not officially recorded until March 1939, TREPPER seems to have paid a visit or visits there on his return from Moscow towards the end of 1938, and may already have been using the cover of a business man. It is certainly to be suspected that he was behind a new development in the career of Leon GROSSVOGEL. Leon had become unpopular with his employers, the owners of the Excellent Raincoat Company. Though they recognised his ability, and though he was related to one of them, KAPELOWITZ, by marriage, they knew that GROSSVOGEL had communist sympathies and they found him awkward during a strike which took place at their Brussels plant in 1938. They therefore accepted with relief a proposal made before by GROSSVOGEL that he should set up an independent company in the same line of business. They themselves subscribed some $8,000 towards the new firm and held between them half of the share issue. The other half was held by GROSSVOGEL himself and it is hard to believe that he was not supported financially by TREPPER as a foreign business man, or under some other cover. The new concern, the Foreign Excellent Raincoat Company, was expressly designed to deal in the export of raincoats to Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, territory in which TREPPER planned to set up bases for an operation against the British Isles. The formal institution of the company dates from December 1938.

(ii) Holland

4. Towards the end of 1938 WENZEL under his alias of "HERMANN" revisited GOUWLOOZE and told him that he had settled in Belgium. He asked for a man from the Dutch Communist Party to help on some unspecified task and GOUWLOOZE provided him with WINTERINK. It was not until some time later that GOUWLOOZE learned of WINTERINK's training by WENZEL as a wireless operator.

E. Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia

1. Von SCHELIHA continued to be exploited as a source of intelligence against Germany in his post at the German Embassy, Warsaw.

/In November

Chapter III (continued)

2. In November FOOTE was posted to Munich via Switzerland and England in Ursula HAMBURGER's new service. He had been given 2,000 Swiss francs for his first three month and his instructions were to learn German. He had also been advised to study wireless and photography and he was expected to make contacts among the employees of the B.M.W. factory. He carried out the first part of his instructions but otherwise lived as a man of leisure on an allowance of 500-550 RM a month.

F. Scandinavia

1. TREPPER passed through Denmark, Sweden and Finland on his way to France from Moscow. He may have been able to announce to his contacts in these countries the coming foundation of the Foreign Excellent Raincoat Company and its proposed export business with Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.

G. The Balkans

1. Germaine SCHNEIDER may have continued to work as courier to an unknown agent in Bulgaria.

H. Italy

1. RADO may have been conducting operations against Italy during this year.

I. Western Hemisphere

1. In 1938 we have our earliest traces of the Western Hemisphere as a financial base in this story. Firstly there is a record that $6,500 were credited from the Chase National Bank, New York, to an account run by von SCHELIHA in Zurich. (It may be relevant that the American Communist Party, using a former member of the bank's organisation, seems to have run a disguised account at the Chase National Bank from early 1941. Both Russian funds and Russian agents were involved in this transaction). It is possible that most of von SCHELIHA's espionage income went into his Swiss account before the war.

2. Secondly it is believed that SUKOLOV had monies sent from Mexico to a bank in Marseilles during this year.

Chapter IV. 1939.

A. Switzerland.

1. RADO's service continued during 1939 quite independently, it seems, of either DUEBENDORFER or Ursula HAMBURGER, but he had a visitor from outside, an agent with the cover name "MANOLO", who may have brought him fresh instructions on the outbreak of war. By July 1943, MANOLO had fallen into German hands but the damage he could do to the Swiss network was limited, since all that he knew was the name and address of RADO and the fact that he was working for Red Army Intelligence. (It is possible that MANOLO should be identified with SUKOLOV whom we know to have visited Switzerland in the following year and who was used for a mission similar to that of MANOLO, in his visit to SCHULZE-BOYSEN in Germany in April 1939. According to one German source, SUKOLOV admitted that he handed over a cypher to someone in the Rue de Lausanne at Geneva in the summer of 1940. This address would fit RADO and corresponds roughly with the limited amount of knowledge which MANOLO is supposed to have had. It may well be that the German source has confused two of SUKOLOV's visits to Switzerland and that he handed over this cypher in the summer of 1939 not 1940).

2. (Another possible candidate for identification with "MANOLO" is JEFFREMOV who travelled to Brussels from Zurich in September 1939 under a Finnish alias. We do not know when or how JEFFREMOV arrived in Switzerland and whether he was sent there from Russia. It is possible that he may have brought RADO's cypher to him.)

3. The point of the cypher must have been to prepare RADO for an alternative means of communication with his management. The system of postal and courier links through which he passed his microphotographed intelligence to the Soviet Military Attache in Paris was clearly vulnerable to censorship and other accidents of war even before the German invasion of France. By June, 1940, a wireless link between RADO and Moscow had become essential but the advantages of such a link must have been obvious enough a year before, and it seems likely therefore that "MANOLO's" visit was a first step in the new direction, providing RADO with a cypher against the time when he would have both wireless transmitters and operators. (Cf. the story of GOUWLOOZE and the "reserve code", Chapter IV, D.)

4. ROBINSON visited Switzerland in February, May and June-July. To judge from his messages to Moscow in 1940 and 1941, his business during these visits was with DUEBENDORFER. There are various unidentified characters in ROBINSON's messages who seem to have belonged to a group or network under DUEBENDORFER before the war. The position of one of these, "JENNY", may imply that DUEBENDORFER was working against France in 1939, but it is possible that she had other interests as well.

5. Ursula HAMBURGER's service against Germany was brought to a standstill by the Russo-German pact of August 1939. Although Red Army Intelligence ordered her at short notice to halt all work against Germany, it would be unwise to regard this as a sign of some general suspension of R.U. activities in that direction. Ursula's service, in so far as it had any practical existence from 1938 to 1939, had been concerned far more in plans for sabotage than in the collection of intelligence, and may have been wholly designed for sabotage work. Suggestions in this field had been required from both FOOTE and BEURTON; they were given elementary instruction in the manufacture of incendiary bombs; and projects had ranged from the burning of a Zeppelin to the assassination of Hitler.

/Although

Chapter IV (continued).

Although these plans were amateurish in the extreme and were despised as such by FOOTE himself, it is evident that Ursula HAMBURGER engaged in them with the backing of Moscow, until the time of the Russo-German pact. Indeed, if we consider Ursula HAMBURGER's work in 1938 - 9 as a sabotage mission, some of the more puzzling features in FOOTE's story begin to disappear. Sabotage and assassination involve publicity and in peacetime the risk of international complications. The choice of two rolling stones from the International Brigade, Englishmen with good campaigning records but without formal Communist Party connections, may have been both deliberate and sound. Moreover, as we know from his own testimony, FOOTE had he been caught as a saboteur, could not have named the organisation for which he was working. It was only after his recall to Switzerland that Ursula told him who his masters were. On the whole, therefore, any general deductions from the eclipse of Ursula HAMBURGER should be applied to the sabotage work of Red Army Intelligence against Germany. Though direct action of this kind may have been considered impolitic after the Russo-German pact, the collection of intelligence is likely to have increased rather than diminished.

6. Ursula HAMBURGER remained in wireless contact with Red Army Intelligence Headquarters and was directed to instruct her agents in wireless technique. Moscow was probably considering the need for alternative means of communication, both in RADO's and in DUEBENDORFER's services, and this instruction may have been complementary to the visit from MANOLO. There seems, however, to have been no contact between Ursula HAMBURGER and these services during 1939. In September Moscow made their only direct contribution in manpower to Ursula HAMBURGER's group. This was Frans OBERMANNS @ ALEX, a German Communist who had served with the International Brigade and who was sent into Switzerland from Russia through Germany, with W/T apparatus. He was given a Finnish passport but insufficient training to support his cover and was arrested by the Swiss in December. For the rest of the war he worked under mild restrictions in a Swiss labour camp and remained both a financial and a security liability to the Swiss network.

B. France.

1. ROBINSON continued his service from Paris against the British Isles, at least until the outbreak of war, and visited England from May 26th to June 4th. He visited Switzerland in February, May and June-July (see Chapter IV, A). (Our passport records of ROBINSON do not go later than July 1939.) Most of ROBINSON's business in England during 1939 must have been with "JEAN" (see C below). WEISS had his last contact with him in Paris in July, on which occasion ROBINSON seems to have shown no anxiety about the approach of war or the effect that war might have on their communications. After the Russo-German pact he sent WEISS a letter in plain language code apparently to reassure him on the ultimate nobility of Russia's motives.

2. We have no information on the activities of OZOLS during 1939, but he may have continued a mission against the British Isles.

3. DANILOV remained at the Soviet Consulate in Paris. SUKOLOV seems to have been in France until July when he arrived in Brussels under a Uruguayan alias. Funds were sent to him this year, as in 1938, from Mexico to a bank in Marseilles.

/C. The British Isles.

Chapter IV (continued).

C. The British Isles.

1. In the early spring of 1939, Leon Charles BEURTON, whose name had been given by FOOTE to Ursula HAMBURGER in 1938, was recruited for her service through her sister Brigitte LEWIS, presumably with the help of the Communist Party. FOOTE has said that the circumstances of BEURTON's recruitment were much the same as his own. BEURTON had a rendez-vous with Ursula HAMBURGER in Switzerland and was posted thence to Frankfurt-am-Main

2. In April 1939, we have our first certain record of "JEAN" as an agent in England collecting intelligence from a number of subordinates, of whom the most important appear to have been the "PROFESSOR", "BOB" and "ELLEN". It is reasonable to suppose that "JEAN" was an agent of some standing and that he had been working for ROBINSON in England at least since the beginning of 1939. There is, for example, a report to ROBINSON from England signed "J" which appears to date from February 1939. On January 1st 1939, ROBINSON was sent a long report in English on "Greater London" which appears to be a guide or training document for an agent about to be posted to London. It cannot be established whether the report was prepared by "JEAN" but it was evidently written by somebody who knew London personally, and it has been disowned by WEISS. (The writer's English shows German characteristics and it may be relevant that "JEAN's" April report is written in German.) As for JEAN, it is worth considering whether he may not have been identical with an R.U. agent known at headquarters as "DOCTOR". This man is said to have worked in England for the Fourth Section of Red Army Intelligence, that is, the section concerned in the collection of technical intelligence, for some years before 1940, and is likely to have remained in this country after that date. "DOCTOR" is said to have had "secret lodgings", which is consistent with JEAN's circumstances described in the next paragraph. Moreover, according to his report of April 1939, JEAN's transactions with his source or sub-agent BOB had been covered by an "artificial limb story". The use of such a cover story becomes easier to understand if it is supposed that JEAN himself masqueraded as a "doctor".

3. JEAN, to judge from his report of April 1939, was living and working in England under some temporary cover. He needed both fresh cover and addresses, for example, an "official address" where he might be supposed to live; a place of safe keeping for intelligence material; and cover addresses for his correspondence with ROBINSON. (There seems to have been a postal link between JEAN and ROBINSON, possibly combined with a courier service; and a book code was used to conceal the most secret parts of their correspondence.)

4. As for WEISS, his espionage products from MEREDITH continued to be small and after July 1939, when he saw ROBINSON for the last time in Paris, he claims to have dropped out of the service. He says that he last heard from ROBINSON about August 1939, when he received a reassuring note on the Russo-German pact (see B.). The contrast between the inactivity of WEISS and the busyness of "JEAN" in 1939 is considerable and needs some explanation. WEISS claims that he had been anxious to retire from the service for some time past and that he had shown his inclinations to both HARRY II and ROBINSON. This may be true, but up to the date of his last meeting with ROBINSON he was still being paid at the average rate of eight to ten pounds a week, including expenses. WEISS has also suggested that he was being gradually discarded by his employers, who may have doubted his reliability ever since the protest which he claims to have made to them in

/Switzerland

Chapter IV (continued).

Switzerland in 1934. Against this suggestion we must set the fact that WEISS's name, address and telephone number were sent by ROBINSON to Red Army Intelligence in 1941. The messages can be partly explained as arrangements for contact with MEREDITH, but in one of them dated March 18th, 1941, WEISS's name appears to be related to the "PROFESSOR" and the PROFESSOR's wife SHEILLA. The PROFESSOR and his "wife" are known to have been members of the service operated by "JEAN", and WEISS, who disclaims any knowledge of "JEAN" or his works, has been unable to explain the mystery.

5. In October 1939, a certain Bob DARWIN, who as long ago as 1932 had been taken into the service with WEISS's knowledge and assistance, asked WEISS to meet him in London. WEISS had grounds for supposing that DARWIN had come to grief about 1934 when he was working for some part of the Russian Intelligence in Vienna. At the meeting of October 1939, DARWIN confirmed this impression and showed himself to be very much down on his luck. The purpose of the meeting is obscure. According to WEISS, DARWIN complained that he was being watched by his former employers and asked that WEISS should intercede on his behalf. WEISS doubted whether this story was true and suspected an attempt at blackmail. He told DARWIN that he had no more to do with the organisation and when he heard from him again in 1941 he ignored his letter.

D. The Low Countries.

(i) Belgium.

1. TREPPER made his official arrival in Brussels in March 1939 under the alias of Adam MIKLER, a Canadian businessman. He was joined next month by Michel MAKAROV who had been sent from Moscow through Stockholm and Copenhagen to Paris at the beginning of the year. In Paris he had been given a Uruguayan passport in the name of Carlos ALAMO and some ten thousand dollars. It is said that MAKAROV's primary telent was as a forger of documents, but he later worked as a W/T operator, and his posting to Ostend by TREPPER in April 1939 suggests that he was intended to serve in the front line of TREPPER's communications with the British Isles. MAKAROV's cover in Ostend was fortified by the "sale" to him of a branch of the Foreign Excellent Raincoat Company which had hitherto been managed by GROSSVOGEL's wife. Leon GROSSVOGEL himself made a tour of Scandinavia in the spring of 1939, ostensibly on behalf of the Foreign Excellent Raincoat Company. He was presumably engaged in establishing further bases for TREPPER's operation against the British Isles.

2. In July Victor SUKOLOV arrived in Brussels, also under a Uruguayan alias, Vincente SIERRA. According to German sources SUKOLOV had been destined for Copenhagen but remained in Brussels as an assistant to TREPPER. This statement needs qualification. We do not know what SUKOLOV's business may have been in France in 1938 and the first half of 1939 but there is nothing to show that he was working for TREPPER at that time. In April 1939 SUKOLOV visited Berlin on instructions from Moscow in order to revive SCHULZE-BOYSEN as a source and to arrange communications with him by courier. SUKOLOV's posting to Brussels in July therefore may have been made in order to provide a reception point for SCHULZE-BOYSEN's information and a means of relaying that information from Belgium to Moscow. This probability is borne out by SUKOLOV's career betweeen July 1939 and June 1940. During that time he is known to have associated with TREPPER

/but

Chapter IV (continued).

but he handled his own traffic with Moscow, without reference to the so-called "Grand Chef". Their association may have grown, however, from their sharing of the means of communication with their common employer, the R.U.

3. Soviet Diplomatic offices in the Low Countries were available to both of them and there is evidence that TREPPER did refer on occasion to the Soviet Embassy in Brussels. But the regular use of diplomatic links would have endangered their cover and each must have been anxious for his own purposes to establish a private line of communication. We do not know if TREPPER had any quantity of intelligence to pass back. SUKOLOV, on the other hand, if the SCHULZE-BOYSEN line was his, must have been under some pressure, and it is likely therefore that it was he who sought out the Dutch Communist Party link described under (ii) below. Once this link was working TREPPER may have used it too, through SUKOLOV, and this may be the explanation of the German statement that SUKOLOV, in 1939, learnt to encypher with the codes which TREPPER himself used. It must be remembered here, as elsewhere, that the German story derives mainly from the statements of TREPPER himself, and that it was in TREPPER's interest to magnify his own importance even though it might be at the expense of SUKOLOV. If there ever was a plan to send SUKOLOV to Copenhagen it is likely to have been abandoned before he went to Berlin and some months before he arrived in Brussels. SUKOLOV's cover as Vincente SIERRA seems designed to serve for a prolonged residence in Belgium and his conduct as SIERRA contains no hint of plans for Denmark.

4. The foundations of a third independent service in Belgium were laid by the arrival of Konstantin JEFFREMOV in Brussels in September. He came under a Finnish alias, Erland JERNSTROEM, from Zurich, and he professed to be a student of chemistry. Chemistry in fact is likely to have been the immediate interest of his mission, for he is said to have served as a chemical warfare specialist with the Red Army and to have been employed before the war in the collection of technical information about chemicals. We do not know against whom this particular mission was addressed, nor what became of it. JEFFREMOV's arrival in Belgium three days after the outbreak of war was evidently too opportune to be wasted on a short-term mission and he was instructed to build up a network. For this purpose he was put in touch with WENZEL, and he also made use of the SCHNEIDERs. It is not clear whether JEFFREMOV's network was designed for immediate operations or whether it was meant to be held in reserve for an emergency. The latter possibility suggests rather more providence on the part of Red Army Intelligence than the rest of this story warrants. Against it we must set the facts that WENZEL was building up this service at the beginning of 1939 (see (ii) below) and that TREPPER knew nothing of it until the emergency of 1941.

(ii) Holland

5. At the beginning of the year, WENZEL was in Amsterdam where with the help of GOUWLOOZE he recruited WINTERINK for the service which was to become JEFFREMOV's. It has been commonly supposed that WINTERINK remained in Holland and that his later W/T link with Moscow operated from that country. The evidence of GOUWLOOZE to the Germans, however, suggests that WINTERINK was taken by WENZEL into Belgium at least for his W/T training, and it is possible that the W/T station itself was set up in Belgium towards the end of the following year. About June 1939, WENZEL asked GOUWLOOZE for another recruit and Adam NAGEL, a Dutch Communist and a photographer by profession, was sent to him in Belgium.

6. GOUWLOOZE himself paid a visit to Moscow in 1939 and had discussions on the subject of an information service by the Dutch Communist

/Party

Chapter IV (continued).

Party, which Moscow (presumably the Comintern) had planned as far back as 1937 to come into operation on the outbreak of war. GOUWLOOZE had been making technical preparations for a W/T link in this service for some time past, and it probably came into operation after his return to Holland. The Dutch Communist Party contributed political information at first but after an interruption caused by the German invasion, the traffic became largely concerned with Russian and Communist interests in the Dutch resistance movement. So far as our story is concerned, the interest of this Dutch information service lies in the use of its W/T communications and its covert organisation for the purposes of the Russian Intelligence Services. Our knowledge of the Dutch Communist Party's information service is also valuable because of the light which it throws on similar services elsewhere, particularly in France, and on their general accessibility as emergency links with Moscow for the R.I.S.

7. In October 1939, perhaps only the second month of its existence, the Dutch Communist Party's information service was required through GOUWLOOZE to provide a temporary W/T link with Moscow for a Russian Intelligence agent in Belgium. This agent was known to GOUWLOOZE under the alias "CLEMENT" and he is so far unidentified. CLEMENT in his conversations with GOUWLOOZE implied that he had come from France where intelligence work had been disorganised by the outbreak of war and the ban on the Communist Party. At the beginning of 1940, he told GOUWLOOZE that a man from Paris had arrived in Brussels with a wireless operator and transmitter so that they could establish their own link with Moscow and the Dutch Communist Party could be relieved. The "man from Paris" was described by GOUWLOOZE as "very stout" and it seems possible that he may have been TREPPER. As for CLEMENT, it seems likely that he was either SUKOLOV or JEFFREMOV. We do not know whether JEFFREMOV had any urgent information to pass to Moscow at this time. SUKOLOV on the other hand had recently revived the SCHULZE-BOYSEN source in Germany and provided that the courier service with SCHULZE-BOYSEN was in working order it seems likely that SUKOLOV was in the most pressing need for a link between Belgium and Moscow. Through SUKOLOV this Dutch Communist Party link may also have been used by TREPPER (see (i) above).

8. The use of GOUWLOOZE for Russian intelligence purposes was not casual but calculated and his reputation as a useful man in this field dated at least from 1936-7. During his discussions in the Dutch Communist Party information service at Moscow in 1939 he was given a "reserve cypher" which he was to hold against further instructions and which became of great importance to the Russian Intelligence Service in the following year. The banking of this cypher with GOUWLOOZE may be compared in date with the visit by MANOLO to RADO (see Chapter IV, A).

E. Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia.

(i) Germany

1. On the instructions of Moscow SUKOLOV, presumably from a base in France, visited Berlin in April 1939 to revive SCHULZE-BOYSEN as a source and to stimulate his production of other sources from German Government employees. SCHULZE-BOYSEN had been inactive since 1937 and it appears that SUKOLOV had some difficulty in rousing him to the new task. However, a courier link was established between him in Berlin and (presumably) SUKOLOV, who in July took up his station in Brussels. The exact date when

Chapter IV (continued).

SCHULZE-BOYSEN's supply of information began in 1939 is not known, but considering his position in the German Air Ministry it is likely to have been of high value. For this reason it may have been SUKOLOV who in October arranged for an emergency link from Belgium through the Dutch Communist Party W/T to Moscow.

2. In the early summer of 1939, BEURTON, who had been recruited from England for Ursula HAMBURGER's service, was posted to Frankfurt a/Main. Like FOOTE he was supposed to learn German and to develop contacts in a local firm. Like FOOTE again he seems to have taken his duties lightly and the two friends were in the habit of meeting in Munich. In August FOOTE made an appointed visit to Ursula HAMBURGER in Switzerland. He had begun his journey back when Ursula, alarmed by the threat of war, changed her mind and told him to stay in Switzerland. Shortly afterwards, the Russo-German pact was signed; Moscow suspended her service against Germany; and BEURTON was recalled to Switzerland.

3. Von SCHELIHA had continued to be exploited as a source in Poland from January to September 1939. When war broke out between Germany and Poland he returned to the Foreign Office in Berlin. He succeeded in placing Ilse STOEBE with the Press Section of the Foreign Office where she had official relations with the representatives of TASS in Berlin. Until June 1941 von SCHELIHA's intelligence passed through Ilse STOEBE's hands to TASS and thence to the Soviet Commercial Attache at the Berlin Embassy.

(ii) Czechoslovakia.

4. It is possible that the Russian Intelligence network known as the OSKOL group began its existence in Prague during 1939 and SUKOLOV may have visited the group about the time of his visit to Berlin in April. Very little is known about the OSKOL group but it is presumed to have been connected at this time with the Soviet Embassy in Prague.

F. Scandinavia

1. In the Spring of 1939 GROSSVOGEL toured Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland, ostensibly for the Foreign Excellent Raincoat Company. In Stockholm GROSSVOGEL seems to have set up BOELLENS as an agent for the company, but it is not known whether this man was ever consciously engaged in espionage.

G. The Balkans

1. At an unknown date in 1939 STOINOFF and his wife Milka STOINOFF were sent into Bulgaria from Russia to establish an intelligence network and wireless communications with Moscow. They were Bulgarians born and they appear to have gone under Bulgarian cover, but with the alias of MIRTSCHEFF. The STOINOFFs had gone to Russia in 1935 apparently as visitors, without any strong political background. They had fallen on evil days and were picked up by one of the Russian Intelligence Services which gave them an extensive training in espionage and wireless technique. Their 1939 mission opened at Plovdiv. They were equipped with money, a short-wave transmitter and other technical material, and they had been given addresses of Russian Intelligence contacts in Bulgaria. It is possible that they thereby became connected with the unknown agent for whom Germaine SCHNEIDER had travelled as a courier

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Chapter IV (continued).

in preceding years. Bulgaria was certainly not a new centre for Russian espionage, and the Soviet Legation at Sofia may have had connections ranging into Western Europe, to judge from the stories told by TREPPER after his capture in 1942.

H. Italy.

1. RADO may have been conducting operations against Italy during this year.

I. The Western Hemisphere.

1. As in 1938, money seems to have been sent from Mexico to a bank in Marseilles for SUKOLOV, presumably during the first half of 1939 when SUKOLOV was still in France.

Chapter V. 1940

A. Switzerland

1. During the first half of 1940 FOOTE and BEURTON continued to train as W/T operators. In the spring there was a proposal from Moscow that the whole of Ursula HAMBURGER's group should be transferred to Rumania, either to set up a new service there or to reinforce some existing group which was perhaps in need of W/T communications. It was intended that FOOTE should be the forerunner and make preparations in Rumania for the arrival of his colleagues. Nothing more was heard of the plan which seems to have been finally abandoned when the Germans moved into Rumania. The proposal deserves record, however, because it shows that the combination of Ursula's group with RADO's service had not yet been decided.

2. Early in 1940 Ursula divorced Rudolf HAMBURGER in a Swiss Court and married BEURTON, with whom she had developed a passionate friendship since his recall to Switzerland in August 1939. According to FOOTE, the divorce was obtained by false evidence of Rudolf's infidelity. It aroused no suspicion with the Swiss or British authorities, but it produced a dangerous situation in Ursula's own circle. Olga MUTH, Ursula's German maid, who had seen long service with the KUCZYNSKI family, was fond of Rudolf and she had therefore been told that the marriage with BEURTON was merely "de convenance", a tactical move in Ursula's secret career in which Olga herself had taken a part. In June 1940, some time after the marriage however, Olga discovered that it was by no means a matter of form. In her indignation she proceeded to telephone the British Consulate to inform on both the BEURTONS. Fortunately for Ursula, Olga's English was so bad that she failed to make herself understood and an impatient official at the Consulate cut her off. Olga was packed off to Germany and she has not been heard of again. Moscow was told the whole story and for a time they held Ursula to be compromised. Since no action was taken by the Swiss or the British against Ursula or her companions it is unlikely that they maintained this view and it would be rash to suppose that she was retired for this single reason.

3. In March SUKOLOV paid a three weeks' visit to Switzerland from Belgium. The visit was made openly in the character of Vincente SIERRA and the Germans seem to have regarded it as part of his "business" cover. Considering the use made of SUKOLOV in 1939 to revive the SCHULZE-BOYSEN source, and bearing in mind his possible identity with "MANOLO" who visited RADO in 1939, it seems unlikely that SUKOLOV had no intelligence commitments on the 1940 journey. According to FOOTE, RADO was told in early 1940 that he would be visited by a courier with money from abroad. When the courier arrived, however, he said that he had no money to offer and that his mission was simply to inspect RADO's service. (Chapter IV., A.). The identification of this courier with SUKOLOV is uncertain. There were other people whom SUKOLOV might have visited in March, 1940. His mission may have been to see DUEBENDORFER or some other member of "Gisela's family"; or he may have had business with Ursula HAMBURGER. In December, 1940, the R.U. told ROBINSON that they had sent a young man with money to the agent ANNA, but they did not know whether he would succeed in reaching her. ROBINSON himself had expressed anxiety about ANNA or ANNI in November, and in January, 1941 he said gloomily that he hoped the R.U. man would reach her soon;

/"You know

Chapter V (continued)

"You know ANNI and you know what is meant by that". From the context of these messages it is possible that ANNA was in Switzerland and it has been suggested that she should be identified with Anna MUELLER, a member of "Gisela's family". (See Chapter I. A). It is not impossible that the young man from the R.U. was SUKOLOV. In February 1940 Franz SCHNEIDER of Brussels is known to have visited Anna MUELLER, and to have given her $300 on behalf of ROBINSON.

4. Communications in France were disrupted by the German invasion in June and it is likely that RADO lost some of his links with the Soviet Military Attache in Paris. Even when the postal services came to be restored it is likely that censorship and the control of the demarcation line between occupied and unoccupied France made his old methods of communication unsafe. Probably for these reasons Ursula HAMBURGER was put in touch with RADO about June and began to carry some part of his traffic for Moscow over her wireless transmitters.

5. DUEBENDORFER's communications also seem to have been interrupted by the German invasion of France, and this is one reason for supposing that she had been linked with the Soviet Military Attache in Paris between 1936 and 1940. It was not until the beginning of 1941 that ROBINSON succeeded in making courier contact with DUEBENDORFER, and the news which he passed on from her to Moscow at that time showed that she was without funds or instructions, and generally disorganised. It is worth considering whether DUEBENDORFER's espionage before June 1940 may not have been directed against France herself. DUEBENDORFER's intelligence achievement against Germany from 1941 to 1943 seems to have been on an entirely new line and cannot be regarded in itself as evidence that she had worked against Germany before the war.

6. In December Ursula HAMBURGER, now Ursula BEURTON, and a British subject by marriage, left Switzerland for the British Isles and handed over her service of wireless communications to FOOTE and BEURTON. From this date the service became part of RADO's apparatus. Apart from the revolution in her private life, Ursula HAMBURGER seems to have been shaken in her politics by the Russo-German pact. She had worked for many years on the most orthodox "anti-Fascist" basis and she spoke with bitterness to both BEURTON and FOOTE about Russia's volte-face. How far these feelings were known to the R.U. we cannot say. If they had known the full facts about her marriage to BEURTON they might have regarded it as a sympton of indiscipline or at least a lack of self control. In form however the marriage had advantages since it gave Ursula a safe passage into England as a British subject. The R.U. therefore may have had some intention of employing Ursula in England once they were satisfied that the Olga MUTH incident was closed. But there is no evidence that Ursula did any intelligence work in the British Isles between 1941 and 1949.

B. France

1. Throughout 1940 ROBINSON seems to have maintained his relations with the Soviet Military Attache at Paris, though there may have been a considerable interruption in contact at the time of the German invasion. During the first half of the year he was

/still

Chapter V (continued)

still responsible for a service from the British Isles, though he seems to have had no direct or indirect contact with WEISS, and another of his agents there, probably JEAN, complained in January that he had been left entirely in the lurch.

2. The surviving messages between ROBINSON and Red Army Intelligence begin in July 1940, and they show him at the first all adrift. He reports that he has had no news from England for a long time and sees no possibility of re-establishing contact there. He wonders whether the game is ended: "I do not know to what extent I can still be useful for your work and I beg you to tell me without equivocation whether it is necessary for me still to continue my activities. As I have told you, I am very willing to do a useful job but not to receive a pension for I am still too young for that. Forgive my speaking frankly on this point but you should understand that in my present situation, producing no concrete results, I am bound to come to these conclusions". Against this dutiful resignation, however, he makes brisk proposals for the collection of intelligence on German enterprises in France, and during the rest of 1940 he sends in various scraps of information, some acquired with the help of the French Communist Party and some by his own recruitment of agents and sources. Most of the messages from the R.U. to ROBINSON during 1940 are lacking from our records, but they evidently encouraged his establishment of a new network against Germany in France. In December 1940 he was directed to devote his main efforts towards the recruitment of agents among French workers who were being sent to work in Germany. The R.U. was also insistent that he should establish a "safe house" for a wireless transmitter. By January 1941 ROBINSON was writing with assurance of "work in the new direction", that is to say against Germany and Germany in France instead of the British Isles. Nevertheless he had not been relieved of his responsibilities for his "clients" in England and he was concerned in enquiries about other agents isolated by the German advance.

3. According to an informant who served at R.U. headquarters in 1940-41, the fourth section had possessed a large and efficient network in France, but after the German victory "there was chaos and the very hell". It is not surprising therefore that ROBINSON, the faithful shepherd, should be set to work finding lost sheep.

4. In July 1940 TREPPER and GROSSVOGEL retreated from Brussels through Paris to unoccupied France where TREPPER established a link with the Soviet Military Attache at Vichy. His cover as a Canadian business man had become a liability after the German invasion of the Low Countries, and the Foreign Excellent Raincoat Company had been taken over with its parent firm by the occupying power. Considering the reorientation of TREPPER's work against Germany instead of England it is likely that the Foreign Excellent Raincoat Company would soon have outlived its uses. TREPPER made a tour of the Belgian battle-fields with GROSSVOGEL. This tour, which was secured by the use of Bulgarian diplomatic cover, was ostensibly to inspect Foreign Excellent Raincoat properties in the battle area. Plans for a new and more elaborate business cover, SIMEX, were laid in the autumn when TREPPER and GROSSVOGEL moved to Paris.

/5. During

Chapter V (continued)

5. During the German invasion, OZOLS may have remained in Paris and have lost contact with the Soviet Military Attache after the withdrawal of Embassy officials to unoccupied France. He was given a fresh commission in August, probably by the Soviet Military Attache at Vichy, and at the same time he seems to have been equipped with a wireless transmitter.

6. During 1940 DANILOFF seems to have been transferred from the Soviet Consulate in Paris to the Embassy at Vichy, where Nokolaevitch Guennadi KARPOV became his intelligence chief. KARPOV had served as a clerk in both the Paris and Vichy Embassies and may have been concerned in both ROBINSON's and TREPPER's affairs.

7. At an unknown date in 1940 a Frenchwoman, later known under the alias of "Anna FROLOVA" left Paris for Russia via Copenhagen. This woman was a French Communist and may have been known to ROBINSON; she was to reappear in France in March 1942, probably on a mission to TREPPER's organisation.

C. The British Isles

1. At the time of ROBINSON's capture by the Germans in the autumn of 1942 there was found in one of his false passports (WEHRLI) a letter from London dated 22nd January, 1940. This letter is in plain language code, but it is not difficult to understand. The writer, we construe, was a member of ROBINSON's service in England, and he was complaining of the prolonged lack of contact with his management since September 1939. One part of the letter refers to "BOBINETTE" - presumably BOB, one of JEAN's principal agents - and indicates that this man had secured some position or contact which greatly increased his value as a source. This new advantage seems to be confirmed by a message from ROBINSON to the R.U. of July 1940, where he speaks of the value of JEAN's connections "since BOB got his step up". The names used at the beginning and end of this letter have no relation to any of the known agents in ROBINSON's world, as we have been told by WEISS himself that it was customary in letters of this kind to invent both an addressee and a signatory for each occasion.

2. There are good grounds for supposing that this January letter was written by a member of JEAN's group, probably JEAN himself, and it must be added that there is no evidence in the ROBINSON papers of an improvement in JEAN's position during the rest of 1940. For his own part ROBINSON made strong recommendations to Moscow for the re-establishment of contact with JEAN, explaining that while JEAN's sources were undoubtedly good, his financial position must have become difficult. It was not until the end of the year, however, that Moscow seems to have discussed with ROBINSON a link of their own with his English connections and there is evidence that such a link was still lacking in February 1941. The reason for the delay is not clear. An informant, who worked in the fourth section of the R.U. at Moscow in 1940-41, has said that at this time Germany and the United States were considered to be the most important targets. The British Isles took a secondary place and communication difficulties delayed the establishment of a network there. Nevertheless the Russians had their diplomatic representatives in this country and in

/the case

Chapter V (continued)

the case of another recommendation by ROBINSON they seem to have made contact in England at least by December 1940. This recommendation, however, does not seem to have concerned JEAN's group and may have been no more than the indication of a potential source connected with one of ROBINSON's agents in France. The man in question, known to us as "the friend of M.P.", (M.P. was one of ROBINSON's principal agents in France) may have been a French officer who had served as an illegal resident for the fourth section of the R.U. in France, and who escaped to the British Isles after Dunkirk. It is said that this officer was given new intelligence assignments on his arrival in England but we do not know by whom.

D. The Low Countries

1. About January 1940 the temporary W/T link provided by GOUWLOOZE through the Dutch Communist Party for "CLEMENT" (? SUKOLOV) (see Chapter IV. D.) came to an end. CLEMENT told GOUWLOOZE that a man from Paris had arrived in Brussels with a wireless operator and a transmitter so that they were now able to conduct their own communications with Moscow. According to GOUWLOOZE, the man from Paris was "a very stout individual" who left Brussels about the time of the German invasion of the Low Countries, taking his wireless cypher with him. This sounds like TREPPER himself. The fact that TREPPER had been in Brussels at least since March 1939 might well be unknown to GOUWLOOZE. The wireless operator is not so easy to identify, but it may have been MAKAROV, recalled by TREPPER from Ostend in early 1940 to help in the urgent business of establishing an independent wireless link with Moscow. If the man from Paris was indeed TREPPER he presumably took his cypher with him in July 1940 to use at his new base in France. That he should have left SUKOLOV at a disadvantage by removing this cypher suggests again that there was only limited collaboration between TREPPER and SUKOLOV at this period and that they were by no means in each other's confidence (see Chapter IV. D.). Even though between October 1939 and January 1940 TREPPER used the same link as SUKOLOV with Moscow, the nature and situation of this link - in the Dutch Communist Party Information Service - may have been known only to SUKOLOV. In these circumstances, though TREPPER left MAKAROV and other parts of his Low Countries apparatus at SUKOLOV's disposal, he may not have been well enough acquainted with SUKOLOV's affairs to know that he lacked a cypher. In any case the damage was repaired by GOUWLOOZE, who produced for SUKOLOV's use a reserve code which he had been given in Moscow in 1939, possibly by the Comintern.

2. The Foreign Excellent Raincoat Company was taken over by the Germans with its parent firm, not long after the occupation of Brussels. Its last use by Russian Intelligence seems to have been during TREPPER's tour of the Belgian battlefields in July 1940 (see B. above). The plans of TREPPER and GROSSVOGEL in the autumn of 1940 for a new business cover, SIMEX, in France, were matched in Belgium by projects for the establishment of SIMEXCO. The invention and interdependence of the two firms are commonly regarded as symptoms of TREPPER's authority in France and the Low Countries at the same time. But communications between the R.U. and the field were regular and easy enough at this time for the SIMEX-SIMEXCO scheme to be a Moscow conception, put into operation through the parallel agencies of TREPPER in France and SUKOLOV in Belgium. The commercial relationship of the firms was an obvious

/aid to

Chapter V (continued)

aid to intelligence communications but it did not necessarily imply the control of SIMEXCO by SIMEX nor of SUKOLOV by TREPPER. To do TREPPER justice, the use of a common trade name for the two firms shows a lack of security sense which is not characteristic of his work.

3. JEFFREMOV's service seems to have maintained its independence in the Low Countries though its scope during 1940 is obscure. According to one source, WENZEL and WINTERINK had established a W/T link between Moscow and JEFFREMOV by December 1940. This is contradicted, however, by the evidence of GOUWLOOZE who believed that wireless contact was not achieved until the autumn of 1941.

E. Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia

(i) Germany.

1. Von SCHELIHA continued to be exploited as a source through Ilse STOEBE, the TASS representative in Berlin and the Soviet Commercial Attache.

2. SCHULZE-BOYSEN continued to supply information by courier to Belgium whence it was transmitted to Moscow by SUKOLOV.

3. About December 1940 an agent, probably of the R.U., using the alias of "Alexander ERDBERG" and the cover of the Soviet Trade Delegation in Berlin, recruited Arvid von HARNACK, a Communist sympathiser who already had acquaintance among Soviet deplomats in Berlin. HARNACK was later to work as a group leader and operator, collecting information from various well placed connections in German Government circles, but at this date he was probably no more than a source.

(ii) Czechoslovakia.

4. During 1940 the OSKOL group was probably developing in Czechoslovakia and communicating with Moscow through the Soviet Embassy, Prague.

F. Scandinavia

1. If it is true that the bases founded by GROSSVOGEL for TREPPER in Scandinavia under the cover of the Foreign Excellent Raincoat Company were part of an operation designed against the British Isles, then they are likely to have been abandoned during 1940.

2. At an unknown date in 1940 "Anna FROLOVA" passed through Copenhagen on her way through Paris to Russia. (See B. above).

/G. The Balkans

Chapter V (continued)

G. The Balkans

(i) Rumania.

1. In the spring of 1940 Moscow proposed to Ursula HAMBURGER/ BEURTON that her group should be transferred to Rumania and that FOOTE should go there as a forerunner to establish Rumanian contacts. The proposal was not confirmed and seems to have been abandoned when the Germans moved into Rumania.

(ii) Bulgaria.

2. By the autumn of 1940 the STOINOFF-MIRTSCHEFF group was effectively under way in Bulgaria. Their communications with Moscow had been improved by the arrival of two more W/T agents who were sent into Bulgaria from Russia during the year.

H. Spain and Portugal

Portugal.

At the end of October 1940 money was passed through Portugal to RADO in Switzerland; $3,500 of this were intended for Ursula HAMBURGER.

I. The Western Hemisphere

1. We know from SUKOLOV's mistress, Margarete BARCZA, that he had correspondence during 1940 from a certain "ELLEN" of New York. SUKOLOV said that ELLEN was his fiancee, but it may be suspected rather that she represents a continuing R.U. connection (probably financial) between SUKOLOV and the Western Hemisphere. (Cf. his payments from Mexico during 1938 and 1939).

2. In 1940 Charles BECKER, who had been working for some years in the Economic Section of the I.L.O. at Geneva, left for the Argentine via France. BECKER was known at Geneva as a close associate of Rachel DUEBENDORFER and Hermina RABINOWITCH, and he has been tentatively identified in the ROBINSON papers under the cover-name of "CONFISEUR" and "KUCHENMANN". In January 1941 ROBINSON forwarded to Red Army Intelligence headquarters from Rachel DUEBENDORFER the information that "KUCHENMANN" was "overseas". In May of the same year he reported again from DUEBEBDORFER that "CONFISEUR" was at the Universidad Nacional de Cuyo (sic), Mendoza. With the help of certain papers found at the time of DUEBENDORFER's arrest in 1944 it has been established that CONFISEUR may be identical with Charles BECKER of the same Argentinian address. Nothing is known of his activities, if any, as an agent in the Argentine. Presumably if the R.U. were making enquiries about him in 1941, his existence at that time was no more than a matter of record. It is probable that Moscow was working on a list of "GISELA's family" dating from the time of her (POLIAKOVA's) last communications with DUEBENDORFER in 1939.

/3. In September

Chapter V (continued)

3. In September 1940 another of DUEBENDORFER's friends, Hermina RABINOWITCH, left Europe via Portugal to work at the headquarters of the I.L.O., which had been transferred to Montreal. She had been working for the I.L.O. since 1929 and from GOUZENKO's documents and her unwilling evidence in the Canadian case it seems clear that she also qualified as a member of "GISELA's family". It is possible that she should be identified with "HERMANN" who, according to the same ROBINSON - R.U. message of January 1941 - was then, like "KUCHENMANN", overseas.

Chapter VI. 1941.

A. Switzerland.

1. In January 1941, the courier sent by ROBINSON to DUEBENDORFER in Switzerland about December 1940 made his way back to Paris. He brought for ROBINSON himself a "business" message from DUEBENDORFER, reporting her lack of money and accounting for various other members of "GISELA's" family. ROBINSON passed this news on post-haste to Moscow, and at the same time he seems to have forwarded a packet of intelligence - the contents probably unknown to him - which had been collected by DUEBENDORFER despite her lack of contact. Some idea of DUEBENDORFER's importance even at this date may be gathered from the fact that ROBINSON sent her $2,000 from his reserves without waiting for further instructions from Moscow.

2. Among other agents about whom the courier brought news, there was a certain Mme. DUBOIS who seems to have been of some importance since she and her husband had been the subject of enquiries from Moscow in November 1940. In that month ROBINSON reported that Monsieur DUBOIS ought to be found in England since he had made every preparation on June 5th, 1940 to leave for England on the order of his superiors. There is no more news of Monsieur DUBOIS, but in December 1940 Moscow mentioned to ROBINSON the possibility of their making contact with a DUBOIS who seems to be Madame. By February 1941, "LORA", who on one reading of the ROBINSON papers can be identified with Madame DUBOIS, seems to have had her own line of communication with GISELA (identified here as Lt.-Colonel POLIAKOVA), and in March ROBINSON mentions LORA in a context which seems to place her on an equal footing with GISELA. It has been suggested from this evidence that LORA may have represented G.U.G.B. interests in an area corresponding to, or overlapping with, GISELA's sphere of interest for Red Army Intelligence. There is little to support this theory and much the easiest identification of M. and Mme. DUBOIS is with Hillel and Cecile KATZ, who are known to have used such an alias and who were both arrested in the autumn of 1942 as part of the ROBINSON ring in TREPPER's combined organisation. Hillel KATZ held a Palestinian passport. Although this had been revoked, he seems to have enjoyed the status of a British protected person during the early days of the war and this might account for ROBINSON's story of "Monsieur DUBOIS'" proposed mission to England.

3. Until at least April 1941, DUEBENDORFER seems to have remained dependent on ROBINSON for her contact with the R.U. In March, for example, ROBINSON reported to Moscow the receipt of valuable intelligence by courier from three of DUEBENDORFER's agents, and asked whether he should encypher it. In April, he referred to another line of communication which his management claimed to have with DUEBENDORFER, but in his last surviving message of June 24th he doubts whether they have any regular link with her and he is not prepared to rely on it for his own purposes. The line claimed by Moscow presumably ran through FOOTE and RADO, and other evidence confirms that there was no regular contact between DUEBENDORFER and RADO before May 1941. The lack or poverty of communications never seems to have discouraged DUEBENDORFER as a collector of intelligence, and she was able to provide RADO with her famous LUCIE material from the very beginning of the Russo-German war. LUCIE was Rudolf ROESSLER, a Czech refugee who had made a name for himself in Switzerland as an authority on military science and strategy. By the beginning of the war he was in contact with the Swiss General Staff and thereby gained access to Swiss Military Intelligence. By itself, however, this position does not seem enough to account for the uncommon quality of the LUCIE material, which can be described in general

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Chapter VI (continued).

terms as a series of accurate and up-to-date reports on German Order of Battle on the Eastern Front. ROESSLER was not in direct contact with DUEBENDORFER but supplied her with the LUCIE material through a cut-out, Christian SCHNEIDER. Although both SCHNEIDER and ROESSLER may have had sympathies with the Russians, their services to DUEBENDORFER and from her to RADO seem to have been conducted on strictly financial lines. The first samples of the LUCIE material were transmitted to Moscow by RADO, over FOOTE's transmitter, in June. RADO did not know who LUCIE was and he was not surprised when Moscow rejected such pretentious information from an unproven and venal source. But when he found that LUCIE had given an accurate picture of the time and direction of the German attack on Russia, RADO was impressed enough to continue sending this material in spite of the R.U.'s objections. By the autumn of 1941 he had won his point and Moscow admitted that LUCIE warranted exploitation at all costs.

4. By March 1941, FOOTE's pupil Edmond HAMEL had become proficient enough to operate his own transmitter, and RADO therefore acquired two independent and reliable wireless links with Moscow. In the Spring he was offered an alternative link into Jugoslavia, either as an extension of his service or against emergencies. Moscow sent him a Jugoslavian address with which messages in secret writing could be exchanged, but there is no evidence to show whether the link was ever established. It might have been attempted in the period of six weeks, October - November, 1941, during which RADO lost all wireless contact with Moscow. The reason for the interruption was the removal of the R.U. wireless station from Moscow to Kuibishev, but this was unknown to RADO's group who became more and more disturbed by the silence. In October, with RADO's agreement, FOOTE cabled to Brigitte LEWIS in England a message in plain language code, relating their anxiety lest "Uncle Joe" should have been "injured in the blitz". It is believed that Brigitte LEWIS passed this message on. The traffic was suddenly resumed in November, according to FOOTE in the middle of a sentence which had been interrupted six weeks before.

5. One of the constant worries of RADO's network in Switzerland during the war was the supply of funds. Expenditure was considerable and ROESSLER, for example, in his heyday was paid at the rate of 7,000 Swiss francs a month. For the most part funds were secured by dummy business transactions from America and in July 1941 the R.K.O. Picture representative in Switzerland was used for this purpose for the first time.

B. France.

1. ROBINSON's new service against Germany and against Germany in France was developing well by the beginning of 1941, and Moscow began at this time to supply him with various mechanical aids to set up a link independent of the Soviet Embassy in Paris. About January 1941, he seems to have received a wireless transmitter and a cypher, together with apparatus for micro-photography. He continued his preparations for a safe house and a safe housekeeper for the transmitter, and he selected from his old political acquaintances a technician capable of training as a wireless operator. In his reports to Moscow during the first half of 1941 ROBINSON shows both thoroughness and skill. He seems to have acquired valuable sources among French officials collaborating with the Germans and within the German occupying authority itself. Although he was well disciplined towards R.U. commands he did not hesitate to make dispositions of his own. When it came to the payment of agents, for example, Moscow was inclined to be parsimonious, but ROBINSON was firm in

/relating

Chapter VI (continued).

relating these payments to the cost of living in France. Despite a show of what seems to be genuine modesty and self-denial, he was courageously frank about his own circumstances and limitations. He was not given to window-dressing, and in reply to a rather academic brief from Moscow he describes at length the practical difficulties of recruiting agents among the French workers sent into Germany. He declared himself to be handicapped by his limited knowledge of the war situation and repeatedly asked for a visitor from headquarters. Such a visitor was promised but had not arrived by June 1941 when ROBINSON's papers came to an end.

2. During the first half of 1941, TREPPER does not seem to have had any connection with ROBINSON. Although he and GROSSVOGEL were now based on Paris, their main preoccupation was the foundation of a new cover business, the firm of SIMEX. This was set up on a grand scale and was no doubt heavily subsidised by Russian money at the time of its foundation. A sister firm, SIMEXCO, for the use of SUKOLOV, was established in the Low Countries in March. SIMEX itself developed connections much further afield and at the time of its collapse in 1942 was said to possess representatives in Germany, Scandinavia and the Balkans. SIMEX was a firm of general dealers and contractors, expressly designed to carry the contracts arising from the German occupation, and dealing extensively with the TODT organisation. While the firm provided direct contact with the Germans and produced in the course of its business valuable privileges, such as freedom of movement in occupied territory, it was insulated as far as possible from direct espionage operations. GROSSVOGEL's principal task therefore was to build up a sound and respectable business while TREPPER concerned himself in the development of the espionage network which was to shelter behind it. The obvious relationship between SIMEX and SIMEXCO can be criticised in the light of later events, even though its significance was not understood by the Germans until the last weeks of their attack in 1942. From the point of view of the R.U., it must be remembered that communications between Russian agents in German occupied territory were becoming more and more difficult and that a regular commercial connection carried on with German approval between Paris and Brussels was therefore of first importance to TREPPER's relations with SUKOLOV. TREPPER does not seem to have had any wireless link of his own with Moscow at this time. He may have used the Soviet Embassy in Paris but he probably preferred to send his intelligence to SUKOLOV's transmitter in Belgium (see Chapter IV, D). Moreover, according to TREPPER himself, in his story to the Germans, he was due to retire from his duties in Western Europe in June 1941, and it may have been intended therefore that SUKOLOV should take charge of the new apparatus in France.

3. The outbreak of war between Germany and Russia in June 1941, put an end to any proposals for TREPPER's retirement. It also removed from France the valuable links provided by the Soviet Embassies in Paris and Vichy. TREPPER still had his line to SUKOLOV in Brussels but ROBINSON was isolated, since his wireless transmitter for one reason or another had failed to come into operation. Had ROBINSON been able to establish his own communications with Moscow it seems likely that his and TREPPER's networks would have remained independent and distinct. The form of the ROBINSON papers suggests that before June 1941 he handed his reports to a cut-out described as "LUX" who passed them on to the Soviet Embassy for transmission to Moscow, possibly by diplomatic bag. His meetings with "LUX" may have been by fixed rendezvous without arrangements for emergencies or specially urgent messages, and during a period of illness towards the end of 1940 he was unable to keep up the liaison. There appear among the papers certain messages which are described as "telegrams". These are short and condensed to the point of obscurity and they may have been put up in this form for speed and security in transmission, either by Embassy wireless or by the

/wireless

Chapter VI (continued).

wireless link of a French Communist Party Information Service (compare the use of the Dutch Communist Party Information Service described in Chapter IV, D). Some means of communication with Moscow through the French Communist Party was presumably available to ROBINSON in June 1941, but Communist contacts may have been considered particularly dangerous at that juncture. The meeting arranged between TREPPER and ROBINSON in that month may therefore have been the result of R.U. instruction to TREPPER through SUKOLOV's W/T link in Brussels, and the union of ROBINSON's service with TREPPER's which was completed about September 1941 may also have been forced upon them by the need for secure communications. It was not until February 1942, that TREPPER, resuming ROBINSON's Communist Party connections, made use of the Party's W/T link with Moscow. It must be remembered also that security anxieties were not only felt by the R.U. The French Communist Party had its own fears of compromise in any working association with Russian intelligence and it is not likely to have been cooperative on this question of communications in the period immediately after the explosion of the Russo-German war.

4. As for the new combined network, it may be suspected that ROBINSON brought with him a good deal more than TREPPER had prepared for himself, and there are indications that some of the agents whom TREPPER claimed to have recruited during 1941 should in fact be credited to ROBINSON. ROBINSON was TREPPER's senior, especially in experience of France, and he had the advantage of an old and intimate understanding not only with the official French Communist Party but with its clandestine apparatus and its sphere of secret influence.

5. TREPPER told one of his German interrogators about two agents who came from Russia through France during the summer of 1941. One was an R.U. agent destined for England and it was ROBINSON, said TREPPER, who arranged his voyage across the Channel. There is some support for this story in the ROBINSON papers, for in January 1941, speaking of the new link which Moscow proposed to arrange with "JEAN" in the British Isles, ROBINSON told Moscow that there was a fairly frequent exchange of couriers and letters between the unoccupied zone of France and England. It is to be supposed that through the French Communist Party ROBINSON could have sent an agent to England under some "French Resistance" cover. The other agent in transit was destined for Portugal, and TREPPER alleged that he was relieved by this man of certain responsibilities in the Peninsula (see I below).

6. Apart from courier traffic with SUKOLOV, TREPPER himself paid visits to the Low Countries during 1941. It was on one of these visits in December, that by a happy chance he discovered the German capture of SUKOLOV's wireless transmitter a few hours after it had happened. He was able to warn SUKOLOV who escaped with Isidor SPRINGER to France.

7. We have no news of OZOLS during 1941 and he seems to have lost contact with Moscow after the outbreak of the Russo-German war, probably through the breakdown of his transmitter.

8. In the autumn of 1941, DANILOV who seems to have been left behind when the Soviet Embassy was withdrawn from Vichy in July, was sent to Brussels as an assistant wireless operator for MAKAROV in SUKOLOV's service. DANILOV is said to have been appointed to this task by Nikolaevitch Guennadi KARPOV (see Chapter V, B). DANILOV can hardly have settled down in his new post before he was arrested by the Germans.

/C.

Chapter VI (continued).

C. The British Isles.

1. In January 1941, Ursula HAMBURGER/BEURTON arrived in England from Switzerland. Whether or not she was intended to work for the R.U. in the British Isles, there is no good evidence of intelligence interests in her movements between 1941 and 1949.

2. In the same month, ROBINSON had been notified in France of the R.U.'s intention to take over his former connections in the British Isles and to discharge him of all responsibilities in that quarter once they had established a new link. It seems logicial to relate this fact to TREPPER's story of an agent passed by him and ROBINSON to England in the summer of 1941. We have no further news of this agent unless it was he whom TREPPER mentioned to SPAAK after his escape from the Germans in 1943. If such an agent did arrive in England in June 1941, he must have had some difficulty in reviving ROBINSON's connections which appear to have had no sort of encouragement since August 1939.

3. In October 1941, FOOTE cabled to Brigitte LEWIS from Switzerland reporting in plain language code the interruption in radio communications between RADO and Moscow. It is believed that Brigitte LEWIS passed his message on to Moscow. Radio communications seem to have been resumed automatically when the R.U. wireless station had completed its move from Moscow to Kuibishev.

D. The Low Countries.

1. Until December 1941, SUKOLOV continued to supply Moscow with SCHULZE-BOYSEN's intelligence through the W/T station in Brussels. He may also have contributed intelligence collected in the Low Countries, some from his own agents in Belgium, such as Isidor SPRINGER, and some from agents bequeathed to him by TREPPER in June 1940.

2. In March 1941, the firm of SIMEXCO was established in Brussels with SUKOLOV under his cover of SIERRA as the largest shareholder. Like its sister firm SIMEX in Paris, SIMEXCO was designed for general dealings and contracting in support of the German occupation (see Chapter VI, B), and it provided a regular and privileged means of communication between TREPPER and SUKOLOV. It is likely that SUKOLOV passed over his wireless transmitter a good deal of TREPPER's intelligence and business messages to Moscow, even before the Soviet Embassies were withdrawn from France in June and July 1941. After that date, that is between July and December 1941, SUKOLOV's transmitter was probably the sole means of communication for both TREPPER and his new partner ROBINSON. There is no evidence of an alternative line through RADO's service in Switzerland, though ROBINSON expressed the hope of a regular contact with DUEBENDORFER in June 1941.

3. In the autumn, MAKAROV, SUKOLOV's wireless operator, was given an assistant DANILOV, formerly of the Soviet Embassy, Vichy (see B above), but on December 12th DANILOV was arrested by the Germans in the act of transmission, and MAKAROV was captured shortly afterwards. The Germans had been intercepting SUKOLOV's W/T traffic since June 28th. The fruits of their success were snatched from them by TREPPER himself. He visited the house where the transmitter was kept a few hours after it had been seized by the Germans and fell himself into German hands. But his acting and his cover were good enough to secure his release and he was able to warn SUKOLOV before further damage was done. SUKOLOV withdrew from SIMEXCO and escaped to France with SPRINGER. The damning connection between SIMEXCO and SIMEX remained undiscovered or at least unappreciated until the autumn of the following year, and the German penetration of the Low Countries network was partly, but not completely, sealed off.

/E.

Chapter VI (continued)

E. Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia.

1. About June 1941, before the Soviet Embassy was withdrawn from Berlin, "Alexander ERDBERG" of the Soviet Trade Delegation took steps towards the independent operational establishment of both the HARNACK and the SCHULZE-BOYSEN groups, providing them with funds and wireless transmitters. Both transmitters were failures, and after June 1941, the groups were without a direct line to Moscow. SCHULZE-BOYSEN continued to send his information by courier to SUKOLOV, and HARNACK seems to have been dependent on a courier link through Bernhardt BAESTLEIN of the German Communist Party in Hamburg through Flensburg and Denmark to the Soviet Embassy, Stockholm. Both HARNACK and SCHULZE-BOYSEN, however, did show a steady development from the status of sources to that of group leaders. SCHULZE-BOYSEN in his prime is said to have owned a network with connections in Prague, Augsburg, Saxony, Thuringia, Magdeburg and Hamburg.

2. The attempts of the German groups to become self-sufficient were supported by SUKOLOV. At the end of July and the beginning of August, 1941, he made a five day visit to the Leipzig Fair under SIMEXCO cover, and it is probable that he there met representatives of the groups. In September he made a fortnight's journey from Belgium, ostensibly to visit the Prague Fair. On his way through Germany he dealt not only with the HARNACK and SCHULZE-BOYSEN groups, but also with a representative of the STOEBE-von-SCHELIHA connection. For the HARNACK group he produced a new wireless transmitter (in the event no more successful than the old one) and to an agent of Ilse STOEBE he gave a cypher. (The cypher seems to have been intended for use in a wireless link between STOEBE and Moscow, but this was never achieved. Except for possible transactions with SUKOLOV during his visits to Germany in the summer of 1941, it is unlikely that any of von SCHELIHA's information reached Russian hands after June 1941.) SUKOLOV strengthened and confirmed his arrangements for a courier and postal link with the SCHULZE-BOYSEN group.

3. In Prague SUKOLOV visited the OSKOL group whose wireless link with Moscow had been interrupted for some technical reason since August 27th 1941. SUKOLOV was able to report the operational wavelengths of the OSKOL group to Moscow and possibly to restore their communications. If there was a restoration it is unlikely to have lasted for long, since on October 3rd, 1941, the Germans captured a W/T station in Prague and made some 73 arrests. There seems little doubt that this was the OSKOL service of which nothing more was heard. Although SCHULZE-BOYSEN is reported to have had intelligence connections in Prague the Germans do not seem to have found any evidence of a link between SUKOLOV's German and Czechoslovakian clients.

4. According to German findings in 1942, representatives of SIMEX were set up in Berlin, Hamburg and Prague, but it is not known whether these dated from 1941, the year of SIMEX's foundation, neither is there any evidence that they were used for espionage purposes.

F. Scandinavia

1. During 1941, HARNACK appears to have passed the collected intelligence of his group through Bernhardt BAESTLEIN of the German Communist Party in Hamburg via Flensburg and Denmark to the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm. It seems probable that the Danish and perhaps the Swedish Communist Parties were intermediaries on this line.

/2.

Chapter VI (continued)

2. According to German findings in 1942, representatives of SIMEX were set up in Oslo and Copenhagen but it is not known whether these dated from 1941, the year of SIMEX's foundation, neither is there any evidence that these representatives were used for espionage purposes.

G. The Balkans.

1. In the early spring of 1941, RADO was given an address in Jugoslavia with which he might exchange messages in secret writing. It is not known whether this was intended to be an extension of RADO's service or an emergency link. Nothing more has been heard of the connection.

2. In the autumn of 1941, the Germans achieved their first interceptionsof the STOINOFF-MIRTSCHEFF W/T traffic between Bulgaria and Moscow, but they were not able to decypher the messages.

3. According to German findings in 1942, representatives of SIMEX were set up in Belgrade and Sofia but it is not known whether these dated from 1941, the year of SIMEX's foundation, neither is there any evidence that these representatives were used for espionage purposes.

H. Italy.

1. RADO may have continued operations from Switzerland against Italy during 1941.

I. Spain and Portugal.

1. TREPPER told one of his German interrogators that about June 1941 an R.U. agent passed through Paris on his way to Portugal and relieved him of certain responsibilities in the Peninsula. The story is reasonable in point of date since the withdrawal of Soviet Embassies and the consequent scarcity of communications are known to have disturbed much of the R.U. organisation in Western Europe. But there is no evidence in TREPPER's earlier career of a Portuguese or Spanish connection, and it might be suspected that here, as elsewhere, he exaggerated his importance in order to deceive the Germans. On the other hand there are indications in 1944 and 1945 that PANNWITZ, the leader of the Sanderkommando which exploited the arrests of TREPPER and his friends in 1942, extended his interests into Spain.

J. The Western Hemisphere.

In July 1941, the R.K.O. Picture representative in Switzerland was used for the first time in the transmission of funds from America to RADO's service.

Chapter VI (continued)

2. In September 1941, Rachel DUEBENDORFER's sister, Rosi LUSCHINSKY @ RUDI @ HEPNER reached the U.S.A. It is possible that this woman was the agent, JENNY, mentioned in ROBINSON's papers as a connection of both DUEBENDORFER and Mme. DUBOIS. If so, she went to America on R.U. instructions.

Chapter VII. 1942

A. Switzerland.

1. During 1942 RADO continued to supply Moscow with the LUCIE material and with miscellaneous intelligence from a variety of sources, some of them tapped through the Swiss Communist Party. Certain intelligence from Italy, for example, seems to have passed from the Italian to the Swiss Communist Party and thence through cut-outs to RADO. The LUCIE material was warmly encourage by Moscow who found it of increasing value. It must be remembered, however, that although DUEBENDORFER was passing this information to RADO, she still retained a measure of independence and she regarded RADO's service as a channel rather than a controlling authority over her own activities. For example, the R.U. and RADO still hankered after knowledge of LUCIE's identity, which DUEBENDORFER firmly refused to divulge. It is even possible that material which all originated from ROESSLER was broken up into separate categories before it reached RADO by the use of fictitious source names in addition to LUCIE. DUEBENDORFER herself found SCHNEIDER and ROESSLER difficult to handle, and she persistently declined to pass back Moscow criticisms on the LUCIE material.

2. FOOTE handled a large proportion of RADO's traffic, and his pupil, HAMEL, had plenty to do. In the Spring of 1942 a new transmitter was set up in the charge of Margarete BOLLI, another of FOOTE's trainees, and it is probable that her transmitter gave an intermittent service. BOLLI was also used as a courier and maid-of-all-work for the group. About June, BEURTON left Switzerland to join his wife Ursula in the British Isles. For some time past he had been of little use to RADO's service although he was fully trained as a wireless operator. BEURTON had made a nuisance of himself not only by his laziness but because, to Moscow's indignation, he abused the wireless link with enquiries about Ursula and his domestic affairs. This is not to say that BEURTON was rebellious or any real danger to the security of RADO's service. His personality is decidedly negative and the reason for his behaviour seems to have been his dependence on his wife. HAMEL's operations suffered an interruption in September when the Cantonal Police raided his flat in Geneva. HAMEL claimed - and RADO seems to have believed him - that the Cantonal Police failed to identify two wireless transmitters which existed in his house. They took no open action against him, but it is possible that they reported the affair to the Federal Police, and that they had not been as blind as he supposed them to be. The arrest of HAMEL and BOLLI in October 1943 may have been the final step in a prolonged investigation. Meanwhile, HAMEL's working transmitter was removed for safety to a villa near the French frontier. At an unknown date in 1942, FOOTE was instructed by Moscow to seek out Anna MUELLER, whose services were needed for the renewal of a false passport used by an agent in Italy (see H. below). He understood that this woman had been used frequently before the war to supply the Russian Intelligence Service with passports confected by a corrupt official in the Swiss passport service at Basle. He found her destitute. It was so long since she had received any money from the Russians that she had been reduced to working as a charwoman in the local hospital. FOOTE persuaded Moscow to restore her to their pay-list, but they would not discharge her debts.

/B. France

Chapter VII (continued)

B. France.

1. Following the German seizure of SUKOLOV's wireless station in Brussels, TREPPER seems to have been left for the time being without any means of communication with Moscow. It is interesting to notice, therefore, that in January 1942 a woman agent of the Russian Intelligence Service who used the alias of "Anna OUSPENSKAIA" was landed in Northern France with a mission to re-establish wireless communication between the U.S.S.R. and occupied France. It is not known what became of her, nor whether TREPPER's actions at the beginning of 1942 had anything to do with instructions which she might have brought to him from Moscow. It may be significant, however, that in the same month TREPPER seems to have had his first news of JEFFREMOV, whom he met at a rendezvous arranged by the R.U. in the SCHNEIDERs' house at Brussels. TREPPER handed over to JEFFREMOV the surviving Low Countries organisation of SUKOLOV and the important responsibility of maintaining the courier link with SCHULZE-BOYSEN. He must also have discussed with JEFFREMOV the restoration of wireless communications between Belgium and Moscow, including the possibility of a courier link between himself and the restored service. On this question our evidence is a little obscure. WENZEL had by now spent some time on the preparation of transmitters and wireless operators for JEFFREMOV's service, and it might be supposed that a W/T link was already in operation. GOUBLOOZE, who supplied WENZEL with two of his trainees and who was, perhaps for that reason, decidedly critical about WENZEL's W/T enterprises, said that he understood a wireless link was achieved by December 1941. We are therefore confronted with the possibility that such a link existed but was not used by TREPPER until June 1942. The explanation may be either that the wireless communications run by WENZEL and his assistants failed for some technical reason at the beginning of 1942, or that TREPPER considered a regular courier link between himself and JEFFREMOV was unsafe until the clouds of German suspicion following the arrest of DANILOV and MAKAROV had subsided. The possibility that JEFFREMOV possessed a working wireless link with Moscow at the beginning of 1942 but concealed it from TREPPER does not seem to deserve serious consideration. The need for security precautions seems on the whole to be the best explanation of the problem. Nevertheless, TREPPER did not detach himself entirely from JEFFREMOV's service during the first half of 1942. Germaine SCHNEIDER was an occasional courier between the two groups, and TREPPER kept SIMEXCO alive, if only for his lines of communication (see D. below). There is yet another possibility: that JEFFREMOV's intelligence, until May 1942, was passed to Moscow through TREPPER and the French Communist Party.

2. Back in Paris, TREPPER had recourse to an alternative link with Moscow. This was a wireless transmitter of the French Communist Party to which he had found access through ROBINSON. It is not certain whether this French Communist Party transmitter communicated directly with Moscow. If it was either of the two stations seized by the Germans in June and December 1943 there is evidence of a link with England and, from other incidents recorded in Chapter VIII, it may be thought that French C.P. communications were relayed from the Soviet Embassy, London, to Moscow. TREPPER used this Communist Party link from February to April, but it probably had considerable disadvantages and in the latter month he succeeded in setting up his own station in Paris. It is evident from TREPPER's dealings with Claude SPAAK in 1943 (see Chapter VIII) that he found the French Communist Party awkward to handle. The orthodox tradition of Russian Intelligence forbids any working relations in the field with the indigenous Communist

/Party

Chapter VII (continued)

Party and there is a corresponding inhibition on the side of the Party (see also Chapter VI, B.). (So far as the G.R.U. is concerned, there can be instanced their instructions to RADO in Switzerland during a scare in November 1942: "Examine immediately all connections with political circles and other collaborators, especially with active Communists and left-wing Socialists. Please understand how dangerous such connections are to the work of the whole organisation.") It is not known whether Moscow approved of this temporary arrangement, and it may be significant that in March 1942 three more agents from the U.S.S.R. were deposited in France, this time equipped with a wireless transmitter. The mission of "RODIONOV", "Anna FROLOVA" and "DANILOV-DUPRE" was to unite with a group in Lyons and to establish wireless communications between France and the U.S.S.R. It is unlikely that this mission can have been independent of TREPPER's activities in France, but the wireless transmitter may have been sent in support rather than as a corrective to his current line of communication. It was presumably the SPRINGER Group which these three agents were to join in Lyons. Isidor SPRINGER had been posted there by TREPPER at the beginning of 1942, and his group was in working order by May.

3. As a parallel to SPRINGER's posting, SUKOLOV, his old master, was sent to Marseilles in the Spring of 1942. SUKOLOV may have had old acquaintances in Marseilles, since there are signs that he worked there in 1938 and 1939 (see Chapters III and IV). The construction of his new group was covered by the institution of a branch of SIMEX in Marseilles. This was founded by Alfred CORBIN, a director of SIMEX, Paris, who became a courier between SUKOLOV and TREPPER.

4. Although TREPPER's dispositions were still on a bold scale, he had not long to run. In June 1942 the SOKOLs, whom he had established in April as wireless operators for a station of his own in Paris, were arrested by the Germans. The SOKOLs were originally recruited through the French Communist Party, and although our information on their wireless service is limited they may have had connections with the Party's W/T system. Some resemblance to the Party W/T links appears in SPAAK's statement that the SOKOLs were able to transmit messages to Moscow via London. We do not know how much incriminating evidence was obtained by their arrest and it is possible that TREPPER succeeded to a large extent in sealing off the incident, just as he had done in the Low Countries in December 1941. Possibly the SOKOLs, if they had talked, could have compromised the Party communications system. This might account for the apparent sang froid with which TREPPER diverted his traffic for the U.S.S.R. not to the French Communist Party but back to JEFFREMOV's station in Brussels. The new line lasted hardly a month, for WENZEL was arrested, transmitting for JEFFREMOV, on June 30th. TREPPER was luck once again to get an early warning of the disaster. Germaine SCHNEIDER had also been arrested by the Germans, but she deceived them, won her release, and made her way post-haste to TREPPER. It is likely that she was able to tell him not only of WENZEL's and JEFFREMOV's arrest, but of the far more serious fact that they were being turned by the Germans to their own purposes. This meant not only that any traffic intercepted between the Belgian station and Moscow might be decyphered and the vital German sources compromised, but that the history of the Belgian network and of TREPPER himself would be partly revealed. The exposure of the SIMEX-SIMEXCO conspiracy was now inevitable. TREPPER admitted, after his own arrest in the autumn, that when he heard Germaine SCHNEIDER's news the end seemed well in sight. Since he made no attempt to retire, but kept up all his activities in France, it is important to consider what plans he may

/have

Chapter VII (continued)

have made and what steps he may have taken in this conviction of his fate. He told one of his German interrogators that the compromise of WENZEL's cyphers was reported to Moscow through Bulgaria. (This might be related to Germaine SCHNEIDER's former connections with Bulgaria and the message may have been transmitted by the STOINOFF/MIRTSCHEFF network.) TREPPER himself moreover had re-established communications of his own with Moscow, using the French Communist Party for the second time, and he must therefore have been able not only to pass on Germaine SCHNEIDER's warnings, but to discuss his own future. In short, during the five months, July - November, 1942, TREPPER was in a position to agree with Moscow some provisional plan for the triple-cross operations which seem to have taken place during 1943 and 1944. Evidence of local precautions against an expected emergency appears in the message which TREPPER passed to the Soviet Embassy, London, after his escape in September 1943 (see Chapter VIII, C.).

5. The Germans soon had a wealth of information from their interrogations and manipulations of captured agents in Belgium, and it was not long before they uncovered the SIMEX-SIMEXCO connection. Nevertheless, the watertight compartment system by which TREPPER had separated the business dealings of SIMEX from the underlying espionage organisation stood up extremely well against the German flood. An elaborate coat-trailing operation to provoke the business side of SIMEX into opportunist espionage had no success. This failure is further evidence of TREPPER's preparedness for the attack. The Germans were reduced to cruder methods. In the autumn of 1942, they arrested the entire staff of SIMEX in Paris and after tedious and barren interrogation at last gained a clue which led to the arrest of TREPPER on December 5th, 1942. It is interesting to observe that their clue was obtained not so much from the breaking down of Alfred CORBIN as from a breach by TREPPER himself of his own security rules. CORBIN seems to have been reduced by interrogation to a state of mind in which he was anxious to tell the Germans anything he knew about TREPPER. The most he was able to produce, however, was a probable indication of TREPPER's dentist, TREPPER having been unwise enough to ask for CORBIN's advice on a dentist, and - as the Germans discovered - to take it.

6. The German accounts of TREPPER's arrest deserve study. TREPPER was not dismayed but resigned; he congratulated his captors on their skill and went on without hesitation to offer them his whole-hearted collaboration. There are various reasons now for supposing that this offer was part of a preconceived plan: even at the time it was made, TREPPER showed such deliberation that he aroused the Germans' suspicions. They began to show him some severity, and TREPPER hastened to give proof of his desire to collaborate by ringing up Hillel KATZ, his right-hand man, in the presence of the Germans. This was accepted as a sign of good faith, and in the following weeks TREPPER amply fortified their confidence. Directly or indirectly he put his finger on an impressive collection of agents, including his great partner, ROBINSON, in Paris, and the members of the SPRINGER group in Lyons. Whatever may have been the truth about the extent of TREPPER's authority in the creation and manipulation of R.U. networks in the Low Countries and France, there can be no doubt of his importance in their death and destruction. His influence extended moreover into the German post-mortem studies of these networks. It should be remembered that the German conception of the story discussed in this book rests in the main upon the identifications, arrests and confessions of July - December, 1942. They regarded TREPPER as the height of their operational achievement, and their findings were coloured deeply by his interpretations. If we accept the view that TREPPER was following a triple-cross

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Chapter VII (continued)

plan, then it must be considered that the Germans were subject to occasional deception by him from his arrest in December 1942 until his escape in September 1943. Both the R.S.H.A. and Ast Belgium reports date from the first half of this period. To preserve the appearance of collaboration TREPPER was bound to divulge most of the truth, but since his intentions were strictly dishonourable we cannot be sure that he did not conceal some facts and distort others. He was evidently untruthful about his Communist Party connections and it will be seen below that he protected at least one minor agent from German discovery. To judge from his actions after his escape, he knew - but did not reveal to his captors - that there were other working regimentations of the R.U. in France, safely detached from the SIMEX apparatus.

7. Within a fortnight TREPPER seems to have lulled all the suspicions of his enemies and on Christmas Day they began a play-back to Moscow on a wireless station which TREPPER was supposed to have set up in Paris. Although this play-back began so soon after TREPPER's arrest it is possible that Moscow were aware of the deception from the start. After his escape in September, 1943, TREPPER told SPAAK of a report which he had smuggled out of his captivity and sent on its way to Moscow "two or three weeks after his arrest." On the pretext of learning German, said TREPPER, he had won a night's privacy, during which he wrote a full account of his situation and his plans. His understanding with his captors was by this time so good that he was able to forward his report under the guise of collaboration. He had told the Germans that in order to achieve a thorough penetration of his network they must allow him to appear at various of his old rendezvous in Paris. (This probably refers to "control meetings" at which agents can see and be seen by each other without contact and merely confirm that their affairs are in working order.) The Germans had agreed to TREPPER's proposal and were content to watch these occasions from a distance. By visiting a shop at one of the rendezvous, therefore, TREPPER was able to pass his report, without being seen, to a woman agent whom he had not betrayed to the Germans. It seems likely that this woman agent took the report to the French Communist Party who transmitted it either directly or via London to Moscow. Although the R.U. may have been prepared beforehand for a triple-cross plan, it could not have come into effective operation until they knew the circumstances and results of TREPPER's arrest. We do not know how long the report took to reach Russia, neither have we any certain evidence when the R.U. entered upon TREPPER's triple-cross operation.

8. Until recently the exact date of TREPPER's arrest was unknown, but the date given here, December 5th, has been provided by his German bear-leader during the time of his captivity, Wilhelm BERG, and there can be little doubt of its accuracy. It follows that SUKOLOV's arrest, which took place on November 12th, 1942, cannot have been the result of TREPPER's revelations. It seems probable that SUKOLOV was betrayed by his connections in the Low Countries. We do not know when SUKOLOV's apparent collaboration with the Germans began, but the fact that he was not instituted as a wireless play-back until March 1943 suggests that he may have been slower in satisfying his captors than was TREPPER. (It should also be borne in mind that SUKOLOV's testimony was required in relation to the arrests in Germany from August to October, 1942 - see E. below). There are certainly no signs that SUKOLOV embarrassed TREPPER's triple-cross plans, which may have been agreed between them before their separate arrests. However that may have been, the Germans assisted their conspiracy by bringing them together in captivity during the summer of 1943.

/C. The British Isles .

Chapter VII (continued)

C. The British Isles.

1. In 1942 we have to reckon with the possible existence in the British Isles of the R.U. agent whom TREPPER claimed to have sent there through ROBINSON in June 1941 (see Chapter VI, C.). The initial task of this agent would probably have been to revive ROBINSON's connections which, so far as we know, had been without guidance or payment since August 1939. No evidence has been obtained from WEISS that any such revival was attempted in his case, but he had moved so much since the beginning of the war that it would not have been easy to find him. We know nothing more of JEAN and his colleagues. There is one slight indication that a source worked before the war by ROBINSON through WEISS may have belonged to an espionage organisation in England in the Spring of 1941. But this story has no obvious connection with TREPPER's friend who did not arrive in this country before June 1941. Since the source in question had a Communist Party background it is possible that he belonged to a Party apparatus rather than a Russian intelligence organisation.

2. In January 1942, Rudolf HERRNSTADT tried unsuccessfully to obtain legal entry into England from the U.S.S.R. In 1932 he appears to have been linked with HARRY I through Ilse STOEBE, his mistress, who was a recruiting agent for HARRY I, and in 1937 and 1938 he met Ilse STEINFELD in London on a number of occasions (see Chapter I, C.) If he had succeeded in reaching England, it is possible that HERRNSTADT was to have provided succour for JEAN's group.

3. During 1942 D.F. SPRINGHALL, the National Organiser of the C.P.G.B., was engaged in espionage for certain members of the Soviet Embassy in London. As a collector and exploiter of Communist Party Intelligence, his role may have resembled that of GOUZLOOZE with the Dutch Communist Party in 1936-37 (see Chapter I, D.). Like GOUZLOOZE, SPRINGHALL had personal connections in Moscow: he had been there as recently as 1939, and he may have been given some intelligence mission during the visit. We do not know when his espionage began. Before the Party's change of line in June 1941, when the "unjust imperialist war" became the "just and peoples' war", SPRINGHALL was concerned with secret organisation in the armed forces. There is an easy transition from this form of conspiracy to espionage, and it is worth remark that both occupations were in the prescribed field of Red Army Intelligence. On the other hand, SPRINGHALL's espionage is noticeable for its lack of method or organisation such as any service sponsored by the R.U. might be expected to show. His position as National Organiser of the C.P.G.B. gave him knowledge of secret Party members in the government service and a controlling interest over the various "discussion groups" and other cover organisations from which they drew their political sustenance. From this quarter SPRINGHALL selected both conscious and unconscious sources of intelligence. Even where the sources were conscious he seems to have been careful to suggest that their espionage was Party work and to conceal his dependence on Russian directions. In his overt function as National Organiser, SPRINGHALL was able to draw on a variety of unconscious sources, such as Party members employed in munitions factories. His Russian masters for their part seem to have been ready to accept from him large and various contributions, some of which had very little value. On one occasion they are known to have arranged for direct contact with a Communist Party source discovered by SPRINGHALL, and they may have decided that it was worth separate exploitation. In this and other limited aspects SPRINGHALL's espionage may be related to the Canadian Case,

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Chapter VII (continued)

but on the whole it presents an opportunist and amateur style which is not characteristic of either R.U. or G.U.G.B. management. It is worth recording that the Germans, in their capture of the two French Communist Party wireless stations at Le Raincy and Choisy le Roi in 1943, believed they had discovered evidence of a Communist Party information service working from England, and exchanging certain intelligence with the French stations. Our own evidence does not suggest that the C.P.G.B. had an information service during 1942 and 1943 of anything like the scale and efficiency demonstrated by the French and Dutch Communist Parties. It is just possible, however, that the English material which the Germans claimed to have discovered in the French W/T stations had some connection with SPRINGHALL's somewhat haphazard exploitation of his Party authority. Against this possibility we must set the fact that there is no evidence of a Party wireless transmitter operating from Great Britain during the war. There is indeed marked evidence to the contrary. The only probable wireless link for the French Communist Party in the British Isles would have been the Soviet Embassy in London, and it is difficult to see why the Embassy should have transmitted any of SPRINGHALL's intelligence to France.

4. In July 1942 BEURTON returned to England and rejoined his wife. There can be no doubt that his stock with Moscow is low, and there is no evidence that he has done any intelligence work since he left Switzerland.

D. The Low Countries.

(i) Belgium.

1. In January 1942, TREPPER met JEFFREMOV in the SCHNEIDERs' house at Brussels at a rendezvous arranged by the R.U. (see B. above). It seems that TREPPER had no knowledge of JEFFREMOV before this date. TREPPER handed over to JEFFREMOV the surviving parts of SUKOLOV's Low Countries service which itself embodied parts of the service constituted by TREPPER between 1938 and 1940. TREPPER's management of this transaction is no proof of overriding authority, since it would have been unsafe for SUKOLOV himself to visit Brussels so soon after the arrests of DANILOV and MAKAROV.

2. Probably the most important and urgent part of JEFFREMOV's new commission was to continue the transmission of SCHULZE-BOYSEN's material, received by courier from Germany. According to GOUWLOOZE, JEFFREMOV had been in wireless communication with Moscow through WENZEL and his assistants since December 1941, and he should therefore have been able to continue SUKOLOV's traffic without delay. On the other hand, TREPPER's actions until June 1942 (see B. above) may be understood to mean that there was no wireless link between the Low Countries and Moscow at the beginning of the year. The German reports of late 1942 and early 1943 imply that there was no such link until May 1942 when WENZEL established a new line. True, these reports were produced before GOUWLOOZE's arrest and interrogation (in November 1943), but they were presumably founded on the statements of WENZEL himself, who has been generally supposed to have told the Germans all he knew. If we take the view that GOUWLOOZE was wrong and that there was no link between JEFFREMOV and Moscow until May 1942, it might be suggested that JEFFREMOV's traffic, including the SCHULZE-BOYSEN material, was routed through TREPPER himself, since from February to April 1942

/TREPPER

Chapter VII (continued)

TREPPER was in touch with Moscow through a French Communist Party transmitter and he is known to have been visited during this period by Germaine SCHNEIDER as a courier from JEFFREMOV.

3. If WENZEL's wireless link with Moscow was only established in May, it had a very short life, for on June 30th he was captured flagrante delicto by the Germans. Germaine SCHNEIDER was also arrested but, with the help of her husband, she skilfully masqueraded as WENZEL's mistress and was released as of no intelligence interest. She quickly reported to TREPPER in Paris. In July JEFFREMOV was arrested and in the same month both he and WENZEL appear to have been broken down under severe interrogation to a point where they were regarded as "turned" to German purposes. Speculation as to whether "turning" on the part of WENZEL and JEFFREMOV was calculated or incomplete is bound for lack of evidence to be less substantial than it is in the cases of TREPPER and SUKOLOV. In favour of deception it may be noted (a) that WENZEL escaped in November 1942 after about four months in captivity; (b) that JEFFREMOV at an unknown date "proved unsatisfactory" and was put in solitary confinement; (c) that there are discrepancies between GOUWLOOZE's evidence of November 1943 and parts of the German reports of late 1942 and early 1943 which are presumably based on the evidence of WENZEL and JEFFREMOV; (d) that the German reports lack information which we may suppose the two prisoners to have had, particularly about JEFFREMOV's past; (e) that Moscow was warned from other quarters of WENZEL's arrest and its consequences and that W/T deception through WENZEL and JEFFREMOV may therefore have been redoubled by the R.U. with or without the prisoners' connivance. Against deception it must be remembered that WENZEL and JEFFREMOV not only betrayed a number of their fellow-agents; they revealed what was far more damaging to the R.U., their W/T cypher. Points (a), (b) and (e) are inconclusive. As for (c) and (d), WENZEL and JEFFREMOV seem to have answered most of the questions they were asked, and, though the information they provided now seems to us incomplete, it must be allowed that the Germans were interested in immediate operational questions rather than background information. Their first aim was to start up convincing wireless play-backs with the shortest possible interruption between the real and false transmissions.

4. The exploitation of JEFFREMOV's confessions led to the arrest in Holland of WINTERINK, though various of WINTERINK's assistants escaped. Because the arrest took place in Holland, and possibly because of WENZEL's evidence, the Germans were under the impression that WINTERINK's station had been operated from Holland under WENZEL's indirect control. The evidence of GOUWLOOZE, however, shows that both WINTERINK and NAGEL went into Belgium for their training by WENZEL and there may be some doubt whether the station did not operate from Belgium under WENZEL's direct control. GOUWLOOZE implied that WINTERINK had come to Holland to hide before he was arrested. WINTERINK himself refused to give any information about his work.

5. From August to October the Germans instituted a series of W/T play-backs whose very richness ought to have seemed suspicious to Moscow by contrast with the meagre lines of communication which had existed before June 30th. WENZEL was made to operate a play-back in his own character in August, and in September a substitute for WINTERINK was set up with a further transmitter. This was followed in October by two more, one operated by JEFFREMOV himself and the other by a substitute for ISBUTSKI, originally one of SUKOLOV's assistants in the Belgian network. Not one of these play-backs is likely to have achieved any success against Moscow. Apart from the early

/ warning

Chapter VII (continued)

warning of WENZEL's arrest delivered to TREPPER by Germaine SCHNEIDER, there is evidence that Moscow was given news of the disaster from as far away as Bulgaria. Much the most important part of the Germans' attack lay in their penetration of such fragments of the network as survived and their exploitation of what the captured agents told them. They at last discovered the significance of SIMEXCO, all of whose officials were arrested in Autumn 1942, and by that date they were well equipped for their attack on TREPPER's organisation in France. They may have uncovered a separate trail to SUKOLOV in Marseilles (see B. above). To set off their success, the Germans lost WENZEL who escaped from their custody on November 17th, 1942, and disappeared. We do not know what became of WENZEL. On the one hand his escape might be compared with TREPPER's eleven months later, as part of a triple-cross plan. On the other, if he had betrayed all he knew to the Germans, it is possible that he went in fear of both sides and retired altogether from the intelligence world.

(ii) Holland.

6. In considering the problem of the wireless link between the Low Countries and Moscow from January to May 1942, it must be remembered that the Dutch Communist Party Information Service was then in working order and that GOUWLOOZE should have been able to provide JEFFREMOV with a wireless link had everything else failed. WENZEL had the means of liaison with GOUWLOOZE and a courier service between Brussels and Amsterdam should have been easier and safer to arrange than one between Brussels and Paris. However, there seems to be no indication of such a link in GOUWLOOZE's evidence.

7. On the other hand, GOUWLOOZE's services to Russian Intelligence had by no means come to an end. For some time past he had acted as godfather to a group of German Communist refugees who had come into Holland about 1933. GOUWLOOZE had provided a link between this group and Moscow who sent them instructions by means of the Dutch Communist Party Information Service. At the beginning of 1942, Alfred KNOCHEL, a member of this group, was instructed by Moscow to go into Germany where his mission seems to have been to set up an intelligence group within the German Communist Party. During the first half of 1942, KNOCHEL passed information of German Communist Party origin by courier to GOUWLOOZE, but before long he reported the preparation of a wireless transmitter and Moscow directed GOUWLOOZE to find him a wireless operator. GOUWLOOZE produced a man named Van PROOSDY, who left Holland to join KNOCHEL in Berlin about November 1942.

8. GOUWLOOZE was also used by Russian Intelligence as a receptionist for various parachute agents whom they dropped in the Low Countries during 1942. On June 21st and 24th, they sent in the two KRUYTs. Father KRUYT was dropped in Belgium and arrested by the Germans shortly afterwards. It is not known whether he was intended to link up with JEFFREMOV's organisation, but as chance fell out he was arrested on the same day as WENZEL. KRUYT the son was dropped in Holland with a wireless transmitter and made contact with GOUWLOOZE. Once again GOUWLOOZE was required to produce a wireless operator. At an unknown date he sent to KRUYT junior a certain De LAAR, who established wireless contact with Moscow. GOUWLOOZE professed to know nothing about the nature of their traffic. On November 30th a further agent, named CUHN, was dropped in Holland, but he had no contact with GOUWLOOZE until March 1943.

/E. Germany

Chapter VII (continued)

E. Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia.

1. During their last months of existence in 1942, the SCHULZE-BOYSEN and HARNACK groups made various efforts to establish wireless contact with Moscow and their attempts were supported by the R.U. who sent over a number of parachute agents. They seem to have had no success so far as the passing of intelligence was concerned, and it was only in the very last days of the groups that a preliminary wireless contact was achieved from Berlin. The SCHULZE-BOYSEN group therefore remained independent on their courier line to the Low Countries and this line was presumably cut after the collapse of JEFFREMOV's organisation at the end of June. The HARNACK group seem to have maintained their link with the Soviet Embassy at Stockholm through the German Communist Party in Hamburg, and this route may have been used by SCHULZE-BOYSEN after June since there are signs of collusion between the two groups during 1942.

2. Rudolf von SCHELIHA paid three visits to Switzerland in February, September and October, 1942. Apart from the banking of his espionage income at Zurich (see Chapter III, I.), there is no evidence that he had any Russian intelligence contact in Switzerland and it seems during 1942 that he remained unexploited as a source for the lack of any link. Despite the potential value of his information, Moscow seems to have thought it unsafe to bring him into the SCHULZE-BOYSEN or HARNACK organisations. Apart from possible danger to the security of von SCHELIHA's very delicate position, it may have been thought that as a purely venal source he would not blend well into the ideological background of the two main German groups. It is also worth considering whether there may not have been some organisational rivalry in Moscow itself over the exploitation of von SCHELIHA. The circumstances of his recruitment and the method of his exploitation between 1937 and 1941 compare closely with the G.U.G.B. methods. It may have been, therefore, that von SCHELIHA was a G.U.G.B. achievement, while SCHULZE-BOYSEN and HARNACK belonged to the R.U. (But cf. SUKOLOV's dealings with an agent of Ilse STOEBE in Chapter VI, E.).

3. The arrest of the SCHULZE-BOYSEN and HARNACK groups in August seems to have been largely the result of WENZEL's betrayal of his cypher and the consequent reading of traffic intercepted between Belgium and Moscow for some time back. SCHULZE-BOYSEN, who had an agent in the German signals interception service, was therefore forewarned, but he does not seem to have attempted any practical evasion for himself or his fellow-conspirators, and it is likely that a clean sweep was made of both groups. (For the story of a doubtful precaution by SCHULZE-BOYSEN see F. below.)

4. Ilse STOEBE, also betrayed by the decyphered traffic, was not arrested until September and von SCHELIHA was not pulled in until October 29th. Meanwhile German zeal had already begun two wireless playbacks with captured Russian parachute agents. These agents had been dispatched with wireless transmitters for the German groups and one of them, HOESSLER, was intended apparently to restore communications with SCHULZE-BOYSEN after the destruction of his link through the Low Countries. In December, yet a third play-back was begun as a notional development of the von SCHELIHA source. Although Moscow had been warned that WENZEL's cypher was compromised and must therefore have known the danger in which these German groups stood, we cannot say when or how the R.U. got news of their collapse and it is possible therefore that these play-backs had some initial success.

/5. In

Chapter VII (continued)

5. In January 1942 Alfred KNOCHEL, a Communist, who had fled from the Nazis into Holland during the 1930s, was returned from that country to Berlin to set up an intelligence group on German Communist Party resources. During the first part of the year he seems to have sent his reports back through GOUWLOOZE and the Dutch Communist Party Information Service, but before long he was able to report the preparation of a wireless transmitter. In November, on Moscow's instructions, the obliging GOUWLOOZE sent him a Dutch wireless operator named Van PROOSDY. In the general witch-hunt which followed the SCHULZE-BOYSEN and HARNACK arrests, it seems unlikely that KNOCHEL and his friends escaped detection. They are indeed brought into this story because of the likelihood that they developed connections with SCHULZE-BOYSEN himself. The evidence of GOUWLOOZE shows that KNOCHEL had come to grief at least by the beginning of 1943 and it seems probable that he was arrested (and possibly turned) by German Intelligence a good deal earlier. KNOCHEL's ability to prepare a wireless transmitter offers a suspicious contrast to the failures of SCHULZE-BOYSEN and HARNACK in this field, and it is possible that the whole Van PROOSDY transaction was engineered by German penetration of KNOCHEL's courier link with GOUWLOOZE.

F. Scandinavia.

1. From January to August 1942, BASTLEIN seems to have maintained his courier link through Denmark to the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm on behalf of the HARNACK group. It is possible that this link was also used by SCHULZE-BOYSEN after his courier service to Belgium had failed at the end of June. There is some support for this possibility in a story that SCHULZE-BOYSEN succeeded in passing certain vital information through to Stockholm just before his arrest and after the warning from his agent in the German signals interception service. The Germans believed, however, that this story was an attempt by SCHULZE-BOYSEN to save his own skin. He seems to have implied that the material could be recovered only if he was given liberty to visit Sweden himself.

2. On an unknown date in 1942 FOOTE had a message from Moscow requiring his help in the delivery of a wireless transmitter to a girl in the Swedish Red Cross. FOOTE was unable to find the first contact for this transaction in Switzerland, and the plan therefore came to nothing.

G. The Balkans.

1. TREPPER told one of his German interrogators that news of the compromise of WENZEL's cypher was sent from Bulgaria to Moscow, presumably in July 1942. Since it was Germaine SCHNEIDER who first brought the news to TREPPER, it is possible that her old courier connections with Bulgaria may have been used though she does not seem to have gone there herself. Comparable with this story is TREPPER's statement that various agents compromised in the round-up of his own network made their way to Sofia on standing orders and from there escaped into Russia. So far no agents have been identified to whom this story might apply.

2. It seems likely that any intelligence traffic or escaping

/agents

Chapter VII (continued)

agents from TREPPER's concerns in Western Europe would have been handled in Bulgaria by the STOINOFF-MIRTSCHEFF network, or by the Russian Legation in Sofia to which this network was allied. The STOINOFF-MIRTSCHEFF network was going from strength to strength during 1942, and by November the German signals interception service had detected twelve separate W/T links running from Bulgaria, some to Moscow and some to Tiflis.

H. Italy.

1. The story of 1942 offers the first clear hints of operations against Italy in which RADO may have been involved since 1937. (See Chapter II, A.). On one occasion in 1942 we know that information was passed to him via the Italian and Swiss Communist Parties. At another unknown date in the same year FOOTE received from Italy a false passport in the name of SCHNEIDER. This passport was a Swiss confection and it was FOOTE's task to renew it through Anna MUELLER. (See A. above). According to FOOTE's recollection, it had been renewed once before at Marseilles. The owner of the passport seems to have had no connection with Christian or Franz SCHNEIDER who appear in the Swiss and Belgian sections of this story. Some time later FOOTE identified the photograph in the "SCHNEIDER" passport with the face of a man pictured in the Italian Press because of his arrest for espionage in Italy.

2. There is an unconfirmed story that a diplomat in the German Embassy at Rome was detected as a Russian agent as a result of the arrests and interrogations in the SCHULZE-BOYSEN group.

Chapter VIII. 1943

A. Switzerland.

1. Until the autumn of 1943 RADO possessed three wireless links with Moscow, operated by FOOTE, HAMEL and BOLLI. The BOLLI service is likely to have been intermittent for the reasons given in Chapter VII A, and FOOTE's service suffered an interruption in April. By 1943 RADO had the Germans as well as the Swiss hot upon his track and in the spring one member of GISELA's family, Anna MULLER, was enticed into Germany after the arrest there of her brother Hans in Freiburg. Hans MULLER had been caught in an attempt to pass a W/T set to a Russian woman parachute agent, "INGE", and since Anna had visited him not long before it is possible that this set was provided by her from Switzerland. The parachute agent has not been indentified but she was one of several, such as KOENEN, who came under German control and who had been schooled in the same R.U. establishment in Moscow. Hans MULLER was executed, but Anna was kept in custody and she was used in the interrogation of ROBINSON. When the two were confronted Anna MULLER admitted that she had helped ROBINSON to make secret crossings of the Swiss/French frontier on various occasions.

2. There was not much that Anna could tell about the existing network in Switzerland, and the German success had little value in that direction. At the beginning of 1943, however, the Germans had begun to exploit against the Swiss network the information and advantages they had won during 1942 in France. It should be borne in mind that although German interception of the wireless traffic between RADO's network and Moscow began in June 1941 the first fragmentary readings of the cypher were not achieved until August 1943, and it was only in the summer of 1944, when the network was already in dissolution, that the Germans gained a full understanding of the damage done to them, particularly by the LUCIE source. Nevertheless by the beginning of 1943 German Intelligence had some knowledge of the quantity, if not the quality of the work done for the R.U. in Switzerland, and their attack on the network was determined even if it was on a small scale. On the other side the defences put up by the R.U. and by RADO's organisation in particular were poor, and in marked contrast to the resourceful tactics of TREPPER and SUKOLOV. The main weaknesses of the Swiss network were:

(a) that RADO lacked personality and courage and never had complete control over his organisation;

(b) that DUEBENDORFER, who was responsible for the most important source of intelligence, LUCIE, distrusted RADO and through him the R.U. itself, suspecting them of attempts to cut her out with LUCIE. She therefore disobeyed orders and disregarded security warnings;

(c) that operators for the service, such as BOLLI, HAMEL and FOOTE himself, were inexperienced in undercover work and therefore showed bad security:

(d) that the members of the organisation in general placed too much reliance on the protection afforded by neutral territory and on the complaisance or inactivity of the Swiss authorities.

/The last

Chapter VIII (continued).

The last failing was also shown by the R.U. management who found the Swiss action against their agents incomprehensible, and went so far as to ascribe it to the machinations of the British Secret Service. The management must also share the blame for (a), (b) and (c). They were reasonably energetic in the provision of money and material and they gave sound security warnings from their own point of view. But on the whole they showed an academic attitude, treating the Swiss service as a smoothly-running business-like organisations, which it never was, and making very little allowance for field problems and the personalities of their agents. Perhaps POLIAKOVA herself, overlooking how much circumstances might have changed in Switzerland since she had worked there, was responsible for this attitude.

3. Early in 1943, Margareta BOLLI seems to have been seduced by a Gestapo agent named PETERS. We do not know how far she became a conscious German agent but at the beginning of February she was the means of providing German intelligence with their first important clue to FOOTE's cypher. This arose from an accident during her work as a courier between RADO and FOOTE, and FOOTE's security blindness has been shown by his own account of the affair. The carelessness and incompetence of RADO's organisation is well illustrated by the fact that neither he nor FOOTE knew of PETERS' existence until he was arrested in bed with BOLLI in October, 1943. Even then FOOTE was unable to make the obvious deductions.

4. An attempt on FOOTE himself was made in April. FOOTE had been told by Moscow to expect a courier from France to whom he was to hand over funds; probably the arrangements for this courier visit dated from before the arrest of TREPPER and ROBINSON at the end of 1942. The Germans having learned of this proposal sent a substitute agent who met FOOTE and received money from him, but seems to have aroused his suspicions. FOOTE has possibly exaggerated the extent of his suspicions in self-defence. The first inkling of the deceiption probably came from DUEBENDORFER who learnt from a private line of her own that Maurice AENIS-HAENSLIN was in German hands, and warned Moscow through RADO. AENIS-HAENSLIN appears to have acted as a courier between ROBINSON and DUEBENDORFER in 1941 (see Chapter VI, A) and was very probably concerned in the plans for a courier visit to FOOTE, if indeed he was not intended to have served as the courier himself. It is quite in keeping with the R.U.'s security rules that they should not have told either FOOTE or RADO of a connection between the courier and DUEBENDORFER, and that DUEBENDORFER herself should have been kept in the dark about this projected visit. Be that as it may, Moscow were at first sceptical about DUEBENDORFER's story and demanded her evidence.

5. In April, again there was another alarum from DUEBENDORFER. It appears that she, or at least her house, was rung up by some unknown person who enquired for her lover, Paul BOETTCHER, under his alias of Herr DUEBENDORFER. It seems likely that this was another attempt at German penetration, based on information received in France. This was Moscow's diagnosis, increasingly firm as they learnt what had become of TREPPER and his friends. But, ironically enough, DUEBENDORFER suspected that the call had come from a representative of the Centre itself, and accused Moscow through RADO of trying to cut her out with her jealously guarded LUCIE source.

6. The German radio intercepts between Switzerland and Moscow, from which most of this chapter derives, provide important evidence of Moscow's knowledge of German penetration in France, and even, it may be, of triple-cross operations by TREPPER. Unfortunately, these intercepts do not establish the date at which TREPPER's report from captivity reached

/Moscow

Chapter VIII (continued)

Moscow (see Chapter VII, B), or the date on which Moscow was warned by any other means. The reason for this uncertainty is the lack of any strong organisational connection between the networks of Switzerland the interrelated services in the Low Countries, Germany and France. It has been shown how these services through difficulties of communication were brought to a fatal interdependence. The Swiss service, however, remained almost entirely within its orthodox R.U. water-tight compartment, and the successes of the Germans outside this compartment gave them little direct or up-to-date information on RADO's organisation. ROBINSON, who of all the Germans' captives at this time probably knew most about R.U. agents in Switzerland, was very slow to talk. TREPPER seems to have known very little of RADO's work, or at least to have concealed his knowledge from the Germans. His report after his arrest - supposing that to have been the first detailed information which Moscow received on the subject - must have been mainly concerned with the Low Countries and France and it may not have mentioned Switzerland at all. There seems no very strong reason therefore why Moscow should have told RADO about their troubles in France at the time when they had word of them. The Swiss network may not have seemed to be in any jeopardy, though they showed a significant interest in DUEBENDORFER's stories of AENIS-HAENSLIN and of her telephone call.

7. It was not until July that Moscow began to send RADO warnings which can be clearly related to their information on events in France. First of all they told him that the courier who had met FOOTE in April was known without any doubt to have been a Gestapo substitute for a captured R.U. agent. They had also been told that the Gestapo agent had succeeded in following FOOTE to his lodgings, but on this point they asked for confirmation. (FOOTE himself tells a circumstantial story of how he had evaded his follower but this may date from the time of his first interrogation by RADO at Moscow's behest. Apart from FOOTE's own testimony there is no evidence that he was not entirely deceived by the bogus courier). FOOTE was ordered into temporary retirement and a general warning was administered against German "provocations".

8. In the same month Moscow told RADO that "MANOLO", the agent who had visited him in 1939, was in German hands. For the reasons given in Chapter IV, A it is likely that MANOLO was SUKOLOV. Moscow could not assess how much information MANOLO had given or could give about RADO but they considered on the whole that their system of water-tight compartments ought to have saved the day. They asked the Swiss group, particularly DUEBENDORFER, to put forward their own views about the dangers of the situation and the counter-measures which should be taken, and they approved a number of recommendations by RADO, who was thoroughly scared. Although the R.U. showed this much respect towards the German attack they seem to have overlooked or discounted the dangers from the Swiss Federal Police. Their attitude was that the supply of the "LUCIE" material must be continued at all costs and they paid little attention to the increasing warnings from RADO and his assistants of the Swiss advance. In fact the Federal Police, helped by what seems to have been a very efficient signals interception service, were ready to move quite independently of any German information.

9 In October they arrested HAEL and BOLLI and it was particularly unfortunate that RADO not long before had deposited various notes of his traffic and finances with HAEL. It was only a matter of time before the one surviving W/T link was cut and FOOTE who operated this was arrested on November 19th. He was able to put his wireless apparatus

/out of

Chapter VIII (continued)

out of action and a play-back which was begun by the Swiss in the same month had little chance of success. They repaired FOOTE's transmitter, but used RADO's code since FOOTE's was inaccessibly contained in his head. This seems to have roused Russian suspicions and such of the Swiss deception traffic as we possess can have done little or nothing to dispel them. (Apart from these technical clues to the Swiss attempt at deception there has been found a mysterious radio intercept from Switzerland dated 6th December, 1943, in which Moscow were told of FOOTE's arrest. The message used the proper name "FOOTE" and not his correct alias of "JIM". The deception exchanges between Moscow and Switzerland ignore this message and its origin is still a matter of speculation.)

10. RADO had meanwhile gone into hiding with his wife. DUEBENDORFER was still receiving "LUCIE" material, but lacked the means to pay her source or pass the information on. She turned in desperation to another member of GISELA's family and in November 1943 sent her first appeal by letter to Hermina RABINOWITCH at the International Labour Office in Montreal. The letter, which is published in the Royal Commission report on the Canadian case, shows that DUEBENDORFER could not understand why the "LUCIE" material was no longer collected from her. She explained that relations with LUCIE continued to be good and that her situation had even improved. She knew that RADO had retired from the network, but she seems to have been ignorant that there were no surviving communications between Switzerland and Moscow. Her initial request was therefore for money and she wrote in the expectation that some part of GISELA's family would seek her out

B. France

1. The W/T play-back of TREPPER (EIFFEL) had been in operation since Christmas Day, 1942. Notionally TREPPER had succeeded in setting up a new wireless station with the apparatus which was factually available to him in France. The Germans were not satisfied with this and in March they began a further play-back with SUKOLOV (MARS). From this they gained in the same month what seems at first sight to have been a considerable success. This was a message from Moscow recommending SUKOLOV to seek out OZOLS who, they said, had possessed a network but had been out of contact for a long time. The indications which they gave of OZOLS' whereabouts and identity were sketchy, but the Germans followed up the hint with great energy.

2. If it is accepted that TREPPER from the first intended and practised a triple-cross then it seems likely that SUKOLOV entered his German captivity with a similar plan. In the case of SUKOLOV we have not the evidence of deception which we possess in the case of TREPPER, but apart from their possible conspiracy during 1942, before their arrests (see Chapter VII, B), they were housed in the same villa from July 1943 until TREPPER's escape in September. Perhaps the most striking evidence of SUKOLOV as a triple-cross agent is contained in the evidence of his mistress about his behaviour just after the escape took place. It seems that everyone showed the wildest excitement and alarm with the marked exception of SUKOLOV himself. It may be conjectured that TREPPER and, through him, Moscow had no assurance of SUKOLOV's situation or loyalty until the captivity of the two agents was joined. The message about OZOLS to the MARS play-back sounds genuine and may indicate that in March 1943, both Moscow and TREPPER were still ignorant of SUKOLOV's arrest.

/If the

Chapter VIII (continued)

If the identification of "MANOLO" with SUKOLOV is right, (see A above), Moscow's message to RADO about "MANOLO" may date, in July, their first news of SUKOLOV's captivity. The message matches well in date with the time that TREPPER and SUKOLOV were brought together.

3. Considered as a triple-cross SUKOLOV had an ungrateful part to play. It would have been his job to remain in German custody, to maintain a high standard of apparent collaboration, particularly by the sacrifice of fellow agents, and to achieve the very complicated feat of including information useful to Moscow in the deception traffic forced upon him by the Germans. We have little indication of how this was done. TREPPER himself after his escape gave SPAAK an instance of his triple-cross success on the "EIFFEL" play-back which might be considered as a sample of SUKOLOV's procedure. TREPPER said that he secured from the German Intelligence, ostensibly to create confidence in Moscow, an accurate statement of their knowledge on British resources in the Mediterranean. This he said was needed by Moscow in their concern for a "Second Front". TREPPER, however, seems also to have had outside lines of communication with the R.U., possibly through the French Communist Party. Using the same method by which he smuggled out his first report, (see Chapter VII, B.), it may have been he who told the R.U. of the substitute courier sent to FOOTE (see A. above). Such outside lines may have been available to SUKOLOV after TREPPER's escape, at least until the capture of the French Communist Party transmitter at Choisy le Roi (see below).

4. In June the Germans, following up various leads they had obtained from ROBINSON's arrest, broke into a French Communist Party wireless station at Le Raincy. They are said to have found there evidence of intelligence contact with the British Isles and of political contact with Switzerland. They attempted a play-back, but failed since the stations called seemed to have been warned beforehand. We have not any details of the material discovered at this station and it is possible that the same limited knowledge was the original reason for TREPPER's escape. TREPPER told SPAAK that he learned some time during his captivity of a "secret Russian cypher" which had been acquired by the Germans, and that he feared for this reason they might uncover from previously intercepted traffic the report which he had smuggled out for Moscow. He hastened to prepare for his escape. It seems possible that this cypher came the Le Raincy station and that TREPPER, to whom it may have been referred much later than June, recognised it as a code used by the French Communist Party.

5. In July OZOLS was found. SUKOLOV made contact with him and procceeded to develop - from the German point of view - a promising new line of deception. OZOLS was not supposed to know that SUKOLOV was under German control and so long as he was kept in this ignorance the Germans might gain not only an invaluable supply of deception material but further penetration into some surviving Soviet network in France. Oddly and perhaps significantly however, OZOLS when he was recruited by SUKOLOV seems no longer to have possessed a network such as Moscow had ascribed to him; at least he was remarkably isolated so far as German knowledge went. Such acquaintance as he admitted was in the French Resistance and with this he made a fresh start under SUKOLOV's tutelage. An expanding network of resistance workers was turned over to serve "Russian intelligence". They produced quantities of useful information from which the Germans could build up their deception traffic. At the same time they were a means of penetration into other French Resistance organisations, a prospect which the Germans found too seductive to resist. Although the MARS play-back continued well into 1944 it seems likely that SUKOLOV's original uses as a German double-agent against the Russians became academic in comparison with

/his employment

Chapter VIII (continued)

his employment in the OZOLS spider-web against the French Resistance. Such a change of interest may have offered triple-cross opportunities to SUKOLOV in so far as it distracted German attention from his real profession. German control of his relations with OZOLS must have been difficult at any time. More importantly, there is evidence of increasing laxity during 1943-1944 in the German management of SUKOLOV's "MARS" transmissions to Moscow.

6. Whether or not the OZOLS organisation was entered upon or continued by SUKOLOV as part of a triple-cross plan, there were signs in August of an attempt at deception by Moscow on the TREPPER W/T play-back. This was a message that the R.U. were sending an agent to Paris to join TREPPER. The Germans were greatly intrigued at the prospect, but whatever Moscow had in mind the plan was soon sterile, for on September 16th TREPPER, practising much the same ruse as he had used in smuggling out his 1942 report, escaped from the custody of his German guard.

7. TREPPER sought help, first through his mistress Georgina de WINTER and then directly, from Claude SPAAK, with whom he had deposited funds through the SOKOLs at the beginning of 1942. He was now interested not only in the money which SPAAK could provide, but in his contacts with the French Communist Party, and he gave to him for transmission by the Party to the Soviet Military Attache in London a message offering a rendezvous in France. It is not certain whether or not this message ever reached London. The rendezvous never took place and GROURADNEZ, the intermediary who carried the message from SPAAK to the French Communist Party, was captured by the Germans at an unknown date. GROURADNEZ seems to have revealed the rendezvous arrangements to the Germans, but it is not known whether he had succeeded before his arrest in passing the original message to the Communist Party information service. TREPPER learned of his arrest and sent a substitute to the rendezvous, thus escaping recapture himself. If TREPPER's message was forwarded, it may have gone through the French Communist Party station at Choisy le Roi. This station was broken into by the Germans about December 10th, 1942, and evidence was found there of contact with the Comintern, Switzerland and England.

C. British Isles.

1. On June 17th, 1943, D.F. SPRINGHALL was arrested, his detection being due in large measure to his lack of security, his direct management of his sources and his failure to use cut-outs. Two members of the Soviet Embassy departed from London shortly afterwards, but they left behind them no traces of a professional network on the R.U. pattern such as TREPPER and ROBINSON had operated in relation to the Soviet Military Attache at Paris. It is generally supposed that SPRINGHALL had been exploited as a free lance Communist Party agent by these two members of the Embassy and that except in one instance they made no effort to reorganise or group the sources he provided, on orthodox R.U. lines.

2. For these reasons it is unlikely that the agent whom TREPPER declares to have been sent to the British Isles through him and ROBINSON in 1941 was disturbed by SPRINGHALL's arrest. If he was then still working in England it is probable that this agent maintained a professional network insulated on the regulation pattern from direct contact with the Communist Party. Some

/confirmation

Chapter VIII (continued)

confirmation of his existence is contained in TREPPER's story to SPAAK after his escape from German captivity in September. According to SPAAK, TREPPER told him that he was one of the two chiefs of Soviet espionage in Western Europe, that he was in charge of the services in France while the other operated in London. Both of them, he said, had taken up these posts before the war. Some allowance must be made for TREPPER's boasting and for a second-hand report some time after the event. TREPPER was inclined to magnify his importance in the eyes of SPAAK, and the story has at least lost no grandeur in the re-telling. The suggestion that this spy leader in England has been working there since before the war does not support his identification with the agent who is said to have been sent there from France in June 1941. This difficulty however is not insurmountable when we take into account the pre-war activities of "JEAN" in England (see Chapter IV, C.), and the possibility that "JEAN" may have been connected as a subordinate or even as a superior with the agent who was sent over in June 1941. In whatever way TREPPER's stories of the agent (or agents) are construed, they at least offer grounds for supposing that a working R.U. service existed in the British Isles in 1943.

3. It is possible that this fellow agent in England was concerned in the rendezvous which TREPPER tried to arrange by a message through SPAAK to the French Communist Party. TREPPER said that the rendezvous invitation was to be sent to the Soviet Military Attache in London. Whether it got there or not is uncertain: TREPPER was prevented from keeping up his attendance at the rendezvous because the Germans got news of it. From the point of view of the Attache in London such a rendezvous would have required clandestine organisation in France. For this purpose it is possible that he might have referred the invitation to TREPPER's fellow agent in England for action or at least for information. This message implies that someone in England had the means of producing a safe and resourceful contact in France despite the extensive German penetration of the TREPPER and ROBINSON organisations. It is conceivable that such a contact might have been arranged under French Resistance cover. There are signs as far back as 1941 (see Chapter VI, B.), that ROBINSON had access to French Resistance communications with England. The same facilities may have existed in the opposite direction. The agent whom ROBINSON is said to have passed to England in 1941 may have travelled there by means of these very communications. Such a connection, once it was formed, would be well worth keeping up, and the agent in England might therefore have been the best or only means for the Soviet Military Attache in London to accept TREPPER's invitation. In support of these speculations it should be borne in mind that evidence of French Communist Party wireless contact with England was found in both the stations seized by the Germans at Le Raincy and Choisy le Roi in June and December 1943.

D. Low Countries.

1. The Germans maintained four W/T play-backs from the Low Countries during 1943, but for the reasons given in Chapter VII, D., they must all have been obvious to Moscow. No successful deception is known to have been practised on either side unless we consider the red herrings which Moscow seems to have offered in answer to German enquiries after funds.

2. In March 1943 CUHN (see Chapter VII, D.), who had been

/parachuted

Chapter VIII (continued)

parachuted into Holland in November 1942, made contact with GOUWLOOZE and told him that his orders were to proceed to Germany. Apparently he was intended to join KNOCHEL in Berlin, but GOUWLOOZE explained to Moscow over the Dutch Communist Party line that links with KNOCHEL did not exist and, probably, that he suspected German penetration in that quarter. In reply Moscow told him to send CUHN to KRUYT junior as a substitute wireless operator for DE LAAR. This was done, but although DE LAAR returned to him, GOUWLOOZE professed to know nothing of KRUYT's intelligence business. The Germans did not need to press GOUWLOOZE on this question because on July 28th, 1943, they had arrested both CUHN and KRUYT. The circumstances and results of their arrest are unknown but KRUYT himself was later released and, bearing in mind the stock manoeuvre of German Intellignece, it seems more than likely that both agents were "turned" to work on some deception plan. At a later date KRUYT reported his freedom to Moscow, but it is not known what became of him. In November 1943 GOUWLOOZE himself was arrested, possibly because of risks he had taken in rescuing from German custody a comrade DANKAART of the Dutch Communist Party Information Service.

E. Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia.

1. The Germans continued one W/T play-back from Germany throughout 1943. They closed down another in February and instituted a new one in March.

2. For the reasons given in Chapter VII, E., KNOCHEL and VAN PROOSDY were probably taken one after the other by German intelligence in the course of 1942. A symptom of their exploitation may be detected in a letter of February/March 1943 written by VAN PROOSDY, probably under compulsion, to his wife in Holland announcing a forthcoming visit to her by "a good friend of his." This person duly appeared at the beginning of June and produced, as evidence of his bona fides, another letter from VAN PROOSDY, this time unfinished. He tried to establish contact with GOUWLOOZE, but was repulsed by Frau VAN PROOSDY who suspected him for what he no doubt was, a German agent.

3. In the spring of 1943 Hans MULLER, the brother of Anna MULLER of Switzerland (see A. above), was arrested in Freiburg. He had been trying to pass a wireless transmitter to a Russian woman parachute agent who may have been one of several who came under German control. Possibly her original mission had been in support of the SCHULZE-BOYSEN and HARNACK groups in 1942. Hans MULLER was executed and his sister Anna MULLER, who may have supplied him with the wireless transmitter, was enticed from Switzerland into captivity.

4. Towards the end of 1943 the Germans captured a further Russian W/T agent in Bohemia and they claimed to have followed this arrest with a successful W/T play-back. The case may be worth record as a possible survival from the OSKOL group, but the agent is more likely to have been on a short term operational mission. A considerable number of such short-term agents were introduced into Greater Germany during 1943 and 1944.

/ F. The Balkans

Chapter VIII (continued)

F. The Balkans.

1. In January 1943 the Germans succeeded in decyphering the code used in the STOINOFF/MIRTSCHEFF traffic from Bulgaria to Moscow and Tiflis. It is not known whether they were helped in this by the discoveries they had made in the Low Countries and France during 1942. In February they seized the STOINOFF/MIRTSCHEFF W/T station at Varna in Bulgaria, but their follow-up was slow and unskilful, so that warning reached Moscow from at least one of the several other lines. Seven other STOINOFF/MIRTSCHEFF stations were captured during 1943, and the Germans believed that the only W/T contact left was between Moscow and the Soviet Legation at Sofia. Despite their belief in this surviving line and the various errors they had made in the general attack, they still attempted a W/T play-back through Milka STOINOFF. This seems to have been a triple cross operation from the start. At a later date, but perhaps still in 1943, one agent of the STOINOFF/MIRTSCHEFF group escaped to Russia.

G. Italy.

1. Any R.U. service there may have been from Italy through Switzerland probably came to an end with FOOTE's arrest in November 1943. (See A. above).

H. Spain and Portugal.

1. There is a report that in the autumn of 1943 a Communist Party W/T service was discovered near Lisbon. We know nothing more about this incident, but a Portuguese Communist Party Information Service, it if existed, might have had connections with the unidentified agent whom TREPPER passed on to the Iberian Peninsula in June 1941.

I. Western Hemisphere.

1. In November 1943 Hermina RABINOWITCH of the International Labour Office at Montreal received her first appeal for help from DUEBENDORFER in a letter sent under cover of the I.L.O. bag (see A. above). In the following month she telephoned TOUNKIN, the Second Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, and asked to see him. TOUNKIN received her unwillingly and did nothing about the situation she described. (See the Royal Commission Report on Soviet Espionage in Canada).

Chapter IX. 1944.

A. Switzerland

1. In January 1944 DUEBENDORFER cabled to Hermina RABINOWITCH in Montreal making a further appeal for help and in March she sent a second letter.

2. The Swiss W/T play-back to Moscow on FOOTE's transmitter never seemed to have had any success with the Russians (see Chapter VIII A) and petered out about April 1944. The Swiss had not completed their work against RADO's organisation however, and in June, continuing there somewhat deliberate investigations, they arrested DUEBENDORFER and Rudolf ROESSLER, the source of the LUCIE material. For domestic reasons, touching his employment by the Swiss General Staff, ROESSLER was soon released and DUEBENDORFER was allowed bail not long afterwards. She seems to have talked very little under interrogation, but some discoveries were made among her papers. It is said that the most important document, probably one concerning ROESSLER himself, was hidden in the sole of a shoe which she was wearing at the time of her arrest.

3. During July the Soviet Military Attache at Ottawa, with the help of Hermina RABINOWITCH, succeeded in arranging the transmission of funds from New York to Switzerland. It is not known whether DUEBENDORFER ever drew from these funds, but they were acknowledged in the following month by ABRAMSON, another member of Gisela's family in the I.L.O. Up to the time of her arrest DUEBENDORFER had been depositing her collection of LUCIE material in ABRAMSON's safe.

4. In September FOOTE was released on bail. He had refused to collaborate with the Swiss in any way, even to the point of declining an earlier release on the grounds that this might rouse suspicion among the Russians. Once he was free, he began to set his house in order with noticeable zeal, and he seems to have been convinced at an early stage that there would be an R.U. enquiry into RADO's organisation. First of all he looked for RADO himself but was given through the Swiss Communist Party a message that his manager was leaving for Paris, where he would arrange for contact to be made with the Swiss network by the newly-arrived Soviet Authorities in France. FOOTE, said RADO, was to wait in Switzerland for further orders. This was not good enough for FOOTE who may already have begun his report on the history and situation of the Swiss network. Through NICOLE of the Swiss Communist Party he contrived to meet Rachel DUEBENDORFER who he had never seen before, and then even ROESSLER himself. ROESSLER, who had also been released in September, seems to have returned to his favorable position with the Swiss General Staff, and was ready to continue the supply of LUCIE material. By these explorations FOOTE probably learnt more about DUEBEMDORFER and her sources than RADO himself had known. He decided that the LUCIE intelligence was too rich to lie fallow and that he would wait no longer for word from France. In November therefore he jumped his bail and with the help of Communist connections in the French Resistance he made his way to Paris and the Soviet authorities, taking with him his report on the Swiss network and accretion of the most important LUCIE material. DUEBENDORFER left for France the following summer.

/B. France.

Chapter IX (continued)

B.. France

1. About January 1944 an important new development took place in the SUKOLOV-OZOLS deception plan. OZOLS put SUKOLOV in touch with LEGENDRE, the leader of a considerable network in the French Resistance and this organisation was persuaded to work for "Russian Intelligence" in addition to its normal activities. The Germans exploited the new connection in a large-scale penetration of the French Resistance and carried out a series of arrests. It is from the son of one of the French Resistance workers who lost his life in this penetration that some of the most direct charges against SUKOLOV as a triple-cross agent derive. According to his information, SUKOLOV was working wholly in Russian intelligence interests, but concealed his aims and built up the confidence of his German warders by a succession of human sacrifices from the French Resistance. Considering SUKOLOV in this light, there can be little doubt by this time that OZOLS was fully in his confidence, if indeed he had not been instructed in the triple-cross plan at the time of their first contact. Signs of SUKOLOV's acceptance by the Germans as a whole-hearted collaborator appear in the licence he was given in the management of his supposed deception traffic with Moscow. The code used for this traffic was so complicated that the last stages of the encyphering process seem to have been left, as time went on, to SUKOLOV himself. This remarkable privilege should have given him opportunities for direct and unconcealed communications with the R.U. An example of SUKOLOV's ambiguous behavour survives in his instructions to the LEGENDRE network against an Allied landing in France. They were to supply him with detailed reports on the scale, successes and reverses of the attack. This increased the doubts of certain members of the network who already suspected German penetration at the upper levels of their organisation. But taking into account all the possibilities of the situation these particular instructions can be construed:

(a) as a brief to the OZOLS bogus "Russian Intelligence" organisation, producing information from which deception material could be selected for transmission to Moscow on the MARS play-back.

(b) as a means of collecting intelligence directly useful to the Germans;

(c) as a means of collecting intelligence directly useful to the Russians; postulating (1) that SUKOLOV had a means of concealing from the Germans his transmission of true intelligence to the Russians; (2) that he was able to conceal from the Germans intelligence that he collected from the OZOLS organisation, or to mutilate such intelligence until it was useless or misleading to the Germans.

2. In considering (c) (1) it should be borne in mind that SUKOLOV, given enough freedom, might have developed, through OZOLS or some unknown, a line of communication with Russia quite independent of "MARS". We do not know what TREPPER was doing in 1944 but it is probable that he was still in France.

3. There is a report that in May 1944 ROBINSON was working as a deception agent for the Germans in the south of France. This

/contradicts

Chapter IX (continued)

contradicts the evidence of our preliminary reports that ROBINSON was executed in Germany some time during 1943. That he was still alive in the summer of 1943 is shown by his joint interrogation with Anna MUELLER (see Chapter VIII A), and there is no doubt that if he had been turned there would have been a promising field for his employment as a double agent in France. The truth remains in doubt. The two German intelligence reports of December, 1942, and March, 1943, both date from a period when ROBINSON refused to talk, while the Anna MUELLER story may suggest the beginnings of collaboration. There are two ex-members of the German Intelligence Service who agree in the story of his survival as a "turned agent", but we have no further information on his career.

4. In July, 1944, JEFFREMOV's "BUCHE-PASCAL" service was transferred from Belgium to Paris and amalgamated with the French play-backs. SUKOLOV and JEFFREMOV were kept in the same house and it may therefore have been possible for SUKOLOV to pass on the triple-cross plan. But in the following month the two were evacuated into Germany.

5. In September RADO and his wife arrived in France, but it is not known how long RADO took to secure an interview at the Soviet Military Mission in Paris. FOOTE arrived in Paris in November, having travelled from Switzerland with the aid of the French Resistance. In the same month he secured interviews with NOVIKOV of the Military Mission and at one of these he met RADO who appeared to have seen NOVIKOV beforehand. FOOTE handed over his LUCIE material and a detailed report on his knowledge of the Swiss network, but this was done without RADO's knowledge. FOOTE was quite ready to arrange a private meeting with RADO, out of Soviet earshot, and he would no doubt have mentioned his report if such a meeting had taken place. But RADO seemed to shun him, and they did not meet again until January, 1945.

C. British Isles.

1. The agent (or agents) mentioned by TREPPER may still have been active in England during 1944. (See Chapter VIII C.)

D. Low Countries.

1. Between February and July 1944 all the Low Countries play-backs seem to have been closed down, with the exception of JEFFREMOV's which was transferred to France in July and amalgamated with the Paris deception service. The futility of the Low Countries play-backs is well illustrated in the case of the WINTERINK ("TANNE") line which was closed down on Moscow's advice.

/E. Germany,

Chapter IX (Continued)

E. Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia.

1. The play-backs from the former R.U. services in Germany seem all to have come to an end during 1944. In August 1944 SUKOLOV was evacutated with the Sonderkommando from Paris into Germany and in the same month JEFFREMOV was evacuated there separately.

F. Spain and Portugal.

1. In April 1944 PANNWITZ, leader of the Sonderkommando controlling the penetration and deception service against the R.U. in France, paid a visit to Spain. The purpose of this visit is unknown, but it is possible that he was following up some lead into Russian intelligence: see, for example, TREPPER's story of a Russian agent passing through France to the Iberian Peninsula in June 1941, (Chapter VI, I.) and the story of "F. FANTATTI" (Chapter X A.).

G. Western Hemisphere.

1. In January 1944, Hermina RABINOWITCH received a further appeal for help in a cable from DUEBENDORFER, followed up by a second letter in March. In April RABINOWITCH telephoned the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa once more and this time secured the interest of ZABOTIN, the Soviet Military Attache, who took over the case. It was not until about July, however, that funds were sent through to Switzerland. These were provided by the Soviet Embassy at Ottawa and transmitted with the help of RABINOWITCH through the HELBEIN Watch Company of New York. The funds were sent to ABRAMSON who acknowledged their receipt in August.

Chapter X. 1945

A. Switzerland.

1. In April 1945 Waldemar von PETRO @ PANNWITZ, a German agent who at one time may have assisted the work of the Sonderkommando in Paris, and who had been living at Lugano since 1944, received under the alias of PANNWITZ a letter from "F. FANTATTI" of Madrid, mentioning "Our friend Annibali" and asking for further orders. Various constructions can be put upon this incident, including the possibility that von PETRO used the alias of PANNWITZ for professional purposes connected with the work of the Sonderkommando, and that "F. FANTATTI" had been concerned in the visit of the true PANNWITZ to Spain in 1944. (See Chapter IX, F.) This theory argues German penetration of some Russian intelligence organisation in Spain. On the other hand, it must be recorded that von PETRO himself was an ambiguous character, suspected of connections with Russian Intelligence before the war. By the end of the war these suspicions had, if anything, increased and SCHELLENBERG himself believed there was deception material in certain reports which von PETRO sent to him from Switzerland during 1945.

B. France.

1. In January 1945 TREPPER, RADO and FOOTE were embarked in Paris, under aliases, for a journey by air to Moscow. When the plane stopped in Cairo RADO showed a more friendly attitude towards FOOTE and proposed to share a bedroom with him for the night. During their conversation FOOTE revealed that he had sent a full report on the Swiss organisation to Moscow, whereupon RADO showed great anxiety and later disappeared from the hotel. The aeroplane went on to Moscow without him. TREPPER showed some knowledge of FOOTE's work as an agent, but gave the impression that he himself had spent most of the war in hiding in France. The two became quite friendly but FOOTE never saw TREPPER again after their arrival in Moscow. The disappearance of RADO and the fact that he had submitted a report inconsistent with FOOTE's story made the Russians suspect FOOTE as a British penetration agent. After some six months of statement and interrogation however, FOOTE was told that RADO had arrived and that they were now satisfied of FOOTE's innocence. FOOTE is under the impression that RADO was executed for dereliction of duty, particularly a large scale embezzlement of funds sent to him in Switzerland for the administration of the network. It is not known how RADO was persuaded to leave Cairo for Moscow. He had first reported to the British to whom he told a cock-and-bull story of involuntary complicity in Russian espionage. (This appears in our preliminary reports, but subsequent evidence has shown it to be worthless.)

C. British Isles.

1. We have no further evidence about the agent or agents of the R.U. in England, mentioned by TREPPER.

/D. Germany,

TOP SECRET

Chapter X (continued)

D. Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia.

1. SUKOLOV was transferred with the Sonderkommando PANNWITZ to the Black Forest in February 1945, and he was last seen in March of the same year at Berlin.

E. Spain and Portugal.

1. (See A. above).

F. Western Hemisphere.

1. On September 5th, 1945, Igor GOUZENKO, a cypher clerk at the Soviet Embassy, Ottawa, deserted the Embassy and sought refuge with the Canadian Government, producing a quantity of papers he had stolen from the Embassy files. Apart from detailed information on ZABOTIN's espionage network in Canada, these papers contained particulars of the message sent by DUEBENDORFER to RABINOWITCH. RABINOWITCH was brought before the Royal Commission but did her best to deny any complicity with GISELA's family or the R.U.

	SWITZERLAND	FRANCE	BRITISH ISLES	LOW COUNTRIES	GERMANY, AUSTRIA & CZECHOSLOVAKIA	SCANDINAVIA	BALKANS	ITALY	SPAIN & PORTUGAL	WESTERN HEMISPHERE
1936.	POLIAKOVA, the woman major, based on Switzerland with wide interests in Western Europe. Has connections with ROBINSON who visits Switzerland. Possibly controls Anna MÜLLER and Selma GREINER-BURGER. Rachel DUBENDORFER also working. Alexander RADO arrives in Geneva and sets up Geopress.	ROBINSON-based on Paris and in relations with Soviet Military Attaché. Connected with POLIAKOVA and possibly working against Italy. HARRY II based on Paris and working against British Isles. Using Germaine SCHNEIDER as Courier and in relations with Soviet Military Attache, Paris. December: Leopold TREPPER arrives in Paris from Moscow.	Ernest WEISS working for HARRY II and developing the new sources MEREDITH and VERNON.	January: WENZEL arrives in Belgium as wireless technician for R.U. SCHNEIDERS are recruited by JEFFREMOV. Germaine SCHNEIDER serves inter alia as courier between HARRY II and WEISS. GOURLOOZE exploiting Dutch Communist Party probably on behalf of OMER.	SCHULZE-BOYSEN, a source in the German Air Ministry, exploited by A.M. APPARAT of N.P.D. who pass his information through Gisela von FOLLNITZ to Soviet Embassy, Berlin. Von SCHELIHA exploited in Poland by HERRNSTADT. Arrival in Warsaw of Ilse STOBBE as cut-out to von SCHELIHA.	TREPPER may have visited Sweden on a technical intelligence mission to assess information on a steel alloy process.	Possibly visited by Germaine SCHNEIDER as a courier to an unknown agent in Bulgaria.	August: ROBINSON pays two visits.		
1937.	POLIAKOVA retires to Moscow. Part of her service taken over by RADO who establishes postal and courier link (micro-photography) with the Soviet Military Attache, Paris. DUBENDORFER probably working independently. MÜLLER and GREINER-BURGER possibly out of work but in touch with ROBINSON. TREPPER may have paid a visit for discussions on reorganisation in Czechoslovakia, the Balkans, Greece and Italy (1937/8)	ROBINSON takes over British Isles from HARRY II in first half of year. HARRY II returns to Moscow. TREPPER, based on Paris, takes part in reorganisation, talks touching Eastern and Western Europe and the Mediterranean. (1937/8) Waldemar OZOLS arrives in France from the Spanish war and takes up R.U. employment visiting the British Isles.	WEISS transferred in July from HARRY II to ROBINSON. TREPPER visits on independent R.U. project. RADO visits 7-10 November on Geopress business. ? OZOLS visits.	The SCHNEIDERS continue to work as couriers. GROSSVOGEL becomes travelling inspector of the Excellent Raincoat Company and is visited by TREPPER in Brussels. GOURLOOZE closes down his Dutch espionage in the summer. October: WENZEL moves from Belgium to Holland to see GOURLOOZE, and then reports to Moscow.	Probable interruption in SCHULZE-BOYSEN's work as a source. von SCHELIHA exploited as a source in Poland. TREPPER discusses in Switzerland reorganisation of service in Czechoslovakia. (1937/8)	TREPPER discusses in Paris reorganisation of service in Scandinavia. (1937/8)	Germaine SCHNEIDER may have continued to serve as courier to an unknown agent in Bulgaria. TREPPER discusses in Switzerland reorganisation of Services in the Balkans and Greece. (1937/8)	Possible operations by RADO from Switzerland. TREPPER discusses in Switzerland reorganisation of Service in Italy. (1937/8)		
1938.	RADO continues working. DUBENDORFER probably working independently. June: Ursula HAMBURGER/KUCZYNSKI sets up new service in W/T contact with Moscow. Recruits POOTE from England and posts him to Munich in November. £ 6,500 paid into von SCHELIHA's account at Zurich from New York.	ROBINSON continues operations against British Isles. Communicates through Soviet M.A. Paris. TREPPER, based on Paris, continues planning operations and pays six months' visit to Moscow. Returns to set up in Belgium under Canadian alias. OZOLS possibly working against British Isles. DANILOFF may have been posted to the Soviet Consulate, Paris, to work with the Military attaches. Money sent for SUKOLOV to bank in Marseilles from Mexico	ROBINSON visits and continues service through WEISS. TREPPER VISITS. September: POOTE is recruited through C.P.G.B. for Ursula HAMBURGER's Swiss Station.	The SCHNEIDERS continue to work as couriers. ROBINSON visits. GROSSVOGEL sets up "The Foreign Excellent Raincoat" in Brussels and develops Scandinavian connections. TREPPER sets up in Brussels (under Canadian alias?) WENZEL returns to Low Countries and settles in Belgium possibly with SCHNEIDERS. Visits Holland in December to see GOURLOOZE.	von SCHELIHA exploited as a source (in Poland). November: POOTE posted to Munich via Switzerland and England for U. HAMBURGER service.	TREPPER passed through Denmark, Sweden and Finland on his way from France to Moscow.	Germaine SCHNEIDER may have continued to serve as courier to an unknown agent in Bulgaria.	Possible operations by RADO from Switzerland.		£ 6,500 credited from the Chase National Bank, New York, to Von SCHELIHA's account at Zurich. Money for SUKOLOV sent from Mexico to bank in Marseilles.
1939.	RADO continues his service. DUBENDORFER working independently. ROBINSON visits February, May and June-July. Brasso-German pact brings U. HAMBURGER's service to a standstill. POOTE and BENTON (recruited in spring through C.P.G.B.) recalled to Switzerland from Germany. September: JEFFREMOV travels to Brussels from Switzerland under Finnish alias. OSBORNES arrives as new recruit for U. HAMBURGER. "MANOLO" (?SUKOLOV) visits RADO. December: OSBORNES arrested by SWISS in possession of W/T.	ROBINSON continues his service against British Isles but is interrupted by the outbreak of war. Last contact with WEISS in France in July. OZOLS possibly working against British Isles. DANILOFF still working with Soviet Military Attaché. Money for SUKOLOV sent from Mexico to bank in Marseilles.	Spring: BENTON recruited for U. HAMBURGER's service through C.P.G.B. April: "Jean" working as established agent under ROBINSON, independent of WEISS. July: WEISS has last contact with ROBINSON in France. August: Frank SCHNEIDER visits as a courier from ROBINSON to an unknown agent	G.January: WENZEL in Amsterdam recruits WINTERINK through GOURLOOZE. MAKAROFF arrives under Uruguayan alias in spring and is posted by TREPPER in April to Ostend. TREPPER remains in Brussels. Spring: GROSSVOGEL tours Scandinavia for "The Foreign Excellent Raincoat". June: HAGEL sent as new recruit from Holland to WENZEL in Belgium. July: SUKOLOV arrives in Brussels probably from France under Uruguayan cover. Destined for Copenhagen, but remains. August: Franz SCHNEIDER visits U.K. for ROBINSON. G.SCHNEIDER had visited in spring. September: JEFFREMOV arrives in Brussels from Zurich under Finnish alias. October: GOURLOOZE provides temporary W/T link with Moscow through Dutch C.P. for "Clement" in Belgium (?SUKOLOV). Unknown date: GOURLOOZE visits Moscow and gets reserve cypher.	von SCHELIHA exploited till September as source in Poland. April: SUKOLOV visits Berlin to revive SCHULZE-BOYSEN as source. Arranges courier service to Belgium. Early summer: BENTON posted to Frankfurt a/Main for U. HAMBURGER's service. POOTE visits Switzerland in August and stays. Recalls BENTON. Possible beginnings of the OSKOL group in Prague in which SUKOLOV may have been involved.	Spring: GROSSVOGEL tours Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland for "The Foreign Excellent Raincoat" and may have set up BOHLMENS as representative in Stockholm.	Autumn: STOINOFF & KISTRIUKOFF and his wife Milka, who had been trained in the U.S.S.R. since 1935, are returned to Bulgaria (Plovdiv) as W/T agents.	Possible operations by RADO from Switzerland.		Money for SUKOLOV sent from Mexico to bank in Marseilles.

YEAR	SWITZERLAND	FRANCE	BRITISH ISLES	LOW COUNTRIES	GERMANY, AUSTRIA & CZECHOSLOVAKIA	SCANDINAVIA	BALKANS	ITALY	SPAIN & PORTUGAL	WESTERN HEMISPHERE
1940	March: SUKOLOV pays three weeks' visit to Switzerland. Spring: Proposed transfer of Ursula HAMBURGER & Co. to Rumania. June: RADO loses his links with the Soviet M.A. Paris and is put in touch with U.HAMBURGER for W/T communications. DERREDORPER's communications also interrupted by the German invasion of France. December: U.HAMBURGER leaves for U.K. and hands over W/T service to FOOTE & Co.	ROBINSON maintains contact with Soviet M.A. Paris, but out of touch with England. After June enters on espionage service for R.U. against Germany, France and German-occupied France. About June TREPPER and GROSSVOGEL retreat from Brussels to unoccupied France and deal with Soviet M.A. at Vichy. August: OSOLS given fresh commission by Soviet M.A. (?Vichy) and probably equipped with W/T. Autumn: TREPPER and GROSSVOGEL moved to Paris. Unknown date: "Anna FROLOVA" leaves Paris for Copenhagen and thence to Russia.	January: "Jean"(?) sends appeal for help and contact to ROBINSON. All ROBINSON's English connections apparently out of touch. December: R.U. informs ROBINSON that they have made contact with one potential source in England	c.January: GOUBLOOZE's temporary W/T link for "Clement" ends. Until June TREPPER and Co. redeploying against Germany (?). June: TREPPER and GROSSVOGEL retreat to unoccupied France. After June GOUBLOOZE hands over the reserve code to "Clement" (?SUKOLOV) who has taken over TREPPER's service. December: ? JEFFREMOV in W/T contact with Moscow through KENZEL and WINTERINK. Legal resident 4th Section KUSTINSKOV, Commercial Attaché at Brussels Embassy. Network equipped with W/T. Possibly connected with U.K.	Von SCHELIHA working to Soviet Embassy Berlin through STOEHR. SCHULZE-BOYSEN supplying SUKOLOV in Belgium by courier. c.December: HARNACK recruited by Alexander ERDBERG of S.T.D. Berlin. ? OSKOL group working to Soviet Embassy, Prague.	Unknown date: "Anna FROLOVA" moves from Paris to Copenhagen and thence to Russia.	Spring: Proposal that FOOTE should go to Rumania to prepare for transfer to U. HAMBURGER's group from Switzerland. Proposal cancelled on German invasion of Rumania. Autumn: STOINOFF & MIRTSCHEFF group in operation. Joined by two more W/T agents during year.	Possible operations by RADO from Switzerland.	End Oct: Money passed through Portugal to RADO in Switzerland of which £5,500 were for U. HAMBURGER.	Unknown date: SUKOLOV in touch with "Ellen" of New York. Carl EMLING, a connection of DERREDORPER's in Switzerland, leaves France for the Argentine. Hermina HABINGTON with same connections leaves Europe for Montreal (I.L.O.) Autumn: Project of sending GROSSVOGEL to U.S.A. is abandoned.
1941	January: ROBINSON makes contact with DERREDORPER by courier. Early spring: Address in Yugoslavia given to RADO for possible secret writing link. March: FOOTE and HAGEL running separate W/T links RADO given contact with DERREDORPER. June: First transmission by FOOTE of LUCIE material. July: First receipt of funds for RADO from U.S.A. by R.K.O. Radio. Oct.-Nov. Interruption of W/T contact with U.S.S.R. FOOTE appeals to Brigitte LEWIS in England.	c.January: ROBINSON receives wireless transmitter and cipher. GROSSVOGEL founds SIMEX in Paris. TREPPER's plans to return to Moscow cancelled by outbreak of Russo-German war. June: Soviet Embassy withdrawn from Paris and ROBINSON's communications interrupted. He is interviewed by TREPPER who takes him over with his network in September. July: Soviet Embassy withdrawn from Vichy. Summer: Unknown agent passed via TREPPER and ROBINSON from Moscow to England. December: SUKOLOV and SPRINGER escape from Low countries into France.	January: Ursula HAMBURGER-RICHTER arrives from Switzerland. January: ROBINSON notified of R.U.'s intention to take over U.K. service and discharge him from responsibility once link is established. Summer: ?Unknown agent sent to British Isles from Moscow via TREPPER and ROBINSON. October: FOOTE cables Brigitt LEWIS for help over the intermission of his W/T contact with U.S.S.R.	SUKOLOV supplying Moscow by W/T. March: Foundation of SIMEXCO. JEFFREMOV working with KENZEL, WINTERINK, etc. ? in W/T contact with Moscow. June 28th: First German interception of SUKOLOV's W/T traffic. Autumn: DANILOFF recruited by KARPOV from Vichy Embassy and sent to supplement MAKAROFF in Belgium. December 12th: DANILOFF arrested while transmitting for SUKOLOV. MAKAROFF arrested. TREPPER discovers arrests and warns SUKOLOV who withdraws from Simexco and escapes to France.	Unknown date: SIMEX representatives set up in Berlin, Hamburg and Prague. c.June: Operational establishment of HARNACK and SCHULZE-BOYSEN groups by ERDBERG. June: Soviet Embassy withdrawn from Berlin. STOEHR and von SCHELIHA out of contact. July-August: SUKOLOV makes five day visit to Leipzig Fair. September: SUKOLOV fortnight's visit to Prague Fair via Germany. Gives W/T to HARNACK group, cipher to STOEHR, and confirms post-liaison with SCHULZE-BOYSEN. Deals with OSKOL group in Prague. ?HARNACK develops courier link via German C.P. Hamburg through Flensburg to Soviet Embassy, Stockholm. SCHULZE-BOYSEN network develops to cover Prague, Augsburg, Saxony, Thuringia, Magdeburg and Hamburg. October 3rd: Germans break into W/T service from Prague to Moscow (? OSKOL group) ½ people involved.	Simex representatives set up in Oslo and Copenhagen. ? Establishment of courier line between HARNACK and Soviet Embassy, Stockholm via German C.P.Hamburg and Flensburg.	Simex representatives set up at Belgrade and Sofia. Early spring: Address in Yugoslavia given to RADO for secret writing link. Autumn: First interception of STOINOFF/MIRTSCHEFF W/T traffic by Germans.	Possible operations by RADO from Switzerland.	c.June: ? R.U. agent passes through Paris to Portugal. Relieves TREPPER of responsibility for the Iberian Peninsula.	July: Transmission of funds to RADO in Switzerland by R.K.O. Radio. Sept.DERREDORPER's sister (? Jenny) reaches U.S.A.

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1942.	RADO continues service, supplied with "Lucie" material by DUEBENDORFER etc. FOOTE W/T working throughout. Spring: BOLLI W/T starts in Basle. Summer: moved to Geneva. February, September and October, von SCHELIHA visits Switzerland. Attempt to send radio valves to Berlin from RADO's service. c.June BEURTON departs for U.K. 6.September: Cantonal Police raid RADOL'a flat. Transmitter removed outside Geneva. Unknown date: Italian information passed via Itslian and Swiss C.P.s to RADO. Unknown date: FOOTE contacts Anna MULLER	January: "Anna OUSPENSKAIA" landed in N.France with mission to re-establish W/T link between occupied France and U.S.S.R. TREPPER based on Paris with ROBINSON. Visited by Germaine SCHNEIDER as courier from JEFFREMOV in Belgium. Feb.-April: TREPPER uses French C.P. W/T link with Moscow. ?This in contact with Soviet Embassy, London. March: "RODIONOV" "Anna FROLOVA" and "DANILOV-DEPPER" dropped in France with W/T for group in Lyons and mission to establish link between unoccupied France and U.S.S.R. April: TREPPER starts up SOKOL W/T link from Paris to U.S.S.R. Spring: SUKOLOV sent to Marseilles where COREIN sets up branch of SINDIX. May: TREPPER starts up SPRINGER group in Lyons. June: The SOKOLS arrested by the Germans. TREPPER diverts traffic for U.S.S.R. to WENZEL in Belgium till June 30. July: G.SCHNEIDER warns TREPPER of WENZEL's arrest and is sent to SPRINGER group in Lyons. TREPPER resumes French C.P. W/T link with U.S.S.R. and ? Soviet Embassy, London. Autumn: Germans arrest SINDIX officials in Paris; capture TREPPER who offers to collaborate; capture ROESSLER. November 12th; SUKOLOV arrested in Marseilles. SPRINGER, G. SCHNEIDER etc. etc. arrested. December 25th: Beginning of TREPPER (KIPPER) play-back. A few weeks after his arrest TREPPER smuggles out full report to woman agent who presumably passes it to U.S.S.R. by French C.P. W/T link.	Possible existence of unidentified agent working to Soviet Embassy, London. Possible contact between TREPPER and Soviet Embassy, London, by French C.P. W/T. July: BEURTON returns to England. SPRINGHALL exploiting British Communist Party intelligence for Soviet Embassy, London.	Jan: Alfred KNOCHEL leaves Holland for intelligence mission in Germany with link to GOUDLOOZE. Jan: TREPPER meets JEFFREMOV by R.U. appointment at the SCHNEIDERS' house, Brussels. JEFFREMOV takes over SUKOLOV's Low Countries network. ? J. has W/T contact with Moscow through WINTERINK. May: WENZEL in W/T contact with Moscow for JEFFREMOV and (June) for TREPPER. June 21: KRUTT junior dropped in Holland with W/T; he makes contact with GOUWLOOZE. June 24: KRUTT senior dropped in Belgium. Arrested by Germans June 30. June 30: WENZEL and W/T captured by Germans. G.SCHNEIDER arrested but released and flees to TREPPER in Paris. July: JEFFREMOV arrested and turned by Germans. WENZEL turned. August: WINTERINK arrested. August: Beginning of WENZEL (ORIDE) W/T play-back. September: Beginning of WINTERINK (CANOE) W/T play-back. October: Beginning of JEFFREMOV (BOSHE-PASCAL) play-back. October: Beginning of ISHEVSKI (BOSHE-BOB) W/T play-back. Autumn: arrest of SINDIX officials. Unknown date: GOUWLOOZE provides KRUTT junior with DE LAAR who makes W/T contact with Moscow. November 17: WENZEL escapes and disappears. November: Van PRAAGH leaves Holland to join KNOCHEL in Berlin. November 30: KIEN dropped in Holland, but has no contact with GOUWLOOZE till March 1943.	January: Alfred KNOCHEL from Holland to Germany. Works on K.P.D. intelligence from Berlin. Failure of either SCHULZE-BOYSEN or HARNACK groups to make W/T contact with R.U. S-B supplying JEFFREMOV in Belgium by courier. HARNACK links with Soviet Embassy, Stockholm, via K.P.D. Hamburg. STOEHR and von SCHELIHA sources sterile for lack of link. Von SCHELIHA pays three visits to Switzerland. Spring: Parachute reinforcements for German network and attempts to set up W/T links. August: SCHULZE-BOYSEN group arrested. HARNACK group arrested. September: Ilse STOEHR arrested. September: Beginning of HARTH (ALTMEIER) W/T play-back. October: Beginning of HOEHLER (H.H.KNOCHEL) W/T play-back. October 29: Von SCHELIHA arrested. November: Van PROOSIJ joins KNOCHEL in Berlin. December: Beginning of KUENZEL (BAER) W/T play-back.	Jan - August: link from HARNACK to Soviet Embassy, Stockholm, passes through K.P.D. Hamburg, Flensburg etc. ?August: Material sent through unknown link to Soviet Embassy Stockholm from SCHULZE-BOYSEN just before his arrest on warning from HOLLMANN. Unknown date: Moscow enlists FOOTE's assistance in an attempt to send W/T set to girl in Swedish Red Cross. FOOTE fails.	? July: Message sent from Bulgaria (?Sofia) to Moscow reporting the compromise of communications by WENZEL's arrest in Belgium c.f. story of compromised agents escaping from TREPPER's network to Sofia. By November 12 W/T links observed by Germans operating from STOINOFF/MIRTCHEFF group in Bulgaria to Moscow and Tiflis.	Unknown date: Italian information supplied to RADO through Italian and Swiss C.P.'s. Unknown date: FOOTE receives false passport in the name of SCHNEIDER from Italy for renewal through Anna MULLER. Later identified passport photograph with man reported in Italian press to have been arrested for espionage in Italy. After August: ?complicity of German diplomat at Rome in SCHULZE-BOYSEN revelations.		

YEAR	SWITZERLAND	FRANCE	BRITISH ISLES	LOW COUNTRIES	GERMANY, AUSTRIA & CZECHOSLOVAKIA	SCANDINAVIA	BALKANS	ITALY	SPAIN & PORTUGAL	WESTERN HEMISPHERE
1943.	W/T links with Moscow from FOOTE, HAMEL and BOLLI (intermittent). Spring: Anna MÜLLER enticed into Germany and arrested. April: FOOTE's rendezvous with bogus courier (Gestapo substitute) from France. July: Moscow warns RADO of MANOLO's arrest and Gestapo attack on Swiss network. October: HAMEL and BOLLI arrested by Swiss. November 19: FOOTE arrested by Swiss. November: Swiss W/T play-back begins. November: DUBENDORFER appeals for help to RABINOWITCH.	TREPPER (KIFFEL) W/T play-back in operation. March: Beginning of SUKOLOV (HARO) W/T play-back. Receipt of Moscow message re OZOLS on MANS line. June: French C.P. W/T station at Le Malzoy captured by Germans. Evidence found of intelligence contact with U.K. (?Soviet Embassy,London) and political contact with Switzerland. Failure of play-back. July 4: Moscow shows knowledge of German penetration in France in warnings to Switzerland. July: SUKOLOV links up with OZOLS. August: Moscow proposes on KIFFEL line to send an agent to Paris (triple-cross operation). September 1st: TREPPER escapes. Gives Claude SPAAK message to be forwarded by French C.P. to Soviet Military Attaché London. c.December 10: French C.P. W/T station At Cholzy le Roi captured by Germans. Evidence found of contact with Comintern, Switzerland and England.	Possible existence of unidentified agent working to Soviet Embassy,London. Possible contact between Soviet Embassy, London, and French C.P. W/T. June 17: SPRINGALL arrested in espionage for Soviet Embassy,London. September: ?Soviet Embassy,London, receives news of TREPPER's escape via SPAAK, GROUBINEK and French C.P. W/T (?Cholzy le Roi).	WENZEL (WILLI), WINTERINK (CANNO) JEFREMOV (BUCHE-PASCAL) and TSE-TSAI (BUCHE-BOB) W/T play-backs in operation. March: CUHN links up with GOUDLOOZE and is passed by G. to KRUYT Junior. De LAAR returns to GOUDLOOZE. July 28: CUHN and KRUYT arrested by Germans. KRUYT later released. November: GOUDLOOZE arrested.	BARTH (AMATEUR) play-back continues. February: End of DUBENDORFER (G.P. BERLIN) W/T play-back. March: Beginning of Erna ELMER (BISONE) W/T play-back. March: CUHN proposed for Germany from Low Countries, but project abandoned. ?ENGELS and Van PROOSDY had been arrested by Germans in early 1943. Spring: Hans MÜLLER arrested, Anna MÜLLER enticed out of Switzerland and arrested. End of year: Capture of Russian W/T agent in Bohemia leads to German play-back.		January: Germans succeed in reading the cipher of STOINOFF/MIRTSCHEFF service in Bulgaria. February: STOINOFF/MIRTSCHEFF W/T station at Varna, Bulgaria seized by Germans. Seven other S/M W/T stations captured by Germans, leaving W/T contact between Moscow and Soviet Legation, Sofia. MILKA W/T play-back begun, but Moscow fully warned beforehand on other lines. Triple-cross. One agent from STOINOFF/MIRTSCHEFF network escapes to Russia.	Autumn: Italian information service probably put off from Moscow by arrests of FOOTE etc. in Switzerland.	Autumn: C.P. W/T service discovered by Portuguese near Lisbon.	November: RABINOWITCH of I.L.O. Montreal receives letter from DUBEN - DORFER asking for help. December: RABINOWITCH telephones PAVLOV at Soviet Embassy, Ottawa.
1944.	January: DUBENDORFER cables RABINOWITCH in Canada. March: Second letter from DUBENDORFER to RABINOWITCH. April: Swiss W/T play-back peters out. June: DUBENDORFER etc. arrested by Swiss. July: RABINOWITCH and Soviet Embassy, Ottawa, arrange for funds to be sent from New York to Switzerland. August: Funds from New York acknowledged by ABRAMSON. September: FOOTE released on bail. September: RADO and wife escape to France. November: FOOTE leaves for Paris.	c.January: OZOLS puts SUKOLOV in touch with LEHMANN. May: ROBINSON reported to have been working as U.A. in S.France. July: JEFREMOV (BUCHE-PASCAL) W/T play-back transferred from Belgium to Paris and amalgamated with TREPPER (KIFFEL) play-back etc. SUKOLOV and JEFREMOV kept in same house. August: SUKOLOV evacuated with Sonderkommando from Paris to Alsace. September: RADO and wife arrive in France. November: FOOTE and RADO interviewed by Soviet Military Mission in Paris (NOVIKOV).	Possible existence of unidentified agent working to Soviet Embassy,London.	Feb - March: ? end of WELTE play-back. March-April: TANGE play-back closed down on Moscow's advice. July: BUCHE-BOB play-back closed down. July: JEFREMOV (BUCHE-PASCAL) play-back transferred to Paris and amalgamated with KIFFEL etc.	March: End of AMATEUR play-back. August: SUKOLOV and Sonderkommando arrive in Germany. August: JEFREMOV arrives in Germany.				April: Visit of PAVLOV to Spain.	January: RABINOWITCH receives cable from DUBENDORFER. March: RABINOWITCH receives second letter from DUBENDORFER. April: RABINOWITCH telephones Soviet Embassy, Ottawa. Soviet Military Attache (ZAROUIN) takes over case. (July(?)) Funds transmitted by Soviet Embassy, Ottawa, and RABINOWITCH etc. to Switzerland (ABRAMSON) through HELBEIN Watch Company. August: Receipt of funds acknowledged by ABRAMSON.
1945.	April: Waldemar VON PETRO under alias PANTITZ receives letter from P. PANTATTI of Madrid mentioning "our friend Anniballi". End July: DUBENDORFER jumps her bail and escapes to France.	January: TREPPER, RADO and FOOTE embark under aliases in Paris for journey by air to Moscow. RADO takes French leave in Cairo. TREPPER and FOOTE arrive in Moscow. End July: DUBENDORFER arrives in France.	Possible existence of unidentified agent working to Soviet Embassy, London.		February: SUKOLOV and Sonderkommando transferred to Black Forest. March: Last news of SUKOLOV in Berlin.				April: P.PANTATTI of Madrid writes to Waldemar VON PETRO @ PANTITZ in Switzerland mentioning "our friend Anniballi".	September 5: GOUDLOOZE leaves Soviet Embassy in Ottawa with stolen papers.